The presumption of adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act cannot displace a contrary inference supported by adequate evidence. Furthermore, partnership accounts that have been annually compared and adjusted should not be reopened after a long period without a very strong case.

Sir Lawrence Jenkins :-

This appeal arises out of a suit for dissolution of partnership and consequential relief, instituted as far back as the 9th August 1905 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cocanada.

Following on a reference to a Commissioner and a report, a preliminary decree was passed on the 16th March, 1908, dissolving the partnership and determining a number of matters on which the litigants were at issue; and after a further reference and report, the final decree was pronounced on the 8th September 1908. On appeal to the High Court at Madras the Subordinate Judge's decision was modified, and it is from this appellate decree that the present appeal has been brought.

The partnership dates back to a time before 1894, but in that year the members of the firm entered into a registered agreement of partnership, by which their relations with each other were determined.

Of the original partners, the 1st defendant alone was alive at the date of this suit's institution, the other partners then being the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 and the defendants Nos. 6 and 7, who had come into the firm by way of succession. The 1st defendant's share was two-fifths, that of the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 two-fifths, and that of the defendants Nos. 6 and 7 one-fifth. The firm traded in tobacco. Its principal place of business was Cocanada, where the plaintiffs were in management, and there was also a branch at Viravallipalem, which was throughout managed exclusively by the 1st defendant. The ordinary course of business was that tobacco was bought by the Viravallipalem branch and was then consigned to the Cocanada branch where it was sold. The articles of partnership provided that accounts should be kept at both branches and compared in March of every year, and the uniform practice was for the accounts of the Viravallipalem branch to be brought to Cocanada for comparison with the accounts of the Cocanada branch where a Cocanada ledger and a Viravallipalem ledger were kept, and this practice continued until the disputes in 1905, which led to this litigation.

In the earlier stages of the suit, the matters in dispute were numerous, but three only now remain.

The first relates to certain plots known as the Cheyyeru lands which were purchased in 1900. They are claimed by the plaintiffs as partnership assets, and were so held to be by the Commissioner and the Subordinate Judge. The claim, however, was disallowed by the High Court, and to this decision exception is taken by the 1st defendant, or more strictly by his representatives.

It is true that the purchase money was originally paid out of the firm funds, but the transfer was expressed to be made to the first defendant, and this with the entries in the firm accounts and the evidence relevant to this issue lend strong support to the High Court's decision that the purchase was for the 1st defendant.

In view, moreover, of the course the discussion has taken, their Lordships think it unnecessary to examine in detail the materials on which this decision rests; it is enough to say that they see no reason to dissent from it. But there is an alternative claim which has been more seriously pressed, and it is that if the purchase was for the benefit of the 1st defendant it was incumbent on him to discharge himself of the purchase money which undoubtedly was derived from the firm funds.

As a proposition of law, this cannot be questioned; but it remains to be seen whether at this stage and in all the circumstances of this case it would be right to direct a further account as to this transaction. This litigation has now been pending for over 14 years, and the first suggestion of the right to this account was made in the course of the argument of the appeal before the High Court. The learned Judges considered it was then too late to ask the 1st defendant's representatives to trace this particular item through the accounts. This view commends itself to their Lordships and all the more because the present is certainly