The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the Limitation Act and the significance of adverse possession in property disputes.

Lord Radcliffe.:-

These are two appeals from the High Court of Judicature at Patna. They have been consolidated, and the central point upon which each appeal turns is the same: which of the parties is to be treated as the lawful owner of the piece of property in dispute ? That piece of property is a four annas undivided share out of a fourteen annas partitioned share of an estate called Touzi no. 7893 in Mouza Awari, Pargana Lautan. District Darbhanga, and it is hereinafter referred to as "the disputed property."

2. The two suits out of which the appeals arise were respectively a partition Suit (No. 89 of 1933) filed by the appellant on 16th September 1932, and a Title suit (No. 72 of 1933) filed by the respondents in the second appeal on 7th November 1933. The appellant, who is the Mahanth of a Math or Asthal called the Birpur Asthal, sought by the partition suit to obtain a declaration of his title to the disputed property and an order for partition of the lands of which that property was an undivided share. He was met by a defence on the part of those respondents who formed the defendants first party to his suit to the effect that on various grounds, some of which will be noticed later, he had no title to the disputed property. These respondents were the Mahanth and the Deities (acting through the Mahanth) of another Math or Asthal known as the Pokrauni Asthal and it was they who instituted the title suit in which they asked for a declaration against the appellant that the disputed property is devottar property of the Pokrauni Asthal and that the appellant had no right to any interest in it. As it is plain that the real question at issue is, to which of these two religious institution does the disputed property belong, it will be convenient to use the term respondents to refer to the respondents Mahanth Ramkirpal Das and the Idols Sri Thakurji, Ramji, Lachhmanji and Jankiji.

3. In their Lordships' view, as will appear later, the appellant has a good defence to the title suit under the Limitation Act: (IX [9] of 1908) as subsequently amended, and, although other grounds of appeal were argued before them, it is upon this ground that they think that the appeals should be allowed. So much of the narrative of the complicated history of this case as follows is recorded therefore in order to explain how the question of limitation arises rather than to give any comprehensive account of the various issues in the suits.

4. The appellant's claim to the disputed property comes through his predecessor as Mahanth of the Birpur Asthal, one Priya Das. In the year 1910, Priya Das had lent 500 maunds of grain to the then Mahanth of the Pokrauni Asthal, Damodar Das. The loan was not repaid and on 16th May 1913, Priya Das obtained a decree against Damodar Das in the Court of the Munsiff at Muzaffarpur ordering Damodar Das to pay him the sum of Rs. 1562-8-0, the monetary equivalent of the loan, together with costs and interest. This was followed by a sale of the disputed property at public auction in execution of the decree, Priya Das was himself the purchaser, and on 6th April 1915, he received the usual Court certificate confirming his purchase. One of the questions that was in issue in the present suits was the question whether this loan of 500 maunds was for any "justifying necessity" of the Pokrauni Asthal itself. The relevance of the enquiry was that, had the loan been made for any such necessity, the disputed property, even if it did belong to the Asthal, instead of being the private property of the Mahanth, would have been validly disposed of by an execution sale pursuant to the decree for payment of the value of the loan. The Subordinate Judge, after reviewing the evidence, decided that Damodar Das did not "run into the debt in question for any justifying necessity of the Asthal." On appeal the High Court expressed their agreement with the trial Court on this finding. The appellant sought to challenge the High Court's decision on this poin