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2014 Supreme(SC) 303

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, Vikramajit Sen, JJ.
Shamim Bano – Appellant
Versus
Asraf Khan – Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.820 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 4377 of 2012)
Decided On : 16-04-2014

Important Point
Even if an application has been filed under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973.

Headnote:Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 – Section 125 – Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 – Section 3 – Whether the Muslim Divorced woman’s application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code is to be restricted to the date of divorce and, as an ancillary to it, because of filing of an application under Section 3 of Act,1986 after the divorce for grant of mahr and return of gifts would disentitle the appellant to sustain the application under Section 125 of the Code – During the pendency of appellant’s application under Section 125 of the Code the divorce took place – The wife preferred an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of mahr and return of articles – Magistrate, directed for return of the articles, payment of quantum of mahr and also thought it appropriate to grant maintenance for the Iddat period – Thus, in effect, no maintenance had been granted to the wife beyond the Iddat period – Even if an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of maintenance was filed, the parameters of Section 125 of the Code would have been made applicable – Quite apart from that, the application for grant of maintenance was filed prior to the date of divorce and hearing of the application continued – High Court held not correct in opining that when the appellant – wife filed application under Section 3 of the Act, she exercised her option – As the Magistrate still retains the power of granting maintenance under Section 125 of the Code to a divorced Muslim woman and the proceeding was continuing without any objection and the ultimate result would be the same, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to hold that the proceeding after the divorce took place was not maintainable – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside – Matter remitted to Magistrate for re – adjudication of the controversy in question – Appeal allowed(Paras 13 to 19)

       Facts of the Case

       Whether the Muslim Divorced woman’s application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code is to be restricted to the date of divorce and, as an ancillary to it, because of filing of an application under Section 3 of Act, 1986 after the divorce for grant of mahr and return of gifts would disentitle the appellant to sustain the application under Section 125 of the Code.

       Findings of the Court –

       A. High Court held that as the appellant had already taken recourse to Section 3 of the Act after divorce took place and obtained relief which had been upheld by High Court, application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code would only be maintainable till she was divorced.

       B. During the pendency of appellant’s application under Section 125 of the Code the divorce took place. The wife preferred an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of mahr and return of articles. Magistrate, directed for return of the articles, payment of quantum of mahr and also thought it appropriate to grant maintenance for the Iddat period. Thus, in effect, no maintenance had been granted to the wife beyond the Iddat period . Even if an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of maintenance was filed, the parameters of Section 125 of the Code would have been made applicable. Quite apart from that, the application for grant of maintenance was filed prior to the date of divorce and hearing of the application continued. High Court held not correct in opining that when the appellant – wife filed application under Section 3 of the Act, she exercised her option. As the Magistrate still retains the power of granting maintenance under Section 125 of the Code to a divorced Muslim woman and the proceeding was continuing without any objection and the ultimate result would be the same, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to hold that the proceeding after the divorce took place was not maintainable. Impugned judgment of High Court was set aside. Matter was remitted to Magistrate for re – adjudication of the controversy in question. Appeal was allowed

       Result – Appeal allowed

       

JUDGMENT

Dipak Misra, J. –

Leave granted.

2. The appellant, Shamim Bano, and the respondent, Asraf Khan, were married on 17.11.1993 according to the Muslim Shariyat law. As the appellant was meted with cruelty and torture by the husband and his family members regarding demand of dowry, she was compelled to lodge a report at the Mahila Thana, Durg, on 6.9.1994, on the basis of which a criminal case under Section 498 – A read with Section 34 IPC was initiated and, eventually, it was tried by the learned Magistrate at Rajnandgaon who acquitted the accused persons of the said charges.

3. Be it noted, during the pendency of the criminal case under Section 498 – A/34 IPC before the trial court, the appellant filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg for grant of maintenance on the ground of desertion and cruelty. While the application for grant of maintenance was pending, divorce between the appellant and the respondent took place on 5.5.1997. At that juncture, the appellant filed Criminal Case No. 56 of 1997 under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for brevity “the Act”) before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg. The learned Magistrate, who was hearing the application preferred under Section 125 of the Code, dismissed the same on 14.7.1999 on the ground that the appellant had not been able to prove cruelty and had been living separately and hence, she was not entitled to get the benefit of maintenance. The learned Magistrate, while dealing with the application preferred under Section 3 of the Act, allowed the application directing the husband and others to pay a sum of Rs.11,786/ – towards mahr, return of goods and ornaments and a sum of Rs.1,750/ – towards maintenance during the Iddat period.

4. Being grieved by the order not granting maintenance, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No. 275 of 1999 and the revisional court concurred with the view expressed by the learned Magistrate and upheld the order of dismissal. The aforesaid situation constrained the appellant to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the code in Misc. Crl. Case No. 188 of 2005. Before the High Court a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent – husband that the petition under Section 125 of the Code was not maintainable by a divorced woman without complying with the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Act. It was further put forth that initial action under Section 125 of the Code by the appellant – wife was tenable but the same deserved to be thrown overboard after she had filed an application under Section 3 of the Act for return of gifts and properties, for payment of mahr and also for grant of maintenance during the ‘Iddat’ period. It was also urged that the wife was only entitled to maintenance during the Iddat period and the same having been granted in the application, which was filed after the divorce, grant of any maintenance did not arise in exercise of power under Section 125 of the Code. Quite apart from the above, both the parties also had advanced certain contentions with regard to obtaining factual score.

5. The High Court, after referring to certain authorities, came to hold that a Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code even beyond the period of Iddat if she was unable to maintain herself; that where an application under Section 3 of the Act had already been moved, the applicability of the provisions contained in Sections 125 to 128 of the Code in the matter of claim of maintenance would depend upon exercise of statutory option by the divorced woman and her former husband by way of declaration either in the form of affidavit or in any other declaration in writing in such format as has been provided either jointly or separately that they would be preferred to be governed by the provisions of the Code; tha




















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