Lord Romer:-

This appeal by the plaintiff and cross-appeal by the defendant arise out of a suit brought for the purpose of winding up the affairs of a partnership that existed many years ago between the two parties. The questions that the plaintiff seeks to have decided upon his appeal (apart from a question relating to interest) are questions whether in taking the accounts of the partnership certain items should or should not be allowed on one side or the ether. They are purely questions of fact. It is not and cannot be suggested that they involve any question of principle whatsoever. Such being the case, they most emphatically are not questions that ought to be made the subject of an appeal to His Majesty in Council. It is true that the appeal is concerned with only six out of a great number of items appearing in the account, and that two out of the six were very properly abandoned during the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff. But that is not to the point. If four of such items are to be regarded as a proper subject-matter of appeal to His Majesty in Council, every such item in the accounts must equally be so regarded. It is not, in their Lordships' opinion, either right or proper that the Board should in this way be required to take partnership or any other accounts. If a question of principle be involved it is, of course, another matter. But where this is not the case, the decision of the Court below on the various items of an account should, in their Lordships' opinion and for the reasons just given, be treated as conclusive unless the appellant can prove that the decision is beyond all question erroneous. With these preliminary observations their Lordships turn to the facts that have given rise to the present appeals.

The appellant and respondent in the appeal (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff and the defendant respectively) are brothers, and before 16th August 1914, bad been carrying on in partnership the business of extracting and refining saltpetre at two factories, one being situate at Chappanwali, the other at Gujranwala. The business appears to have been managed by the defendant, the plaintiff being merely a sleeping partner. On 16th August 1914, the partnership was dissolved by mutual agreement. At the same time various items of the partnership property were divided between the parties, as recorded in a document of that date which has been referred to as the deed of partition. It is unnecessary to state the contents of the deed in any detail. It is sufficient to say that the factory at Chappanwali became the sole property of the defendant and the factory at Gujranwala (though at a later date) became the sole property of the plaintiff. Other items of the partnership property not then divided were described in the deed as "remaining joint," which their Lordships understand as meaning that such items were to be dealt with later, either by being taken over by one of the partners (as happened in the case of the factory at Gujranwala) or by being realised by the defendant and the proceeds thereof divided between them. Of these latter items the only one that need be mentioned is a stock of crude saltpetre at the Chappanwali factory, against which in the deed appears the figure of 24,984. The deed did not indicate in express terms whether such figure represented value or weight. The item appears, however, in a list of items against each of which appears a figure that unquestionably, and indeed admittedly, represents its value. The prima facie inference therefore is that the saltpetre was treated by the parties as being worth Rs. 24,984. As to all the items in such list the deed provides that they shall be divided at the end of the year after the refining of the saltpetre.

On 13th June 1916, the plaintiff commenced the h present suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Gujranwala, claiming to have the partnership dissolved and the usual accounts taken. The case would appear to have been simpl