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1916 Supreme(SC) 30

Privy Council
Sir Arthur Channell, Lord Parmoor , Lord Sumner, Justice Lord Parker of Waddington, JJ.
Bolivar Probate -Appellant
Versus
Divorce, and Admiralty Division. -Resopndent
On appeal from the High Court of Justice
Decided On : 17-05-1916

Important Points

The court possesses an inherent discretionary power to set aside its own judgments of condemnation to allow bona fide claims by unheard parties to prevent substantial injustice, provided the application is made promptly or the delay is reasonably justified.

Subject

Admiralty Law - Procedural Law

Act Referred

Headnote

(A) Inherent Power of Court - Power to set aside judgments of condemnation - The Court possesses an inherent power to set aside its own judgments of condemnation to allow bona fide claims by parties who have not been heard and who had no opportunity of appearing, provided that substantial injustice would otherwise result - This power is discretionary and should be exercised only where substantial injustice would occur if the decree were allowed to stand and where the application for relief has been promptly made.

(B) Delay in Application - Reasonableness of delay - Where applicants await the result of actions taken by a government official on their behalf before instituting further proceedings, such delay is not unreasonable and should not be a ground for refusing relief.

Facts of the case:
An application to set aside a judgment of condemnation was refused by the lower court on the ground of delay. The applicants had been awaiting the outcome of actions taken by a government official who had submitted papers to a claims committee on their behalf before pursuing further legal remedies.

Findings of Court:
The lower court's refusal of relief based on delay was improper because it was not unreasonable for the applicants to have awaited the result of the official's actions before initiating further proceedings.

Issues: Whether the court has the inherent power to set aside its own judgments of condemnation to prevent substantial injustice and whether the delay in the application for relief was unreasonable.

Ratio Decidendi: The court holds an inherent discretionary power to set aside judgments of condemnation to permit bona fide claims from unheard parties to avoid substantial injustice, provided the application is prompt; waiting for the result of official government actions constitutes a reasonable justification for delay.

Result: Appeal allowed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • practice and procedure
    • inherent powers of the court
      • setting aside judgments
    • prize law
      • condemnation proceedings

Advocates Appeared:
Thomas Cooper and Co., serving , G. T. Simons, A. B. Marten , C. R. Dunlop, R. Finlay

Lord Parker of Waddington.:—

Where substantial injustice would otherwise result, the Court has, in their Lordships' opinion, an inherent power to set aside its own judgments of condemnation so as to let in bona fide claims by parties who have not in fact been heard, and who have had no opportunity of appearing. This power is discretionary, and should not be exercised except where there would be substantial injustice if the decree in question were allowed to stand, and where the application for relief has been promptly made. In the present case the learned President has refused the relief on the ground of delay, apparently under the impression that the appellants invoked the assistance of the Prize Claims Committee, whereas in fact the papers were sent to that Committee by the Procurator-General. It was not, under the circumstances, unreasonable for the appellants to have awaited the result of what the Procurator-General was doing before instituting further proceedings in the matter.

Their Lordships therefore think that the proper order would be to allow the appeal and remit the summons to the Court below, with leave to the appellants to amend it in such manner as they may be advised, and file the proper evidence in support thereof.

With regard to the costs of this appeal, their Lordships are of opinion that no costs should be allowed on either side. The costs below will be dealt with by the President on the further hearing of the summons.

Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

Appeal allowed.

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