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1931 Supreme(SC) 54

Privy Council At Calcutta
Sir Dinshaw Mulla, Sir George Lowndes, Justice Lord Russell Of Killowen, JJ.
Janaki Nath Roy and others -Appellant
Versus
Dina Nath Kundu and others -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 90 of 1929; Bengal Appeals Nos. 41 and 42 of 1927
Decided On : 20-05-1931

Important Points

The nature of a lease is determined by the overall construction of the deed. Payment of a substantial premium and clauses prohibiting surrender strongly indicate a permanent tenancy, overriding a narrow interpretation of terms like "bemeyadi" to mean a lease determinable at will.

Subject

Property Law - Lease and Tenancy

Headnote

(A) Construction of Lease - Interpretation of "bemeyadi" settlement - Determination of whether a lease is permanent or determinable at will - Payment of premium as an indicator of permanency - Effect of clauses prohibiting surrender and restricting subletting.

(B) Interpretation of lease documents - The meaning of terms cannot be resolved by reference to a single word but must be determined by considering all provisions of the deed to define the rights of the parties.

(C) Indicators of permanent tenancy - Payment of a substantial premium in substitution of a fixed-term settlement, combined with provisions preventing the tenant from surrendering the lease or objecting to rent increases, strongly suggests a permanent lease rather than one determinable on short notice.

Facts of the case:
Appellants brought ejectment suits claiming they had determined the tenancies of certain premises held by respondents under two separate leases. The tenancies were established via registered deeds described as "bemeyadi settlements" following several previous fixed-term leases. A substantial premium was paid for the "bemeyadi" settlement, and the annual rent was increased. The lower court decreed the suits, but the High Court dismissed them, finding the leases were not determinable at will.

Findings of Court:
The leases are not terminable on service of notice to quit.

Issues: Whether the tenancies were capable of being determined by notice at the will of either party and, if so, whether they had been effectively determined.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the construction of the document must be viewed as a whole. The payment of a substantial premium, the prohibition on the tenant surrendering the lease, and the restriction on granting permanent subleases to third parties collectively indicated that the lease was permanent and not a year-to-year tenancy determinable at will. The court reasoned that it would be improbable for a landlord to receive a substantial premium only to have the power to terminate the tenancy shortly thereafter.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • property law
    • landlord and tenant
      • lease construction
        • permanent tenancies

Advocates Appeared:
S. Hyam, L. DeGruyther , J.M. Parikh, A.M. Dunne

Lord Russell of Killowen—

These consolidated appeals arise out of two ejectment suits which were brought by the appellants, who claimed that they had effectively determined the tenancies of certain premises held by the respondents under two separate leases. The premises in question consisted of a hat, bazar, bandar and ghat, and some other lands at Khankhanapur. The Subordinate Judge decreed both suits and ordered that the plaintiffs recover khas possession. On appeal to the High Court both suits were dismissed.

Two points only were argued before this Board, viz. (1) whether the tenancies were capable of being determined by notice at the will of either party, and (2), if the tenancies were capable of being so determined, whether they had been effectively determined.

The Subordinate Judge decided both points in favour of the appellants. The High Court decided the first point in favour of the respondents, and accordingly the second point did not call for any determination.

The first question is purely one of construction of a registered kabuliyat executed on 21st September 1900 and another executed on 4th August 1903. These documents define the terms of the two tenancies; but it will only be necessary to refer to the contents of the former because it was common ground that a decision upon the true construction of the earlier document would carry with it the same decision in regard to the later one.

The lessees had before the tenancy of 1900 enjoyed six previous leases of the property from Bepin Behari Roy, the predecessor-in-title to the appellants. These were all leases for fixed terms of years varying from three years to six years. Under four of these leases a premium had been paid. The latest of them was for a period of six years expiring with the end of the Bengali year 1307, i. e., mid-April 1901, the rent being Rs. 500 and the premium Rs. 2,000. The kabuliyat was dated 2nd August 1895, and was therein described as a " deed of temporary ijara kabuliyat."

The document which now falls to be construed was in different terms. It is addressed to Bepin Behari Roy and is executed by Dinanath Kundu. It recites his possession under the temporary (miadi) ijara settlement, that he had prayed for a " bemeyadi settlement," and that Bipin Behari Roy, on receiving a premium of Rs. 3,500, and fixing an annual rent of Rs. 800, had granted his prayer and made with him a " bemeyadi settlement." It further recites that thereupon he had been in enjoyment of the profits, and that as Bepin Behari Roy had demanded a kabuliyat from him, he appeared before him, and, agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 800 per annum, he executed that deed of bemeyadi kabuliyat, and promised that he would enjoy the profits on abiding by all the rules and terms set forth below.

There then follow 13 clauses, to some of which reference must be made; but before doing so the word "bemeyadi" requires some comment. Arguments were advanced in the Courts below based upon what each side claimed to be the true meaning of this word. Etymologically it would appears to indicate absence of a term, from which one side claimed that its presence indicated that the lease was interminable or perpetual, while the other side claimed that all that was indicated was that the lease was for no fixed term, but was determinable upon notice in the usual way. In their Lordships' opinion the question cannot be resolved by reference only to the use and meaning of the word " bemeyadi," but should be determined after consideration of all the provisions of the kabuliyat, by which the rights of the parties are defined.

Upon a careful consideration of this document their Lordships have come to a conclusion in agreement with that which was reached by the High Court. It must be observed that the choice lies between two alternatives only. Either the lease is a permanent lease, determinable only in the special cases therein provided, or it is a lease from year to year, which the landlord could at his will determine by a s







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