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1919 Supreme(SC) 23
Privy Council
Shaw of Dunfermline, Lords Dunedin , Finlay, Justice Viscounts Haldane, JJ.
Lennon -Appellant
Versus
Gibson and Howes, Limited -Resopndent
On Appeal From The High Court of Australia
Decided On : 02-05-1919
Important Points
Subject
Taxation Law - Statutory Interpretation
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Statutory Interpretation - Definition of "Cane-grower" - Contextual application - Where a statute provides a definition "unless the context otherwise indicates," the natural meaning of general words in a specific section should prevail if the context, such as the purpose of a fund for the benefit of the industry as a whole, prevents an artificially limited meaning.
Facts of the case:
A mill-owner, who both grew their own sugar-cane and purchased cane from others, refused to pay a statutory levy on the tonnage of cane grown by themselves. The mill-owner contended that the term "received at a mill" implied cane that was sold and taken delivery of, thereby excluding cane grown on lands belonging to the mill-owner.
Findings of Court:
The levy is imposed on the actual tonnage received at the mill. While the statute allows the mill-owner to deduct the assessment from the price paid to third-party growers, a mill-owner who is also a grower simply bears the cost. The purpose of the fund is to support the industry's general administration, including analysis and inspectorate, which benefits all participants.
Issues: Whether the refusal to pay the assessment on self-grown cane was justified, specifically whether "sugar-cane received at a mill" includes cane grown by the mill-owner.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that "received" must be interpreted according to its natural meaning, regardless of the source of the cane. The definition of "cane-grower" used for board representation was inapplicable to the levy section, as the latter deals with the promotion of the industry as a whole rather than the rival interests of growers and mill-owners.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Dutton, Blyth, Leese, Freshfield , Havman, F. Russell, Micklethwait, J.T. Ryan , Blyth, Hartley , John Simon
This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Australia, dated 20th December, 1917, upon a special case stated by consent of parties. The judgment of the Full Court of Queensland was pronounced in favour of the appellant on 9th October, 1917, but was reversed by the High Court.
As appearing from the special case the facts are simple. The appellant is the Minister of the Crown charged with the administration of the REGULATION OF SUGAR-CANE PRICES ACT of 1915. The respondents, a joint stock company, carry on in Queensland the business of mill-owners, manufacturers and refiners of sugar. About half of their sugar is produced from cane of their own growing, the other half from cane bought from other growers. The total quantity of sugar-cane treated and manufactured at the respondents' mill during the 1916 season was 42,470 tons. Of this, 21,193 tons consisted of cane grown by themselves and 21,277 tons of cane grown by others. The respondents refused to pay the sum sued for, namely, £ 176 12s. 2d., being the levy of an assessment of 2d. per ton on the former figure, namely, the cane grown by themselves. Hence the writ and the special case.
The question is whether this refusal was justified. In other words are the respondents liable under the Act for an assessment in respect of sugar cane received at their mill although grown by themselves on lands belonging to them? There is no dispute as to rate or amount.
It is of interest to observe that the Act of 1915, which is to be under construction, was preceded in Queensland by an Act to provide for the establishment and control of sugar experiment stations, and that the expenses of that Act were provided for by the levy of an assessment "not exceeding one penny on every ton of sugar-cane received at a sugar works." By the definition of that Act "sugarcane received'' was to have the meaning of "sugar-cane delivered at a sugar works and accepted." In the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, it may be presumed that the Legislature intended to attach the same meaning to the same words when used in a subsequent statute in a similar connection.
The conflict of opinion between the Courts below has arisen upon the construction of Section 20 of the Act of 1915. By sub-Section 3 thereof it is provided :
"The Central Board may make any levy an assessment of one penny on every ton of sugarcane received at a mill, or such other sum per ton as the Governor in Council may at any time fix by Order in Council. Such assessment shall be paid by the owner of the mill to the Minister, on the first day of every month, upon the actual number of tons of sugar-cane received at the mill during the preceding month."
This is the first half of the sub-section, and did it stand by itself there would appear to be no possibility of doubt that the levy of the assessment was to be made upon every ton of sugar-cane received at the mill; or, more emphatically, upon "the actual number of tons of sugar-cane received at the mill.'' The cane in question in this suit was actually received at the mill, and so far the language of the statute applies expressly to it. But the argument for the respondents, which was very powerfully presented, arose more definitely on the second half of the sub-section. It is in these terms :
"Such assessment shall, however, be borne by the cane grower for every ton so supplied by such cane grower. The amount of the assessment shall be a debt due from the owner of the mill to the Central Board and recoverable at the suit of the Minister accordingly, but the owner of the mill may deduct from the price of the sugar cane each cane-grower's proportion of such assessment. All assessments levied under this Act shall be paid into the fund."
It is no doubt true that the right of the appellant to recover is dependent upon the first half of the section, under which the liability of the mill-owner is fairly plain, and that the second half of the section deals
