Lord Dunedin :-

The question in this case arises under the Indian Immigration Act of Natal, being Law 25 of 1891. By S. 50 of that Act, it is provided: that the Immigration Trust Board are authorized "to appoint a duly qualified medical practitioner to attend upon the Indian immigrants employed upon any estate or elsewhere, and upon any such appointment the proprietor of the estate or the employer of such immigrants shall be released from his obligation to obtain a duly qualified medical practitioner to attend upon such immigrants. And every employer of Indian immigrants not being free domestic servants, on any estate or place for which estate or place the said Board may have appointed a medical practitioner as aforesaid, shall pay quarterly on or before January 10th, April 10th, July 10th, and October 10th in each year to the Protector of Indian Immigrants" (for whom for this purpose the appellants were substituted by S. 10 of Act No. 17, 1895), "a sum not exceeding 1s. sterling per month for every male statute adult immigrant in the service of such employer."

A medical officer was so provided by the appellants and they applied to the respondents, who employed Indians, for their contribution. The respondents were willing to pay in respect of indentured Indian immigrants, but contended that they were not bound to pay in respect of either (1) Indian immigrants who had been indentured but whose term of indentured service had expired, and who had not re indentured themselves, and (2) descendants of Indian immigrants. The local magistrate held that the respondent was liable in respect of both classes (1) and (2). Appeal being taken to the Supreme Court of Natal, the learned judges, unanimously on point (1), by a majority on point (2), affirmed the decision of the local magistrate. Appeal being taken to the Supreme Court of South Africa that Court upheld the decision as to the Indian immigrants who had been indentured but were subsequently free, but, by a majority, reversed it as to the descendants. An appeal has now been taken to this Board against that decision on the latter point. There is no cross-appeal as to the former.

The question, therefore, is simply whether the word "immigrant" in the expression "every male statute adult immigrant" in S. 50 in respect of whom payment is to be made, does or does not include the descendants of Indian immigrants. Sect. 118 is in the following terms :

"The words 'Indian immigrant' shall mean and include all Indians introduced from India to Natal under the provisions of the Laws regulating such introduction, and those descendants of such Indians who may be resident in Natal".

The respondents' first argument is that the interpretation clause does not apply, because in specifying those in respect of whom payment is to be made, the expression is "every male statute adult immigrant." and not ''every male statute adult Indian immigrant." To this there are two answers. In the first place the nominative of the whole sentence, which is "every employer of Indian immigrants" - he who is directed to pay-makes it clear that the immigrants in respect of whom he is to pay are Indian immigrants. Otherwise there would be the fantastic result that an employer of immigrants to Natal of whatever nationality in the world would have to pay in respect of these persons if he employed as well at least two Indian immigrants, and would not have to pay if he did not. In the second place, the matter is made clear beyond all doubt by S. 51, which says : "The age of eighteen years and upward shall be, and is hereby declared to be the age of an Indian immigrant male adult for the purpose of the foregoing section." There seems, therefore, no force in this argument.

Now, when the interpretation clause in a statute says that such and such an expression shall include so and so, a Court in construing a statute is bound to give effect to the direction unless it can be shown that the context of the particular passage where the expressi