1. Management of public religious trust — Framing of scheme for Acharya's allowance — Ownership of trust bonds — Suit under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )
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1946 Supreme(SC) 8
Privy Council At Bombay
Sir John Beaumont, Du Parcq, Justice Lords Macmillan, JJ.
Swaminarayan Jethalal Chimanlal and others -Appellant
Versus
Acharya Shri Devendraprasadji -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 3 of 1940
Decided On : 13-03-1946
Advocates Appeared:
T.L. Wilson and Co., Sturton, Sturton, J.M.R. Jayakar, S.P. Khambatta, PC Sir Thomas Strangman, J.M. Parikh, J.M. Pringle
T.L. Wilson and Co., Sturton, Sturton, J.M.R. Jayakar, S.P. Khambatta, PC Sir Thomas Strangman, J.M. Parikh, J.M. Pringle
Important Points
The court held that the determination of a personal allowance for the head of a religious trust is a discretionary matter for the court. Additionally, funds provided by a private individual do not constitute trust property, regardless of the current head's claim to them.
Subject
Civil Law - Trust and Religious Endowments
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 92 - Public Religious Trust - Scheme for management - Personal allowance of the head of the institution - Discretion of the Court - Definition of personal expenditure - The Court has the discretion to determine a suitable personal allowance for the head of a religious institution. The specific definition of "personal expenditure" used to exclude household expenses from the allowance is a matter of language and does not involve a question of principle, provided the intention is to provide for private purposes over and above normal maintenance. (Para 6)
(B) Trust Property - Private vs. Public Property - Funds provided by a private individual - If funds were provided by a private individual and not the institution, the institution cannot claim them. However, a court cannot declare such funds as the private property of the current head of the institution without evidence of heirship. (Paras 7, 9)
Facts of the case:
Members of a religious sect challenged a scheme framed by the High Court regarding the management of a temple. The dispute centered on the personal allowance granted to the head of the institution, which excluded household expenses, and the ownership of certain bonds. It was alleged that a specific sum of money, invested in bonds, belonged to the institution, while the head claimed it was private property.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the High Court acted within its discretion in fixing the personal allowance and defining "personal expenditure." Regarding the bonds, it was determined that the sum in question was provided by a private individual and thus did not belong to the institution, although it could not be definitively declared the private property of the current head due to a lack of evidence regarding heirship.
Issues: Whether the High Court erred in the quantum and definition of the personal allowance for the head of the institution, and whether a specific sum of money invested in bonds formed part of the institution's trust property.
Ratio Decidendi: The determination of a suitable personal allowance for the head of a trust is within the discretion of the court. Furthermore, property that never belonged to the institution cannot be claimed by the institution's members, regardless of whether the current head is the rightful heir to that property.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
(B) Trust Property - Private vs. Public Property - Funds provided by a private individual - If funds were provided by a private individual and not the institution, the institution cannot claim them. However, a court cannot declare such funds as the private property of the current head of the institution without evidence of heirship. (Paras 7, 9)
Facts of the case:
Members of a religious sect challenged a scheme framed by the High Court regarding the management of a temple. The dispute centered on the personal allowance granted to the head of the institution, which excluded household expenses, and the ownership of certain bonds. It was alleged that a specific sum of money, invested in bonds, belonged to the institution, while the head claimed it was private property.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the High Court acted within its discretion in fixing the personal allowance and defining "personal expenditure." Regarding the bonds, it was determined that the sum in question was provided by a private individual and thus did not belong to the institution, although it could not be definitively declared the private property of the current head due to a lack of evidence regarding heirship.
Issues: Whether the High Court erred in the quantum and definition of the personal allowance for the head of the institution, and whether a specific sum of money invested in bonds formed part of the institution's trust property.
