The importance of the decree agreeing with the judgment and the need for any decree passed by consent to reflect this on its face.

Sir George Lowndes.—

This appeal was heard in November last and their Lordships took time to consider the form in which their humble advice should be tendered to His Majesty.

It appeared at the hearing that the final judgment delivered by the Judicial Commissioners, before whom the case came in appeal, was a judgment by consent of the parties, and their Lordships enquired of counsel appearing for the appellants how, in face of this fact, he could ask the Board to interfere. Counsel did not then contest the consent, but contended that a point which had been the subject of decision at an earlier stage of the case was still open to him.

When the case was set down for judgment a fresh application was made to their Lordships in connexion with this point, supported by an affidavit of the appellant which had been sent from India. In this it is alleged that there had in fact been no consent to the judgment above referred to, and that the statement to that effect by the Judicial Commissioners was a mistake. The judgment was in the following terms:

1. After considerable argument and some unavailing efforts to come to some settlement which would avoid future litigation, it is now agreed among the parties to this appeal that the foreclosure decree in favour of the plaintiff should cover the whole village of Urdhon, that defendant 1 should be allowed an opportunity to redeem in order to secure the payment of his charge on the income of the village, and that the amount of the charge cannot suitably be determined in this suit. Both parties agree that the decree of the lower Court should be set aside and a decree on these lines substituted for it.

2. The only questions for the determination of this Court are the amounts which should be added to the lower Court's decree on account of interest and costs. As regards interest the last ground in the memorandum of appeal has not been pressed, and the plaintiff-appellant and respondent 1 have left the point to the discretion of the Court. The principal amount was Rupees 5,000 advanced in 1908 and here compound interest at 1 1/4 per cent per mensem. The lower Court has allowed only simple interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of suit (15th September 1920), to the lust date fixed for redemption (28th February 1925), and has given a decree for a sum of Rs. 16,475-2-0. exclusive of costs. This amount has not been challenged, and we consider it fair to allow this sum, with further simple interest at 1 per cent per mensem on Rs. 10,475-2-0 from 28th February 1925 to 21st April 1927 the date we now fix for redemption.

3. As regards costs, the efforts of defendant 1, first to defeat this mortgage entirely and then to establish a charge which would defeat it very largely, have been unavailing, and the plaintiff is entitled to add to the amount due on his mortgage the total of his expenses throughout this litigation. Defendant 1 must bear his own costs throughout.

4. The decree of the lower Court is set aside and a preliminary decree for foreclosure will be drawn up:

(1) against all five defendants;

(2) covering the whole of mauza Urdhon;

(3) for the amount permitted by paras. 2 and 3 above:

(4) fixing 21st April 1927 as the last date for redemption;

(5) declaring that the village is subject to a charge of an unascertained amount held by defendant 1 Maulvi Zahirulsaid Alvi.

Under ordinary circumstances their Lordships would not hesitate to take the statements contained in this judgment as correct, and would refuse summarily such an application as is now made to them. But the circumstances in the present case are peculiar.

It appears from the proceedings that the appeal was partly heard by the Judicial Commissioners on 5th October 1926 and then adjourned to the 13th "as there is a chance of a compromise." It came before the Court again on the last-mentioned date when, as appears from the fly-sheet, the attempted compromise broke down. Judgment was then reserved. The record discloses nothing except the judgment set o