Key Points: - Normal rule: similarly situated persons should not be treated differently; extending benefit to others is required to avoid Article 14 discrimination (!) . - Exceptions: laches, delays, and acquiescence can bar extension of benefits to belated applicants (!) . - When judgment is in rem, benefits may be extended to all similarly situated persons regardless of who approached Court (!) . - In present case, respondents delayed 9 years to challenge cancellation of appointments; Court held disproportionate to grant relief 27 years later, citing laches and age considerations (!) (!) . - Tribunals/Courts have extended or denied relief in various cases depending on whether parties acted promptly, the presence of finality, and whether the judgment was general (in rem) or targeted (in personam) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The decision overruling earlier tribunals/high court relief to belated applicants based on delay and acquiescence, while emphasizing that cases with in rem judgments may impose broader obligations (!) (!) . - References to several illustrative judgments establishing the framework for extending benefits to similarly situated employees, including Inder Pal Yadav, K.C. Sharma, and others cited in the judgment (!) (!) . - The present judgment ultimately allows the appeal, reversing prior extensions of relief to the belated respondents due to nine-year delay and long subsequent time lapse (!) .

What is the extent to which the ratio of earlier judgments can be applied to similarly situated persons in service matters, considering laches, delays, and acquiescence?

What is the impact of delay, laches, and acquiescence on extending benefits to similarly situated employees when earlier judgments were in rem versus in personam?

What are the principles governing extension of relief to similarly situated persons in service jurisprudence when petitions are filed belatedly?