Ratio Decidendi: The determination of a suitable personal allowance for the head of a trust is within the discretion of the court. Furthermore, property that never belonged to the institution cannot be claimed by the institution's members, regardless of whether the current head is the rightful heir to that property.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Challenge to the quantum and definition of the Acharya's personal allowance and the classification of specific bonds as private property of the Acharya. (Para 6 , 7 )
3. Validity of court's discretion in fixing personal allowances for trust heads — Distinction between trust property and private funds advanced by third parties. (Para 6 , 7 , 9 )
4. Court's discretionary power to determine suitable personal allowances and define personal expenditure when framing a scheme for the management of a public religious trust. (Para 6 )
5. Appeals dismissed — Decree modified to declare specific funds as not belonging to the institution — Appellants ordered to pay costs. (Para 9 , 11 )
6. How does the court determine the personal allowance for the head of a religious institution when framing a scheme?
The court exercises its discretion to provide a suitable allowance based on the institution's financial capacity and may adopt specific definitions of personal expenditure from similar schemes to ensure the head's maintenance is covered over and above private purposes. (Para 6 )
7. Can a court declare funds as the private property of a trust head if they were originally advanced by a third party?
A court may declare that funds advanced by a third party do not form part of the trust property; however, it cannot declare them as the private property of the trust head without evidence of legal heirship. (Para 7 , 9 )
8. What is the scope of the court's power in framing a scheme for a public religious trust under the Code of Civil Procedure?
The court has the authority to frame schemes for management, associate committees of management with the trust head, and determine financial entitlements to ensure the institution's proper upkeep. (Para 3 , 4 , 10 )
Sir John Beaumont.-
These are consolidated appeals from the judgment and two decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in its appellate jurisdiction, both dated 10th October 1934, the first modifying a decree of the Joint Judge of Ahmedabad dated 30th June 1927, and the second a decree of the first class Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad dated 3rd January 1929. The appeals relate to the affairs of the Northern Diocese of the Swaminarayan sect, the head of which is the Acharya of Ahmedabad. The appellants are members of the said sect who have been substituted for the original plaintiffs in the suit who died pending the hearing of this appeal. It is common ground that the Swaminarayan sect was founded in the early part of the 19th century by a religions reformer of northern India, named Sajanand. He built a number of temples, the principal of which were the Nar Narayan temple at Ahmedabad, and the Lakshmi Narayan temple at Vadtal in the Kaira district. In 1827 three years before his death he divided India into two dioceses, north and south, the center of the former being at Ahmedabad, and of the latter at Vadtal, and, on his death, he appointed one of his nephews Acharya of one diocese, and another nephew Acharya of the other diocese. For the upkeep of the Institution, Sajanand provided that his followers should pay a tax known as dharmada which is a percentage on income. Two other forms of money payment came to be made, namely, "nam vero" which is a poll tax paid by every follower to the Acharya each year, and "bhets" which are voluntary offerings to the Acharya made on special occasions.
[2] The questions in this appeal relate solely to the Ahmedabad temple but, in order to understand the main question raised, it is necessary to mention that in the year 1922 a scheme was framed by the High Court of Bombay relating to the Vadtal temple. The High Court held in that case that the Acharya in the southern diocese was not the absolute owner of "nam vero" and "bhets," but was only entitled to be maintained out of them and any surplus had to be applied for the general purposes of the Institution, and the charge on the rest of the property for the maintenance of the Acharya would not attach unless and until the "nam vero" and "bhets" proved insufficient. The scheme provided that personal expenditure on account of the Acharya in excess of Rs. 2,000 a month should be subject to the sanction of a committee, and the term "personal expenditure" was defined to exclude household expenses, including expenses of residence, food, clothing, servants, horses, carriages and elephant, and all customary expenditure on official tours or other official occasions. This definition will be referred to more particularly at a later stage of this judgment. In the year 1901 the Acharya of the Ahmedabad temple died, having by will appointed Vasudev Prasad, who was defendant 1 and was in 1901 a minor of the age of 2½ years, as his successor, and provided that certain named persons as trustees should manage the affairs of the Institution during the minority of defendant 1. In the year 1902, certain members of the sect filed Suit No. 22 of 1902 in the Court of the District Judge of Ahmedabad under the provisions of S. 539 of the then Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding with section 92 of the present Code) asking for the removal of the trustees, appointment of fresh trustees, accounts, and the framing of a scheme.
[3] On 12th April 1905, the District Judge gave judgment in the suit holding that the property in suit (which was the property belonging to the Northern Diocese) was public religious property, but he declined to remove the trustees and thought it unnecessary to frame a scheme. An appeal was preferred to the High Court of Bombay which dismissed the appeal except only in respect of "nam vero" and "bhets." The High Court amended the finding of the lower Court upon this question by declaring that the property in suit was public religious property exc
