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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J. CHELAMESWAR, A.K. SIKRI, JJ.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. - APPELLANT
VERSUS
ARVIND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA & ORS. - RESPONDENT
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9849 OF 2014 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18639 OF 2012)
Decided on: 17-10-2014
(1997) 6 SCC 721; (1996) 6 SCC 267; (2006) 11 SCC 464; (2005) 13 SCC 300 – Relied upon
(1990) 3 SCC 157; (2008) 9 SCC 24; (1989) 2 SCC 356; (1989) 4 SCC 582 – Referred
(1985) 2 SCC 648; (2006) 2 SCC 747 – Distinguished
(b) Service law – Appointment – Selection process taking place in 1986 – Appointment orders issued and cancelled in 1987 – Respondents not challenging cancellation orders till 1996, for 9 years – Thus accepting cancellation of their appointments – Taking up matter after 9 years without any explanation for delay and latches only when some other persons got relief – By now 27 years have passed after issuance of cancellation orders – Totally unjust to direct their appointment after a period of 27 years when most of them would be almost 50 years of age or above. (Para 24)
Facts of the case:
In the year 1986 the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi, had advertised certain posts of Homeopathic Compounder and Ward Boys. Respondents herein applied for the said post and participated in the selection process. After the interviews, they were kept in the waiting list. Those who were in the select list were offered the appointments. Some of those candidates who were higher in merit and were offered the appointments did not join. For this reason, candidates in the waiting list were issued appointment letters by the then Chief Medical Officer. These included the respondents herein as well. However, before the respondents could join their duties, new Chief Medical Officer assumed the charge and blocked their joining. Thereafter, vide order dated June 22, 1987 he even cancelled the said appointments made by his predecessor for these Class-III and Class-IV posts i.e. Homeopathic Compounder and Ward Boys.
The respondents filed suit challenging the aforesaid orders cancelling their appointments by the new Chief Medical Officer. This suit was dismissed for non-prosecution. The respondents herein did not take any further steps in the said suit either by filing application for restoration of the suit or challenging the said order in appeal.
A few other candidates who were also affected by the same orders whereby their appointments were cancelled, approached the Tribunal challenging the legality, validity and proprietary of the said order on several grounds. The Tribunal decided the case in their favour holding the impugned order as illegal and void and quashed the same.
Challenge to this order failed up to Supreme Court.
The persons who had approached the Tribunal got the appointments.
The respondents herein waited till the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in the year 1994. Only thereafter, in the year 1995, the respondents filed petition for giving appointments to them as well on the strength of the judgment of the Tribunal given in the case of other persons, claiming parity. This petition was rejected by the Chief Medical Officer. Against this rejection the respondents approached the Tribunal by filing Claim Petition. The said petition was allowed by the Tribunal on the ground that they were in the same position in which the other successful candidates were given relief and as such these respondents were also be entitled to the same relief.
The High Court has affirmed the order of the Tribunal.
Finding of the Court:
Case of the respondents suffers from unexplained laches and delays as well as acquiescence. It would be totally unjust to direct their appointment after a period of 27 years when most of them would be almost 50 years of age or above.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Key Points: - Normal rule: similarly situated persons should not be treated differently; extending benefit to others is required to avoid Article 14 discrimination (!) . - Exceptions: laches, delays, and acquiescence can bar extension of benefits to belated applicants (!) . - When judgment is in rem, benefits may be extended to all similarly situated persons regardless of who approached Court (!) . - In present case, respondents delayed 9 years to challenge cancellation of appointments; Court held disproportionate to grant relief 27 years later, citing laches and age considerations (!) (!) . - Tribunals/Courts have extended or denied relief in various cases depending on whether parties acted promptly, the presence of finality, and whether the judgment was general (in rem) or targeted (in personam) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The decision overruling earlier tribunals/high court relief to belated applicants based on delay and acquiescence, while emphasizing that cases with in rem judgments may impose broader obligations (!) (!) . - References to several illustrative judgments establishing the framework for extending benefits to similarly situated employees, including Inder Pal Yadav, K.C. Sharma, and others cited in the judgment (!) (!) . - The present judgment ultimately allows the appeal, reversing prior extensions of relief to the belated respondents due to nine-year delay and long subsequent time lapse (!) .
