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1961 Supreme(SC) 259

SUPREME COURT
KUMARAYYA, J.
P. M. Deshpande and another - Petitioners
v.
Ferro Alloys Corporation and R.B. Sree Ram and Co., Private Ltd., Srikakulam and another - Respondents
Criminal Revn. Case No. 814 of 1961 and Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 722 of 1961, from order of Prl. Sessions Court, Hyderabad
Decided on: 24-7-1961

Advocates Appeared:
S. Suryaprakasam and M. Satyanarayana Reddy, for Petitioners;
K. Srinivasamurthy, for 1st Respondent;
C. Padmanabha Reddy for Public Prosecutor, for the State (2nd Respondent).

Persons who become members of a union after a settlement agreement is reached are not bound by the agreement and cannot be held liable for breach of the agreement under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - SECTION 27, 29 - STRIKE - SETTLEMENT - BINDING NATURE - PENAL LIABILITY - INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS - INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, members of a union, were convicted under Sections 27 and 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act for instigating a strike in breach of a settlement agreement. The agreement was signed by the union and the management during conciliation proceedings and was binding on all parties to the dispute. The petitioners argued that they were not parties to the agreement as they were not members of the union at the time of the settlement.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the petitioners were not bound by the settlement agreement as they were not parties to the industrial dispute at the time of the settlement. The court interpreted Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which specifies the persons bound by a settlement agreement, and found that it did not include persons who became members of the union after the settlement was reached. The court also held that Section 29 of the Act, which imposes penal liability for breach of a settlement agreement, could not be applied to the petitioners as they were not parties to the agreement.

Issues: 1. Whether the petitioners were bound by the settlement agreement. 2. Whether the petitioners could be held liable under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act for breach of the settlement agreement.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and found that it did not include persons who became members of the union after the settlement was reached. Therefore, the petitioners were not bound by the settlement agreement. 2. The court held that Section 29 of the Act, which imposes penal liability for breach of a settlement agreement, could not be applied to the petitioners as they were not parties to the agreement.

Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition and acquitted the petitioners of the charges under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The convictions and sentences of the court below under Section 27 were upheld.

ORDER

The petitioners have been convicted by the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad-Cum-Special First Class Magistrate Hyderabad, for contravention of the provisions of Sections 27 and 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and sentenced to imprisonment and also to fine. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, giving benefit of doubt to accused-1 acquitted him of an offence under Section 29 and upheld the conviction of A.2 under that Section and of both the accused on the other count, but maintained only the sentence of fine awarded to the accused. The petitioners have, therefore, come up to this Court invoking its revisionary powers. Petitioner No. 1 P.M. Deshpande is the Executive Member of the FACOR and Sree R.B. Sreeram Workers' Union and the 2nd petitioner is the President of the said Union. There was a strike from 24-9-1960 to 1-10-1960 of the FACOR and R.B. Sree Ram and Company (Private) Ltd. The case of the prosecution is that there was a settlement during the course of the conciliation on 30-9-1959 to which the FACOR and R.B. Sree Ram and Company Workers' Union and also the management were parties and thereunder the Union had agreed not to resort to any strike or to any direct action in future and agreed that disputes, if any, which might arise in future would be settled by negotiation and conciliation. It was further agreed that the Union would maintain industrial peace for a period of three years from the date and would not raise any demands including increase in wages, in any form and in dearness allowance etc., for the said period commencing from 30-9-1959. This settlement was duly signed by the parties and also the Labour Conciliation Officer. A report was sent to the appropriate Government along with the memo of agreement signed by the parties. The prosecution contends that the terms of this agreement were fully acted upon by the Management, but the Union and the Workers could not be as good as their word, and that at the instigation of the accused, a strike was staged in breach of the settlement making fresh demands. Thus, it is said that the accused petitioners herein, incurred the penalties under Sections 27 and 29 of the Act. The action was initiated at the instance of the Management, who after obtaining the requisite authorities from the Government lodged their complaint with the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal, who happens to be appointed Special Magistrate under Notification G. O. Ms. No. 1517 dated 4-7-1959 with all the powers of a First Class Magistrate for the purposes of trying offences under the Labour enactments in the entire State of Andhra Pradesh. The accused took up several pleas challenging the propriety of the sanction given and also the legality of the action taken against them. All their pleas were rejected. The appellate Court agreed with the findings of the learned Chairman on. all the above points. The same points which have been unsuccessfully urged before the Court below have been reiterated in this revision petition.

2. The first point urged relates to the, jurisdiction of the Tribunal to take cognizance of the matter. It was argued that there was no proper vesting of authority in the Tribunal as contemplated by Section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because the powers conferred under the notification were not on a particular person by name, nor for a particular area in any of the Districts. This contention, having regard to the provisions of Sections 14 and 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is devoid of merit. Before I consider the above provisions of law, it may be necessary to refer the wording of the Notification which had conferred powers on the Tribunal. It reads thus :-

"In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act V of 1898) and in supersession of the notification of Home Department No. 686, dated the 24th October, 1958, published at page 2815 of the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, dated 13-11-1958, the Governor o



























































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