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1931 Supreme(SC) 7

Privy Council At Patna
GEORGE LOWNDES, SIR JOHN WALLIS, Justice LORD MACMILLAN, JJ.
Padmalav Achariya and another -Appellant
Versus
(Srimatyia) Fakira Debya and others -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 99 of 1929, Patna Appeal No. 10 of 1928
Decided On : 19-01-1931

Advocates Appeared:
G.D. Mc Nair, E.B. Raikes , B. Dube

Adoption that displaces the rights of wives or daughters must be proved by clear, consistent, and unimpeachable evidence, free from suspicion of fraud, particularly when customary contemporary records like family accounts are missing.

Headnote:(A) Hindu Law - Adoption - Proof of adoption - Where the rights of wives and daughters are transferred to others by way of adoption, the proof must be free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubt of its truth.

(B) Evidence - Absence of contemporary records - In families where detailed accounts are customarily kept, the absence of entries regarding expenses or the factum of adoption is a significant factor in doubting the validity of such adoption.

(C) Limitation Act - Article 116 - Inapplicability of the article in suits for recovery of shares in certain circumstances.

Facts of the case:
A widow filed a suit to recover her deceased husband's share in joint family properties. The defendants contended that two adoptions had taken place: one by the husband's father and another by the husband himself, which would significantly reduce or eliminate the widow's claim. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the decision, citing suspicions regarding the adoptions.

Findings of Court:
The court found the alleged adoptions to be highly improbable given the ages and circumstances of the parties. There were no contemporary deeds of adoption or entries in family accounts to support the claims. Documentary evidence, including sale deeds and letters, was deemed suspicious or fabricated. A compromise deed signed by the widow was found to be non-binding as it was obtained under threat.

Issues: Whether the factum of the alleged adoptions was established by clear and satisfactory evidence and whether the suit was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the burden of proving adoption is high when it affects the rights of female heirs. The lack of customary documentary evidence, such as family accounts, and the improbable nature of the adoptions, coupled with the suspicious nature of the evidence produced, meant the adoptions were not proved.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • family law
    • adoption
      • factum of adoption
    • succession
      • joint family property
  • practice and procedure
    • evidence
      • standard of proof
      • documentary evidence
    • limitation
  • contract law
    • coercion
      • validity of compromise

Sir John Wallis—

The parties in the case belong to a Brahmin family of good standing who carried on a money-lending business in the District of Cuttack in Orissa and acquired moveable and immovable property valued at two lakhs of rupees. The defendants are the sons and grandsons of Narsingh, who belonged to the senior branch of the family and died in 1914, and the plaintiff, Fakira, is the widow of Abhimanyu, the posthumous son of Kulamoni, who belonged to the junior branch. According to the defendants Kulamoni before his death in 1877 adopted Narsingh's second son Udaya, and similarly in 1903 Kulamoni's son Abhimanyu twelve years before his death in 1915, adopted Udaya's eldest son Padmalav, defendant 1.

In June 1924, nine years after her husband's death, the plaintiff, Fakira, filed the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack to recover her husband's share in the suit properties. She alleged that before her husband's death Narsingh's son, Udaya, had set up a false case that he had been adopted by Kulamoni and that for the sake of peace and to avoid litigation, it had been settled that he should have a one-fourth share of the properties which would otherwise have fallen to her husband, and accordingly she only claimed the remaining three-fourths. She denied that the adoption of defendant 1, Padmalav, by her deceased husband, Abhimanyu, had ever taken place, and alleged that she had been terrorized by some of the defendants and others into signing under a threat of criminal proceedings a deed of settlement under which she was only to be entitled to maintenance.

There were other issues, but the main question in both the lower Courts was as to the factum of the adoptions set up by the defendants. The Subordinate Judge found that both adoptions were proved and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff thereupon appealed in forma pauperis to the High Court at Patna. Das, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, expressed grave doubts as to the earlier adoption, but did not record a formal finding, as the plaintiff had not disputed Udaya's right to the one-fourth share which was all he would in any case have been entitled to on partition with the plaintiff's husband, a natural son born after the adoption. As regards the second adoption, he held that it was clouded with suspicion which the defendants had failed to dispel, and accordingly the High Court reversed the decree of the lower Court and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

From this decree the defendants preferred the present appeal to His Majesty in Council on the grounds, as stated in the appellant's case, that the judgment of the High Court is largely based on suspicion for which there is no justification; that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is based on the credibility of witnesses examined before him which the High Court had not given any cogent reasons for disbelieving; that the weight Of the evidence is in favour of the appellants; and that the suit is barred by limitation.

As regards limitation the Subordinate, Judge had held that the suit was barred under Art. 116, Lim. Act, but, as pointed out in the judgment of the High Court, it is now finally settled by the judgment of the Board in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa , AIR 1924 PC 137=79 IC 971= 51 IA 220=48 Bom. 411 (PC), that this article is inapplicable, and consequently the suit is not barred.

For better understanding of the case it appears desirable in the first place to show the state of the family in the absence of the alleged adoptions.

It is common ground that for nearly forty years before his death in 1914 Narsingh was the karta of the joint family, and the plaintiff's husband, Abhimanyu, was the sole representative by birth of the junior branch, and was at any time after attaining majority entitled to separate, and if there had been no adoption by his father Kulamoni, to take half of the family property on partition, leaving the other half for Narsingh, his five sons and their issue. Fur




































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