No. Those who remained dormant for nine years, accepted the cancellation, and only approached the court after seeing their counterparts succeed are treated as fence-sitters and cannot claim the benefit of the earlier judgment. (Para 23 , 24 )
Yes. If the judgment is in rem and intended to benefit all similarly situated persons, the obligation falls on authorities to extend the benefit to all. If in personam, the claimant must satisfy that their petition does not suffer from laches, delay, or acquiescence. (Para 23 )
Yes. The principle of equality is subject to well-recognized exceptions of laches, delays, and acquiescence. Unexplained delay of nine years and acquiescence in the cancellation of appointments bars the claim despite the general rule of equal treatment. (Para 23 , 24 )
Yes. The respondents accepted the cancellation of their appointments and remained dormant for nine years without taking any steps, which amounts to acquiescence and waiver, precluding them from claiming relief. (Para 24 )
Judgment
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Leave granted.
2) This appeal, preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh and its functionaries, assails the order of the High Court whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants has been dismissed and the order of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (for short, 'the Tribunal') passed in favour of the respondents herein, is affirmed.
3) To mention at the outset, the Tribunal as well as the High Court has given the respondents herein benefit of the order passed by the Court in earlier round of litigation filed by similarly situated persons. The appellants contend that as far as these respondents are concerned, they never approached the Court seeking such a relief and were only fence-sitters and, therefore, relief should not have been granted to them even if they were similarly situated as those persons who have been granted relief in the petitions filed by them. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that once it is found that both sets of persons are identically placed, the impugned orders granting them the same benefit are in tune with the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
4) Such a situation has not occurred for the first time in the present appeal. There are many decisions of this Court. If outcome alone of those judgments is seen, one would find that in some cases the Courts have extended the benefit to the similarly situated persons, whereas, in some other cases similar benefit is denied to the second set of people who approached the Court subsequently. However, on delving deep into the rationale and reasoning of these two sets of cases, one is able to mentally recognise the logic behind different outcomes. Under what circumstances such a benefit can be extended and what are the reasons for denying the same, shall be discerned after taking note of those judgments. But, before undertaking that exercise, it would be apt to take note of the facts of this case in order to understand and appreciate as to how the respondents are placed.
5) It was sometime in the year 1986 that the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi, had advertised certain posts of Homeopathic Compounder and Ward Boys in various newspapers. Respondents herein applied for the said post and participated in the selection process. After the interviews, they were kept in the waiting list. Those who were in the select list were offered the appointments. Some of those candidates who were higher in merit and were offered the appointments did not join. For this reason, candidates in the waiting list were issued appointment letters by the then Chief Medical Officer. These included the respondents herein as well. However, before the respondents could join their duties, new Chief Medical Officer assumed the charge and blocked their joining. Thereafter, vide order dated June 22, 1987 he even cancelled the said appointments made by his predecessor for these Class-III and Class-IV posts i.e. Homeopathic Compounder and Ward Boys.
6) The respondents filed the suit in the Court of City Munsif, Varanasi challenging the aforesaid orders dated June 22, 1987 cancelling their appointments by the new Chief Medical Officer. This suit was registered as Suit No. 695/1987. It appears that this suit could not be taken to its logical conclusion as same was dismissed for non-prosecution because of non appearance of the advocate of the respondents. The respondents herein did not take any further steps in the said suit either by filing application for restoration of the suit or challenging the said order in appeal. In fact, there was a complete quietus on the part of these respondents.
7) It so happened that a few other candidates who were also affected by the same orders dated June 22, 1987, whereby their appointments were cancelled, approached the Tribunal challenging the legality, validity and proprietary of the said order on several grounds. One of the grounds taken was that before cancellation of their appointments,
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