1936 Supreme(SC) 25
Privy Council At Allahabad
Sir George Rankin, Sir Shadi Lal, Justice Lord Blanesburgh, JJ.
Gopi Krishna Kasaudhan -Appellant
Versus
Jaggo and another -Resopndent
Appeal No. 34 of 1934, Allahabad Appeal No. 26 of 1933
Decided On : 28-04-1936
J.M. Parikh
Marriage between different sub-castes of the same Varna is valid under Hindu law as the Shastras contain no prohibition against it, and social prejudice does not constitute a legal bar. Additionally, custom may allow a deserted wife to remarry.
Headnote:(A) Hindu Law - Marriage - Validity of re-marriage after abandonment - Custom recognizing and sanctioning the re-marriage of a woman abandoned by her husband dissolves the marriage tie and permits her to contract another marriage.
(B) Hindu Law - Marriage - Inter-sub-caste marriages within the same Varna - No rule in the Shastras or general principles of Hindu law prohibits marriage between persons belonging to different divisions of the same Varna - Social prejudice or disinclination to marry outside a sub-caste does not amount to a legal prohibition or a custom with the force of law.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding the estate of a deceased person. The appellant, a legitimate son, claimed the entire estate, asserting that the other son was illegitimate. The other son's mother had been married twice previously; the second husband had abandoned her. She subsequently married the deceased through an informal ceremony. The appellant challenged the validity of this marriage on two grounds: first, that the previous marriage still existed, and second, that the parties belonged to different sub-castes of the same Varna.
Findings of Court:
The court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the woman had been deserted and that, by applicable custom, such abandonment dissolved the marriage tie. Regarding the sub-caste issue, the court found no legal rule or Shastric injunction forbidding marriage between different divisions of the same Varna.
Issues: Whether the abandonment of a wife by her husband dissolves the marriage tie under custom, and whether a marriage between members of different sub-castes of the same Varna is invalid under Hindu law.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that concurrent findings of fact regarding custom-based dissolution of marriage via abandonment are not to be disturbed. It further ruled that since the Shastras do not forbid marriages between different divisions of the same Varna, and no custom to the contrary was proved, such marriages are valid despite any existing social prejudices.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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family law
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hindu law
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marriage
- validity of marriage
- remarriage
- succession
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marriage
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hindu law
Sir Shadi Lal:-
This appeal raises a question which has an important bearing upon the law of marriage governing the Hindu community. It arises out of a dispute relating to the estate of one Nikku Lal, who died in July 1923. Nikku Lal was a member of the Vaishya caste of Gorakhpur in the United Provinces of India, and followed the Mitakshara School of Hindu law.
The plaintiff Gopi Krishna, who is the appellant before their Lordships, is admittedly Nikku Lal's legitimate son; and his right to a moiety of the estate is no longer in dispute. He however claims the entire estate on the ground that the defendant, Sri Kishan, is not a legitimate son of Nikku Lal, and therefore has no interest in the property left by him.
That Sri Krishna was born of a woman called Jaggo is not disputed, but the question is whether she was, at that time, a lawfully wedded wife of Nikku Lal. It appears that she was originally married to one Baijnath, while she was a minor; and that, after his death, she married his younger brother Sheonath. The second marriage however did not prove to be a happy one, as Sheonath had another wife who naturally disliked the advent of a rival. There were consequently quarrels between the two wives, and the husband, in order to put an end to the trouble, abandoned the second wife.
Thus deserted Jaggo entered into a matrimonial alliance with Nikku Lal by performing the ceremony of sagai. Now sagai is an informal ceremony of marriage and the Courts below have concurred in holding, not only that she performed the ceremony of sagai with Nikku Lal, but also that it is recognized as a valid ceremony in the case of a re-marriage. This decision is not challenged before their Lordships, but it is urged that the lady could not contract a valid marriage during the continuance of her marriage with Sheonath. It is obvious that she could not marry Nikku Lal if she was still Sheonath's wife. The defendants how-ever invoke a custom which recognises and sanctions the re-marriage of a woman who has been abandoned by her husband. The learned Judges of the High Court have, upon an examination of the evidence, endorsed the conclusion of the trial Judge that Jaggo had been deserted by Sheonath before she married Nikku Lal, and that, by a custom applicable to the parties, such abandonment or desertion of the wife by her husband dissolves the marriage tie and sets her free to contract another marriage. Their Lordships see no reason for departing from the general rule of practice that they will not make a fresh examination of facts for the purpose of disturbing concurrent findings recorded by two Courts in India.
Then, if the existence of Sheonath did not invalidate the marriage of Jaggo with Nikku Lal, was it invalid on any other ground? It is contended on behalf of the appellant that, as the parties to the marriage belonged to two different sub-castes of Vaishyas, the man being a Kasaudhan and the woman an Agrahari, they could not, under the Hindu law, enter into a lawful marriage with each other. Their Lordships are not aware of any rule of Hindu law, and certainly none has been cited, which would prevent a marriage between persons belonging to two different divisions of the same caste. Indeed, there are several decided cases which have upheld such marriages. It is sufficient to refer, in this connexion to two judgments of the Board, Inderun Valungypooly Taver v. Ramaswamy Pandia Talaver , (1869-70) 13 MIA 141=3 Beng LR 1=12 WR 41=2 Suther 267=2 Sar 498 (PC) and Ramamani Ammal v. Kulanthai Natchear , (1870-72) 14 MIA 346.
It is true that both these cases, as well as the judgments of the High Courts which are founded upon them, relate to the Sudra caste; and the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that they cannot establish the validity of a marriage between persons belonging to two sub-castes of a twice-born class such as the Vaishyas. There can however be no doubt that the texts of the Hindu law do not enunciate any rule pr