Lord Atkinson:-

This is an appeal from a judgment and decree dated the 27th February, 1920, of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal which reversed a judgment and decree dated the 17th April, 1919, of the Addi tional Subordinate Judge of Howrah. The main question for determination by the Board is whether or not the compromise of a certain suit instituted by the appellant to recover possession of certain lands there tofore purchased by her from one Dharma Das Kundu, since deceased, purporting to have been made and entered into on the 7th February, 1917, had in fact been so made and entered with her full knowledge and consent or the contrary. The appel lant is a purdanashin lady aged about 43 years. She has two sons, Raman and Srish, the latter of whom appears to be competent to some extent to transact busi ness, and two brothers named Satish, about 47 years of age and the other, Sailadbar, who is younger. She can write and read in Bengali; can sign her name, and from her evidence would appear to be a person of some intelligence. The trial Judge found on the evidence before him that this com promise was not made and entered into with the knowledge and consent of the appellant. The appellate tribunal found on the evidence the affirmative proposition that it was so made, though that proposition was denied by the appellant and not proved directly by any document or by any witness. Their Lordships are not, for the reasons to be stated hereafter, able to take the view of the evidence upon this point which com mended itself to the appellate Court. They think this latter view was erroneous and incline to think that this was due to the fact that the two learned Judges, Richard son and Shamshul Huda, dealt with the case without keeping sufficiently before their minds that an affirmative proposition is not established by showing that the evi dence of witnesses who depose to a con tradictory negative proposition is not reli able. The proposition that the appellant consented to the compromise entered into is an affirmative proposition. She and one of her brothers practically deny that she ever consented to it. No witness gives direct and positive evidence that she did consent to it. Yet these learned Judges con sider that as the circumstantial evidence given in the case would go to show that the evidence of the appellant and her brother on this point was not reliable, they are there fore entitled to hold the affirmative pro position, that she did give her consent to the compromise, was proved. Of course, if there was a conflict of evidence on this point, some witnesses asserting that the appellant did consent to this compromise, some the contrary, it would be perfectly legitimate to take into consideration the circumstantial evidence with a view to show that evidence of the first class of witnesses was true and that of the second false. But in this case, as will presently be shown, there is no conflict of evidence of this kind. The facts of the case may be shortly stated as follows.

On the 15th November, 1913, the ap pellant bought from the said Dharma Das Kumari certain land for the sum of Rs. 9,500. He died on the 6th of February following. He left three sons and three grandsons surviving him who are all respondents in this appeal. The appel lant did not get possession of the land she purchased, and on the 11th July, 1914, she instituted against the above mentioned sons and grandsons of Dharma Das Kumari a suit for a declaration of her title to the land purchased and for the re covery of the possession thereof. The eldest son of the deceased, Amullyadhan, and the three grandsons denied her claim and contested the validity of the sale, but the two younger of the vendor's sons filed a written statement admitting that her claim was just and well founded. The Subordinate Judge of Howrah who tried the case made on the 23rd August, 1915, a decree allowing the appellant's claim with mesne profits and costs. From that decree the el