1931 Supreme(SC) 33
Privy Council At Calcutta
Sir George Lowndes, Salvesen , Justice Lords Macmillan , JJ.
Secretary of State -Appellant
Versus
Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 33 of 1930: Bengal Appeals Nos. 16 and 19 of 1929
Decided On : 20-03-1931
J.M. Parikh, L.De Gruyther , W. Wallach, A.M. Dunne
Subsequent amendments to a general statute are not automatically incorporated into a special local statute that incorporated the general statute by reference at the time of its enactment, particularly where the local statute provides a complete and specific rule on the subject matter.
Headnote:(A) Statutory Interpretation - Incorporation by reference - Whether subsequent amendments to a general act are automatically incorporated into a local act that adopted the provisions of the general act at the time of its enactment - Where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the second statute is generally deemed to incorporate the first as it existed at the time of incorporation; subsequent additions to the parent act are not deemed to be incorporated unless expressly provided, especially if the subsequent act provides a complete rule on the subject matter.
(B) Special Law vs. General Law - Generalia specialibus non derogant - Where a local code provides a specific and limited right of appeal and declares an award final subject to that limited right, such specific provisions prevail over general amendments to a general act that would otherwise grant a broader right of appeal.
(C) Land Acquisition - Nature of Tribunal - A body constituted under a special act to perform functions of a court may not be considered a court subject to the superintendence of the high court, thereby affecting the right of appeal under letters patent.
Facts of the case:
Land acquisition proceedings were conducted under a local improvement act for the purpose of urban improvement. The local act modified the general land acquisition law by substituting a tribunal for the court and declaring the tribunal's awards final, subject to a limited right of appeal to the high court if certified as fit. Following a decision by the high court on compensation, the government sought an appeal to the highest council, arguing that a subsequent amendment to the general land acquisition act—which deemed awards as decrees and judgments under the code of civil procedure—automatically applied to the local act and enabled the appeal.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the local act and its modifying legislation created a special code intended to limit appeals. The amendment to the general act, enacted years after the local act, was not incorporated into the local act as there was no intention to bind the local legislature to future additions of the general act. The provision for finality in the local act was intended to exclude further appeals beyond the high court.
Issues: Whether a subsequent amendment to a general land acquisition act, which characterized awards as decrees, could be read into a prior local act that incorporated the general act, thereby granting a right of appeal to the highest council.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that statutes incorporated by reference are not automatically updated by subsequent amendments to the parent act. Furthermore, under the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific provisions of the local code regarding the finality of the tribunal's award prevail over the general provisions of the amended general act. The deliberate exclusion of general appeal provisions in the local act indicated an intention to bar appeals beyond the high court.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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appeals
- competency of appeal
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appeals
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statutory interpretation
- incorporation by reference
- generalia specialibus non derogant
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administrative law
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land acquisition
- compensation
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land acquisition
Sir George Lowndes—
These are two consolidated appeals from a decision of the High Court of Bengal arising out of certain land acquisition proceedings taken for the purposes of the Calcutta Improvement Act (Bengal Act 5 of 1911).
The property in question belonged to the Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Society), and the questions sought to be raised by the appeals are as to the compensation to be awarded. Neither party was satisfied with the High Court's decision. The Secretary of State applied for a certificate enabling an appeal to His Majesty in Council. The Society objected that no appeal lay, but asked in effect that if a certificate were granted to the Secretary of State, a certificate should also be granted to them. The High Court granted certificates to both parties. The appeals were duly admitted and are before the Board for determination. The Society contend, as they did in the High Court, that no appeal is competent, and this question has been argued before their Lordships as a preliminary point. It is with it alone that this judgment is concerned.
By the Act above referred to, which their Lordships will call for convenience the local Act, a Board of Trustees was constituted and was invested with very wide powers for the purpose of carrying out improvement schemes within the Municipal limits of Calcutta. It was obvious that for this purpose the necessity would arise for the compulsory acquisition of land on a large scale, and the Bengal Government no doubt thought that it would facilitate the proceedings of the trustees if they had a special code of their own under which such acquisitions should be made instead of leaving this matter to be dealt with by the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which was of general application throughout British India.
Under the general Act the land is acquired by the Local Government. It is in the first place valued by the Collector, who makes an "award" which fixes the sum to be offered for the land by Government. Any person interested who does not accept the award may then require the Collector to refer the matter to "the Court" for the determination of his objection, "the Court" being defined as "a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction," or in certain oases a special judicial officer appointed by the Local Government. The Court then proceeds to deal with the matter upon the lines laid down by the Act, and its proceedings terminate again in an award, from which under S. 54 an appeal lies to the High Court.
It was held by this Board in 1912 (see Rangoon Botatoung Company v. Collector of Rangoon , [1913] 40 Cal 21=16 IC 188=39 IA 197 that under this Act no appeal lay from the High Court to His Majesty in Council, the ground of the decision being that the proceedings throughout were in the nature of arbitration proceedings, and that no appeal being given in terms to His Majesty in Council, no such appeal lay.
Part 4 of the local Act deals with the acquisition of land for the purposes of that Act. It provides that the trustees may make such acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act, but proceeds to modify that Act for the purposes of the local Act. The modifications are contained partly in the body of the Act and partly in a schedule attached to the Act. They are numerous and substantial and the effect is, in their Lordships' opinion.
To enact for the purposes of the local Act a special law for the acquisition of land by the trustees within the limited area over which their powers extend.
The most important departure from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act so far as the present appeal is concerned is that the local Act constitutes a "Tribunal" to take the place of the "Court" under the general Act. This Tribunal is to consist of a President with judicial experience and two lay assessors. By S. 71, the Tribunal is to be deemed to be the Court under the general Act "except for the purposes of S. 54 of that Act." This exception operates