IMPORTANT POINT
Duty of appellate court.

Judgment :-

Dipak Misra, J.

[CRL.M.P. NO. 24427 OF 2012]

This is an application for grant of permission to file Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India for assailing the judgment and order dated 4.7.2012 passed in Government Appeal No. 3432 of 2011 by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the Bench declined to entertain the appeal directed against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar in S.T. No. 944 of 2007 wherein the accused persons faced trial for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 328, 323, 506, 368 and 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”).

2. On a perusal of the material on record, there cannot be any dispute that the appellant was the complainant and the real aggrieved party. Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, she has sought permission to prefer the special leave petition. Regard being had to the essential constitutional concept of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as has been stated in Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [(1979) 2 SCC 297] and the pronouncement by the Constitution Bench in P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [(1980) 3 SCC 141] where the assail was to the decision in Arunachalam (supra) under Article 32, we allow the application and permit the applicant to prosecute the Special Leave Petition. The Crl.M.P. No. 24427 of 2012 is accordingly disposed of.

3. Leave granted.

4. The spinal issue that has spiralled to this Court is whether the appeal preferred by the Government questioning the legal substantiality of the judgment of acquittal could have been dismissed by the High Court in such a manner as it has been done.

5. At this juncture, it is apposite to state that the complainant had filed Appeal No. 1674 of 2011 which has also been dismissed by another Division Bench on the foundation that when the Government Appeal had already met its fate of dismissal, there was no justification to entertain the said appeal. No fault can be found in the order passed by the Division Bench dealing with the appeal preferred by the complainant as that cannot survive after the Coordinate Bench had given the stamp of imprimatur to the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge in the Government Appeal. Hence, the prayer has been restricted and, rightly so, by the learned counsel for the appellant to the assail of the judgment passed in the Government Appeal.

6. To dwell upon the seminal issue, it is seemly to reproduce the judgment passed by the High Court in appeal. It reads thus: -

“The learned trial Judge has discussed elaborately the evidence of PW1, the prosecutrix, which appears at pages 12 to 20 of the judgment in the light of submissions of the defence and we are satisfied that it could not be a case under any of the sections for which the accused had been charged and tried. The judgment herein suffers from no perversity and, as such, the appeal is dismissed.”

7. It is urged by Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, learned counsel for the complainant-appellant, that it is obligatory on the part of the High Court while dealing with an appeal to ascribe reasons and not to dismiss it in a cryptic manner. He would further submit that reference to certain paragraphs of the judgment of the trial Court would not clothe the decision of the High Court to be reflective of appreciation and reason but, on the contrary, it would still be an apology for reason which the law does not countenance.

8. The issue that emerges for consideration is whether the aforesaid delineation by the High Court in appeal can be treated to be informed with reason. At this stage, we think it apt to refer to certain authorities of this Court where there has been illumined enunciation of law as regards the duty of the High Court while dealing with criminal appeals, whether it may be an appeal preferred by the Government or an application for leave to appeal by the complainant