1928 Supreme(SC) 40
Privy Council
Sir Lancelot Sanderson, Atkinson, Justice Viscount Sumner, JJ.
Tejpal-jamna das -Appellant
Versus
Ernest v. David and others -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 83 of 1927 : Allahabad Appeal No. 14 of 1924
Decided On : 21-05-1928
Hy. S.L. Polak, B. Dube, A.M. Dunne
The burden of proving a special charge or pledge over property lies with the claimant. Explicit findings of fact by a lower court regarding the non-existence of such a charge and the lack of genuine evidence are binding on appellate courts.
Headnote:(A) Law of Pledge and Insolvency - Burden of proof regarding a special charge over property - Where money is advanced to importers and goods are placed in the godown of the lenders, while it is a likely course of business that such goods be regarded as security for advances, such an arrangement must still be proved by the claimants if they assert a special charge over the property.
(B) Appellate Jurisdiction - Findings of fact - When a lower court makes explicit findings of fact regarding the non-existence of a pledge and the non-genuineness of supporting documents, such findings are binding on the appellate courts, and the higher court cannot re-evaluate the probability of the existence of the charge.
Facts of the case:
A receiver attached goods found in the godown of a firm, believing them to be the property of an insolvent firm. The firm in possession of the goods claimed they were held as pledges for advances made to the insolvent firm. After conflicting judgments in the lower courts, the matter was remitted for specific factual findings. The subsequent finding was that the goods were not pledged and that letters produced to support the claim were fabricated and brought into existence after the date they bore.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the claimants failed to prove the existence of a special charge over the property. It was held that the explicit findings of fact by the lower court, which determined that the pledge was not proved and the supporting evidence was not genuine, were binding.
Issues: Whether the claimants had established a special charge over the attached goods and whether the appellate court could disturb the specific findings of fact made by the lower court.
Ratio Decidendi: The burden of proving a special charge over property lies with the party claiming it. Once a competent court has explicitly found that such a charge has not been proved and that the evidence relied upon is not genuine, those findings of fact bind the appellate courts.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
commercial law
-
security interests
- pledge
-
security interests
-
practice and procedure
-
evidence
- burden of proof
- genuineness of documents
-
appellate review
- findings of fact
-
evidence
-
insolvency law
- receivership
Viscount Sumner. -
On the 4th August 1919 the firm Piare Lal-Basant Lal of Cawnpore, was adjudged insolvent. A receiver had been appointed, and he had, in the course of his enquiries, learned that 35 bales of cloth, believed to be identified as the property of that firm, were at the godown of the present appellants, who are the firm Tejpal-Jamna Das. He thereupon went there and attached them. At a subsequent date the present appellants made an application in the Court of the Judge of Small Causes at Cawnpore to have the bales remaining after some had been sold and the proceeds of those sold adjudged to them under a charge alleged to have been created by the insolvent firm Evidence was called at considerable length and the matter came to judgment. By that time it seems to be fairly clear that the case put forward by the appellants, as the Court understood it, was that, after dealings between the parties had continued for some time upon the basis of advances being made without any specific pledge, a time came when the bales were taken as a pawn and further bales were pawned from time to time. That, therefore, pointed to some specific date, at which and to some arrangement under which for the first time the bales delivered were charged as a security. For various reasons the Judge found that the case was not made out and he dismissed the application.
The matter then went on appeal to the District Judge of Cawnpore, and, when he came to give judgment, he cleared the ground by various comments on the judgment of the first Judge, and stated as the question for his decision whether the lower Court was right in holding that the appellant firm was in possession, of the goods as pledges and not merely on behalf of the insolvent firm, and, after an elaborate discussion, he arrived at the conclusion that the appeal ought to be allowed.
The case then passed upon second appeal to the High Court at Allahabad which, after again fully considering its judgment, remitted the case to the District Judge in order that he might deal with and find the facts upon six questions, two of which, if answered as they were ultimately answered, would dispose of the case and make it unnecessary to-consider the further issues.
When the matter was remitted another Judge had taken the place of the former District Judge. He went into the case under such disadvantages as resulted from his not having had it in hand from the first, but he found explicitly that the goods seized by the Official Receiver were not pledged by the insolvent firm to the appellant firm at all, and that sundry letters, which, if they were genuine, would have formed the strongest corroboration of the case that the goods had been so pledged, were brought into existence at a date later than that which they bore, for the purpose of supporting the case of the appellants.
Upon the District Judge's report, the High Court found with some regret that there was no question of law upon which they could review his decision; that his findings of fact disposed of the matter; and that the appellants' claim must fail. They did, however, subsequently give leave to appeal, and the appeal is now before their Lordships' Board ex parte. Their Lordships have had the advantage of the full assistance of both the appellants' counsel, and they have considered the matter with great care. It is quite true that the relations of the parties were such as made probable some such arrangement as was alleged, for when moneys are advanced to importers for the purpose of their trade, and the goods are placed in the godown of the lenders, it would be an exceedingly likely course of business that the goods should be regarded as security for the advances and that the lenders should take charge of or at any rate keep control over the realization of the goods and should reduce the advances out of the proceeds when received. It is, however, an arrangement which, though not difficult to prove under certain circumstances, still has to be pro