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1935 Supreme(SC) 22

Privy Council At Allahabad
Sir Shadi Lal, Sir Lancelot Sanderson , Alness, Thankerton, Justice Lords Blanesburgh, JJ.
Basant Singh and others -Appellant
Versus
Brij Raj Saran Singh and others -Resopndent
Appeals Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 of 1931; Allahabad Appeals Nos. 2, 7, 8 and 15 of 1929
Decided On : 17-05-1935

Advocates Appeared:
S.L. Polak, W. Wallach, A.M.Dunne, B.B. Lal, J.M. Parikh, L. DeGruyther

The presumption of due execution under Section 90 of the Evidence Act requires the production of the original document and does not extend to copies admitted as secondary evidence. Additionally, customary law may permit the adoption of orphans and persons of different lineages, superseding Mitakshara law.

Headnote:(A) Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 65 and 90 - Admissibility of secondary evidence - Presumption as to documents thirty years old - Production of original document required for presumption under Section 90 - A copy admitted as secondary evidence under Section 65 does not attract the presumption of due execution of the original under Section 90.

(B) Customary Law - Adoption - Validity of adoption of an orphan and a person of a different lineage - Customary law may supersede Mitakshara law - If customary law permits, the adoption of an orphan or a person from a different lineage is valid.

(C) Evidence - Genuineness of a will - Long-term recognition and acting upon a will by family members creates a strong presumption in favor of its genuineness, especially when the status acquired is challenged after a long lapse of time.

Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding the succession to an estate after the death of the last male holder and subsequently his widow. The widow had adopted a son based on authority granted in a will. The adoption was challenged on the grounds that the widow lacked authority, the adopted son was an orphan, and he belonged to a different lineage. The original will was lost, and a copy was produced as evidence.

Findings of Court:
The court held that the copy of the will was admissible as secondary evidence. The will was deemed genuine due to the long-term recognition of the adoption by the family. It was further determined that the deceased was governed by customary law, which permitted the adoption of an orphan and a person of a different lineage.

Issues: Whether the presumption of due execution under Section 90 of the Evidence Act applies to a copy of a document; whether the adoption of an orphan and a person of a different lineage is valid under the applicable customary law.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that Section 90 of the Evidence Act requires the actual production of the document to trigger the presumption of due execution; a copy admitted under Section 65 does not satisfy this requirement. Regarding adoption, the court found that customary law, established through official records, supersedes Mitakshara law and allows for the adoption of orphans and persons of different lineages.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • family law
    • adoption
      • customary law
      • mitakshara law
  • practice and procedure
    • evidence
      • secondary evidence
      • presumptions
      • public records

Lord Thankerton:-

These are consolidated appeals from four decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dated the 16th January 1929, which substantially reversed a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Meerut, dated 2nd March 1925. The property in suit is the Sahanpur estate situated in the District of Meerut, and the last male holder was Kunwar Khushal Singh, a Hindu Jat, who died on 6th August 1879, leaving surviving him a Widow, Rani Raghubir Kunwar, who died on 24th November 1920. The present suit was instituted on 1st May, 1923. The right of succession to the estate lies between the plaintiff-appellants 1 to 5, who are now admitted to be the nearest reversioners, and the original respondent in the leading appeal, Kunwar Brijraj Saran Singh, defendant 1 in the suit, who is now deceased, and whose representative is now respondent. Defendant 1 was in possession, and claimed as adopted son under an adoption made by the said Rani on 13th April 1903. The fact of the adoption is not disputed, but its validity is challenged by the appellants, and this forms the main issue in the appeal. The remaining plaintiffs and defendants claim under-rights derived from plaintiffs 1 to 5 and defendant 1 or Rani Raghubir Kunwar respectively, but no separate question arises as to their rights unless the appeal succeeds.

The validity of the adoption of defendant 1 is challenged in respect of (1) the widow's authority to adopt, and (2), the fact that defendant 1 was an orphan at the time of his adoption. Khushal Singh was the adopted son of Raja Nahar Singh of Ballabgarh in the Delhi District, at that time in the North Western Provinces. Nahar Singh joined the mutineers during the Mutiny and was hanged; his estate was confiscated in 1858 by the Government, who granted allowances to his dependants on condition that they left their home. Khushal Singh migrated to Kuchesar, a large estate in the Bulandshahr and Meerut districts, and married Bhup Kunwar, the daughter of Gulab Singh, the last male owner of that estate. On the death of Bhup Kunwar about 1859, there was litigation amongst various claimants to the estate, including Khushal Singh, which ended in a compromise, which was recorded in a decree dated 29th May 1868, and under which a 5 annas share was carved out of the estate and allotted to Khushal Singh and was thereafter known as the Sahanpur estate, the succession to which is now in dispute. After the compromise Khushal Singh married Rani Raghubir Kunwar, who was the daughter of Umrao Singh, to whom a 6 annas share had been allotted under the compromise, which retained the name of the Kuchesar estate. The remaining 5 annas share went to one Partab Singh, and is known as the Muhiuddinpur estate. It is alleged that on 26th July 1879-eleven days before his death-Khushal Singh executed a will, under which, by para. 3, he gave authority to his widow to adopt a boy, in the event of his having no son or adopted son living at his death, in accordance with the custom prevailing among the Jats, in the first place from the family of the present rais of Kuchesar; in the second place a descendant of Rao Maharaj Singh, resident of Muhiudinpur, and in the event of this being impossible, in the third place, any boy belonging to the brotherhood. She should bring up the boy, educate him and perform his marriage. From the time of adoption that son shall be like the begotten son of my wife and me. But when a boy of one family has been adopted, a boy of another family shall not have any right to urge his claim for being adopted.

That authority is in terms narrated in the deed of adoption of defendant 1 of 13th April 1903. The original will has not been produced, but a copy has been produced, which was made in 1897, under circumstances which will be referred to later. Khushal Singh and his family were Hindu Jats, and the appellants maintain that they were governed by the Mitakshara law, under which the adoption of an orphan is admittedly invalid. B





















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