ORDER

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In this special leave petition, judgment and order dated 15/10/2004 passed by the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No.963 of 2001 is under challenge.

3. The appellant along with others was tried by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Coimbatore for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code ("the IPC"). The Sessions Court convicted the appellant and 2 others for offence punishable under Section 148 of the IPC and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each. The Sessions Court also convicted each of them for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life. The appellant along with the other 2 accused preferred an appeal to the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the said appeal. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant has approached this Court.

3. In the petition, there is no challenge to the conviction and sentence on merits. The only point raised is that the appellant was a juvenile when the offence was committed and, hence, he cannot be convicted. However, in the interest of justice, we have carefully perused the impugned judgment and the relevant record. We are of the considered opinion that the order of conviction and sentence is perfectly legal.

4. We must, therefore, look into the appellant's plea of juvenility. At the outset, we must mention that admittedly the plea of juvenility was not raised by the appellant in the trial court. It was for the first time raised in the High Court while the appeal was being argued. The High Court has noted in the impugned judgment that the plea of juvenility was neither raised before the trial court, nor raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court. The High Court noted that no application was filed before the High Court seeking permission to adduce evidence to establish that the appellant was a juvenile. The High Court, in the circumstances, rejected the plea.

5. The only question which now arises for consideration of this Court is whether the appellant was 'a juvenile' within the meaning of the term 'juvenile' as defined under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 ("the J.J. Act, 2000") when the offence was committed and whether the plea of juvenility can be raised by him at this stage.

6. Section 7-A states the procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court. Proviso to Section 7-A states that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the J.J. Act, 2000 and the rules made thereunder even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the J.J. Act, 2000.

In this Court, therefore, the counsel for the appellant has renewed the plea of juvenility. The case of the appellant is that as on 2/9/1997, when the offence was committed, he was 17 years and 4 months' old. Section 2(k) of the J.J. Act, 2000 defines 'juvenile' as a person who has not completed 18 years of age. Section 2(l) defines 'juvenile in conflict with law' as a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of such offence.

7. It is a settled position in law on a fair consideration of Section 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 of the J.J. Act, 2000 read with Rules 12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 ("the said Rules") that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1/4/2001, which is the date of commencement of J.J. Act, 2000 could be treated as juveniles even if the claim of juvenility