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1936 Supreme(SC) 12
Privy Council At Trinidad and Tobago
Sir Sydney Rowlatt, Maugham , Justice Lords Atkin , JJ.
Andre Paul Terence Ambard -Appellant
Versus
Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago -Resopndent
Appeal No. 46 of 1935
Decided On : 02-03-1936
Kenelm Preedy, F.P.M. Schiller , R.A. Willes, E.W. Cave
Fair and good-faith criticism of judicial acts, including discussions on sentencing disparities and the role of judicial discretion, does not constitute contempt of court, as justice must be open to public scrutiny provided no improper motives are imputed and there is no malice.
Headnote:(A) Jurisdiction of Appellate Court - Appeals from Contempt Orders - The general prerogative of the Sovereign extends to the review of all judicial decisions of Courts of Record in overseas dominions, including those imposing penalties for contempt of court, whether civil or criminal. (Paras 1-10)
(B) Contempt of Court - Scandalising the Court vs. Fair Criticism - Any act or writing calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or lower their authority constitutes one class of contempt. However, judges and courts are open to criticism. Reasonable argument or expostulation against a judicial act, provided it is done in good faith, without imputing improper motives, and without malice, does not constitute contempt. Justice is not a cloistered virtue and must be subject to the scrutiny and respectful comments of ordinary citizens. (Paras 15-18)
(C) Freedom of the Press - Criticism of Sentencing - The right of the press to criticize the administration of justice includes the right to discuss the inequality of sentences and the influence of the "human element" in awarding punishment, provided such criticism is temperate and fair. (Paras 19-22)
Facts of the case:
An editor of a daily newspaper published an article comparing two sentences for attempted murder, suggesting that the disparity in sentencing was due to the personal discretion and habit of mind of the presiding judges. The lower court found the article was written with the direct object of bringing the administration of criminal law into disrepute and imposed a fine for contempt of court.
Findings of Court:
There was no evidence that the article was written with the direct object of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, nor that it was written with untruth or malice. The criticism of the inequality of sentences was a legitimate exercise of the right to criticize the public acts of the judiciary.
Issues: Whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a contempt order and whether the publication of an article criticizing sentencing disparities constituted contempt of court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the public and the press have a right to criticize judicial acts in good faith. Pointing out the inequality of sentences and the role of judicial discretion does not amount to scandalising the court unless improper motives are imputed or the act is driven by malice.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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contempt of court
- scandalising the court
- freedom of the press
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contempt of court
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constitutional law
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jurisdiction
- privy council
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jurisdiction
Lord Atkin:-
This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago ordering the appellant to pay a fine of £25 or in default to be imprisoned for one month for contempt of Court, and further ordering him to pay the costs of the proceedings as between solicitor and client. The first question that arises is whether, as contended by the respondent, the Privy Council is incompetent to entertain an appeal from an order of a Court of Record inflicting a penalty for contempt of Court. The decisions on the point are conflicting. In Rainy v. Justices of Sierra Leone , (1852) 8 Moo PC 47, a Board consisting of Lord Cranworth, Knight Bruce L.J., Dr. Lushington and Sir Edward Ryan undoubtedly decided that no such appeal lay. Lord Cranworth, in giving the judgment of the Board, after pointing out that in this country every Court of Record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of Court proceeded:
We are of opinion that it is a Court of Record, and that the law must be considered the same there as in this country; and therefore that the orders made by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, imposing these fines for contempts, are conclusive, and cannot be questioned by another Court; and we do not consider that there is any remedy by petition to the Judicial Committee to review the propriety of such orders.
The argument, with respect, is not convincing, for it would, seem to apply equally to all decisions in criminal cases which at that time in both this country and the colony were conclusive and could not be questioned by any Court. In McDermott v. Chief Justice of British Guiana . (1868) 2 PC 341=5 Moore PC (NS) 466=38 LJ PC 1=17 WR 352=20 LT 74, leave to appeal from a committal for contempt had been given "without prejudice to the competency of Her Majesty to entertain an appeal." At the hearing the Board, consisting of Lord Chelmsford, Wood, L.J., Sir James Colvile and Sir E. Vaughan Williams, treated the hearing as a motion to revoke the leave. An incidental question was whether the Court that imposed the penalty was a Court of Record and in giving the judgment of the Board Lord Chelmsford said that the applicant had to show either that the Court was not a Court of Record or that if it was, yet there was something in the order which rendered it improper and therefore the subject of appeal. He proceeded to say:
Not a single case is to be found where there has been a committal by one of the Colonial Courts for contempt, where it appeared clearly upon the face of the order that the party had committed a contempt, that he had been duly summoned, and that the punishment awarded for the contempt was an appropriate one, in which this Committee has ever entertained an appeal against an order of this description.
(2) McDermott v. Chief Justice of British Guiana , (1868) 2 PC 341=5 Moore PC (NS) 466=38 LJ PC 1=17 WR 352=20 LT 74.
It would appear to their Lordships that the grounds of decision assume that jurisdiction exists at any rate in cases where it does not appear on the face of the order that the party had committed a contempt, etc. Whether this means that if the order merely recited that a contempt had been committed without more the Board would examine the alleged contempt is not clear. But in Surendranath Banerji y. Chief Justice of Bengal, (1883) 10 Cal 109=10 IA 171 (PC), on an appeal from a committal for contempt by the High Court in Calcutta, the Board examined the written article which was complained of and said that it was clearly a contempt of Court. They set out the passage from McDermott v. Chief Justice of British Guiana . (1868) 2 PC 341=5 Moore PC (NS) 466=38 LJ PC 1=17 WR 352=20 LT 74 at p. 363, which has just been quoted, and proceeded:
Their Lordships having decided that the libel was a contempt of Court, and that the High Court had jurisdiction to commit the petitioner for a period of two months, the case is not a proper one for an appeal to Her Majesty.
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