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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI & J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.
Keshar Bai – Appellant
Versus
Chhunulal – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 106 of 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5126 of 2011]
Decided On : 07-01-2014
(2008) 8 SCC 497; (2005) 12 SCC 239; (2012) 3 SCC 319 - Relied upon
(2012) 8 SCC 584 - Relied upon impliedly
(b) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 - Section 12(1)(c) r/w section Section 111(g), Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Act injurious to interests of landlord - Denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant - Act likely to affect the interest of the landlord adversely and substantially. (Para 11)
(2005) 7 SCC 653; (2002) 3 SCC 375; AIR 1965 SC 1923 - Relied upon
(c) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 - Section 12(1)(c) r/w section 116, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Denial of title of landlord should be anterior to institution of eviction proceedings - After institution of eviction suit it constitutes a ground for eviction - Question of title cannot be decided finally in eviction proceedings although the question may be gone into incidentally (Paras 13 and 14)
(2006) 5 SCC 532; (1989) 4 SCC 732; (1988) 3 SCC 137 - Relied upon
(2010) 9 SCC 560 - Distinguished
Facts of the case:
The appellant purchased the suit house wherein the respondent was already living as tenant.
The landlord had introduced the appellant as ne landlady and the tenant had agreed to pay rent. However he did not pay rent and on default, after serving a notice, eviction suit was filed by the appellant.
The respondent denied the title of the appellant and landlord-tenant relationship. The eviction suit was decreed by the trial court and upheld by the first appellate court.
The High Court however reversed the judgment and dismissed the suit.
Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 falls for consideration in this appeal.
Finding of the Court:
The case if fully covered by Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
Result : Appeal disposed of.
Certainly. Here are the key points derived from the provided legal document:
The denial of the landlord’s title by the tenant after the institution of an eviction suit is a valid ground for eviction. This is particularly applicable when the tenant's denial affects the landlord's interests substantially and adversely (!) (!) .
The legal framework recognizes that denial of the landlord’s title or disclaimer of tenancy by the tenant is an act that can justify eviction, as it is likely to negatively impact the landlord’s interests. Such denial can be considered an act injurious to the landlord, especially when it occurs after the eviction proceedings have been initiated (!) .
The question of title can be raised and even contested in eviction proceedings; however, it cannot be finally decided within such proceedings. Instead, it may be incidental to the primary issue of eviction (!) (!) .
A tenant’s denial of the landlord’s title in their written statement is sufficient to establish a ground for eviction under the relevant law, even if such denial is made after the eviction suit is filed. The timing of the denial (whether anterior or posterior to the suit) is less critical than the fact of denial itself (!) (!) .
The legal position is that the courts should not disturb concurrent findings of fact unless there is perversity. In cases where the courts below have found that the tenant denied the landlord’s title, such findings are generally upheld unless proven otherwise (!) .
The question of landlord-tenant relationship and the existence of title are distinct; the relationship can be established independently of the final adjudication of ownership. The primary focus in eviction proceedings is on the relationship and conduct of the tenant, not solely on the ultimate title (!) .
The issue of title is often considered incidentally and cannot be conclusively decided in eviction proceedings. Final determination of ownership requires a separate suit, and such incidental findings in eviction cases do not bar subsequent claims or proceedings related to title (!) .
The legal principles emphasize that a tenant’s act of denying the landlord’s title, especially when done unequivocally, can be a sufficient ground for eviction, provided it substantially affects the landlord’s interests (!) .
Courts have consistently held that the denial or disclaimer of title by a tenant, especially when unequivocal, justifies eviction, as it constitutes a breach of the landlord-tenant relationship and affects the landlord’s rights (!) .
The courts should uphold the findings of the lower courts regarding denial of title unless there is a clear perversity or error. In such cases, the courts should restore the eviction decree if it was based on valid grounds like denial of title (!) .
These points collectively highlight that in eviction proceedings, a tenant’s denial of the landlord’s title—whether made in pleadings, evidence, or conduct—can serve as a legitimate and substantive ground for eviction, and such findings are to be respected unless proven to be perverse.
Judgment :-
Mrs. Ranjana Prakash Desai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by grant of special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated 03/08/2010 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore allowing Second Appeal No. 756 of 2004 filed by the respondent.
3. Briefly put, the facts are that the appellant-landlady purchased House No. 1/2, Street No. 6, Parsi Mohallah, Indore (‘the said building’) from M/s. Pyare Mohan Khar, Hari Mohan Khar, Shayam Sunder Khar and Anil Khar predecessors-in-title of the appellant by a registered sale deed dated 26/9/1991 for a consideration of Rs. 1,70,000/-. At the time of purchase of the said building, the respondent-tenant was occupying one room (‘suit premises’) situated on the rear side of the said building as tenant. The respondent was informed by the predecessors-in-title of the appellant that the appellant is the new landlady of the said building and he should pay the rent to her. The respondent agreed to pay the rent but failed to pay it. Failure of the respondent to pay the rent resulted in a notice being sent by the appellant to him on 23/11/2002, but despite the notice the respondent did not pay the rent.
4. On 06/1/2003, the appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respondent under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (‘the M.P. Act’) on grounds of non-payment of rent, denial of the appellant’s title by the respondent, bona fide need for residential purpose and reconstruction of the said building as it had become unsafe for human habitation. It was specifically averred in the plaint that the appellant had purchased the said building vide a registered document on 26/9/1991.
5. The respondent contested the said suit and filed a written statement denying the title of the appellant as well as the grounds on which his eviction from the suit premises was sought. The respondent denied that there was any attornement between the parties and that there was a landlord-tenant relationship between him and the appellant. He claimed to be tenant of the earlier landlord Shri Khar. He contended that he had never paid any rent to the appellant. He denied the genuineness of the registered sale deed dated 26/9/1991.
6. The trial court decreed the suit under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. The suit was dismissed so far as the other grounds are concerned. The trial court’s judgment was confirmed by the first appellate court. The High Court by the impugned order set aside the eviction decree passed by the courts below holding that in the facts of the case no decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Act could be passed. The controversy, therefore, revolves around Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act in the context of the facts of this case.
7. Shri Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that both the courts having concurrently found that the landlord was entitled to a decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act and since there was no perversity attached to the said finding, the High Court ought not to have interfered with it while dealing with a second appeal, particularly, when there was no substantial question of law involved in the matter. In this connection, he relied on Deep Chandra Juneja v. Lajwanti Kathuria (dead) through LRs. [(2008) 8 SCC 497], Yash Pal v. Ram Lal & Ors. [(2005) 12 SCC 239] and Firojuddin & Anr. v. Babu Singh [(2012) 3 SCC 319]. Mr. Prasad submitted that it is clearly established from the evidence on record that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant and, therefore, the case clearly falls within the ambit of Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. The eviction decree was, therefore, correctly passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court. In this connection he relied on Devasahyam v. P. Savithramma [(2005) 7 SCC 653], State of Andgra Pradesh & Ors. v. D. Raghukul Pershad(dead) by LRs.& Ors. [(2012) 8 SCC 584] and Bhogadi Kannababu & Ors. v. Vuggina Pydamma & Ors. [(2006) 5
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