1. Action for damages for defamatory libel arising from the publication of a statutory commission's report regarding the integrity of public officials. (Para 1 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 )
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1948 Supreme(SC) 72
Privy Council At Ceylon
Sir John Beaumont, Macdermott, Morton of Henryton, Justice Lords Uthwatt, JJ.
M.G. Perera -Appellant
Versus
Andrew Vincent Peiris and another, Respondents. -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 2 of 1917
Decided On : 13-10-1948
Advocates Appeared:
Darley Cumberland and Co., Burchells, C.E.L. Wickremesinghe, R.K. Handoo, Valentine Holmens, D.N. Pritt, Stephen Chapman, G.O. Slade
Darley Cumberland and Co., Burchells, C.E.L. Wickremesinghe, R.K. Handoo, Valentine Holmens, D.N. Pritt, Stephen Chapman, G.O. Slade
Privilege in defamation cases under Roman Dutch law negatives animus injuriandi if the publication serves the public interest and lacks malice. This extends to reports on the integrity of public officials and includes germane comments on witness credibility.
Headnote:(A) Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (No. 9 of 1872) and Special Ordinance (No. 25 of 1942) - Section 6(1) - Defamatory libel - Roman Dutch law - animus injuriandi - Privilege - Public interest - Publication of a commission's report - In Roman Dutch law, animus injuriandi is an essential element in proceedings for defamation; where words are defamatory, the burden of negativing this intent rests upon the defendant - Principles of privilege and fair comment serve to negative animus injuriandi and may be capable of a wider scope than that accorded to them by common law. (Para 19)
(B) Privilege - General principle based on the common convenience and welfare of society or the general interest of society - For reports of bodies other than judicial or parliamentary, privilege attaches if the subject-matter is in the public interest and the publication is made without malice. (Paras 21, 22)
(C) Divisibility of privileged reports - A statement regarding a witness's lack of frankness is not separable from a report if it is germane to the overall value of the report and the grounds on which the findings were based, as it allows for a just estimation of the report's reliability. (Para 26)
(D) Statutory Interpretation - A prohibition against the publication of "the name and the evidence" is interpreted conjunctively, meaning both the name and the evidence must be published to constitute a breach of the provision. (Para 27)
Facts of the case:
A newspaper published an extract from a report produced by a commissioner appointed under statutory powers to inquire into allegations of bribery among members of a legislative council. The extract stated that a witness was completely lacking in frankness and pretended to know less about the transaction than he actually did. The report had been printed as a sessional paper and made available to the public by the government. The witness sued for defamatory libel.
Findings of Court:
The publication was privileged as the report dealt with a grave matter affecting the public at large, specifically the integrity of members of the legislative council. The statement regarding the witness's conduct was germane to the report's reliability and thus covered by the privilege. Furthermore, the publication did not breach the statutory prohibition as it did not publish both the name and the evidence conjunctively.
Issues: Whether the publication of the report's extract was privileged; whether the statement about the witness's credibility was separable from the privileged report; and whether the publication violated the statutory prohibition against disclosing names and evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: Privilege attaches to the publication of reports if the public interest is served and malice is absent, thereby negativing animus injuriandi under Roman Dutch law. The integrity of public officials is a matter of grave public interest. Statements concerning the reliability of witnesses are integral to the assessment of the report's value and are thus covered by the same privilege.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
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2. Whether the publication was privileged, whether the report was divisible regarding specific comments on a witness, and whether publication breached statutory prohibitions on disclosing in-camera evidence. (Para 2 , 17 )
3. The public interest in the integrity of public officials justified wide dissemination of the report, negating animus injuriandi under Roman Dutch law. (Para 18 )
Lord Uthwatt.-
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ceylon affirming the dismissal by the District Court of Colombo of an action brought by the appellant Dr. M. G. Perera' in which he claimed damages for defamatory libel from the respondents who are the printer and owners of a newspaper called. The Ceylon Daily News. The libel complained of appeared in the issue of that paper of 25th May 1943, and consisted of an extract from the published report of a Commissioner who had been appointed under statutory powers to enquire into certain matters. The extract ran as follows :
"Dr. M. G. Perera who gave evidence was completely lacking in frankness and pretended that he knew very much less about the transaction than he actually did."
[2] The respondents took all defences. They denied that the words were defamatory-a formal defence in the circumstances. The other defences were not formal. They pleaded justification in the sense that the statement was true and that its publication was for the public benefit. Fair comment was pleaded. Privilege was relied on soon two grounds, first, that the proceedings before the Commissioner were judicial proceedings and the extract was part of an accurate report of those proceedings, and second, that, apart from the supposed judicial nature of the proceedings, the circumstances were such that the publication in the newspaper of the report was made on a privileged occasion. Neither the pleadings, the issues settled in the course of the proceedings, nor the conduct of the case at the trial, in any way limited the field of defence open to the respondents.
[3] On the settlement of the issues in the action it was made clear that the appellant did not set up express malice with a view to destroying any qualified privilege that might exist.
[4] The action arose in the following circumstances. It appears that in 1941 there were rumours in Ceylon that bribes had been offered to and accepted by members of the State Council. On 13th August 1941, the Governor, pursuant to a resolution passed by the State Council on 15th May 1941, set up a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (No. 9 of 1872). Under the terms of the appointment Mr. De Silva, K. C., was appointed the Governor's Commissioner for the purpose of inquiring into and reporting upon the following questions :
"(a) Whether gratifications by way of gift, loan, fee, reward, or otherwise, are or have been offered, promised, given or paid to members of the existing State Council, with the object or for the purpose of influencing their judgment or conduct in respect of any matter or transaction for which they, in their capacity as members of that Council or of any Executive or other Committee thereof, are, have been, may be, or may claim to be, concerned, whether as of right or otherwise: and
(b) Whether such gratifications are or have been solicited, demanded, received or accepted by members of the existing State Council as a reward or recompense for any services rendered to any person or cause or for any action taken for the advantage or disadvantage of any person or cause, or in consideration of any promise or agreement to render any such services or to take any such action, whether as of right or otherwise in their capacity as members of that Council or of any Executive or other Committee thereof."
[5] The instrument of appointment then contained the following direction by the Governor :
"And I hereby authorise and empower you to hold all such inquiries and make all such investigations into the aforesaid matters as may appear to you to be necessary ; and I do hereby require you to transmit to me a report thereon under your hand as early as possible."
[6] To assist the Commissioner in this particular enquiry a further ordinance (No. 25 of 1942) was passed which empowered the Commissioner to hear the evidence or any part of the evidence of any witness in camera. Sections 5 , 6 (1) and (2) and 10 (b) of the Ordinance run
