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1937 Supreme(SC) 15
Privy Council At Patna
Sir George Rankin, Sir Shadi Lal , Justice Lord Maugham, JJ.
Maharaja Sir Kesho Prasad Singh Bahadur -Appellant
Versus
Bahuria Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer and others -Resopndent
Appeal No. 19 of 1933, Patna Appeal No. 33 of 1930
Decided On : 01-02-1937
Dold, Douglas Grant, Hunter, Watkins, J.E. Godfrey, Dunne
A judgment is generally inadmissible against a stranger to the suit regarding the truth of the matter decided. Following a revenue sale, former owners must prove actual continuous possession, such as receipt of rent, to establish adverse possession against the purchaser.
Headnote:(A) Evidence Act - Sections 11, 13, 32(4), 35, 36, 83 - Limitation Act, 1908 - Article 144 - United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 - Sections 32, 33, 40, 41, 44 - Admissibility of judgments against third parties - A judgment is generally not admissible evidence against a stranger to the suit as to the truth of the matter decided - While a judgment, the preceding plaint, and execution steps may be evidence of an assertion of a right, they do not alter the burden of proof between rival claimants nor constitute a judgment in rem.
(B) United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 - Section 44 - Statutory presumption of correctness - The presumption of truth applies specifically to entries made under Section 33(3) - Entries in government records are primarily evidence of title because they are evidence of possession; if such entries are contrary to the facts of possession at the time they were made, they carry little weight.
(C) Limitation Act, 1908 - Article 144 - Adverse possession - Where land is transferred via a revenue sale, there is no legal presumption that the old proprietors remained in possession contrary to the purchaser's rights - To establish adverse possession, the former proprietors must prove they continued in possession, typically by demonstrating the receipt of rents from tenants subsequent to the sale - The mere fact that the purchaser was not in possession or did not receive rent is insufficient to warrant a finding of adverse possession.
Facts of the case:
The dispute involves the title to agricultural lands formed by river accretion. The appellant claimed superior interest in the lands based on a 1903 purchase of an estate through a revenue sale. The respondents claimed title as co-sharers of a neighboring estate. The appellant relied on a decree and a boundary map from a 1911 suit involving other co-sharers, as well as subsequent revenue revisions, to assert title. The respondents contended that the lands belonged to their estate or that the appellant's title was extinguished by their adverse possession.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the 1916 decree and the associated map were not binding on the respondents as they were not parties to that litigation. The revenue records produced by the appellant did not meet the statutory requirements to attract the presumption of correctness under the relevant Land Revenue Act. Regarding adverse possession, the court held that the respondents failed to provide sufficient evidence of continuous and exclusive possession for the statutory period of 12 years following the 1903 sale.
Issues: Whether a decree and map from a previous suit are admissible as evidence of title against third parties; whether specific revenue entries carry a statutory presumption of correctness; and whether the respondents established adverse possession to displace the appellant's title.
Ratio Decidendi: A judgment is not admissible against a stranger to the suit to prove the truth of the matter decided. Statutory presumptions in revenue records are limited to specific entries made under the prescribed legal process. In the context of revenue sales, the burden of proof lies with the former owners to demonstrate actual continuous possession to establish adverse possession; the purchaser's failure to take physical possession does not automatically create a presumption of adverse possession in favor of the former owners.
Result: Appeal partly allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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land title
- adverse possession
- accretion and diluvion
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land title
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practice and procedure
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evidence
- admissibility of judgments
- public records
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evidence
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administrative law
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land revenue
- revenue sales
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land revenue
Sir George Rankin:-
In this case five appeals remain to be decided, seven having been compromised. The plaintiff in suit No. 106 (appeal No. 35) was Bahuria Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer and the principal defendant was the then Maharaja of Dumraon. In the other four suits the Maharaja was plaintiff and the principal defendant was Babu Ramsarup Singh, Mt. Bhagjogna's husband. These original parties have all died and their place has been taken by representatives, but these changes in the record may be disregarded for the sake of brevity in expression. The suits arose out of proceedings taken by the tenants of certain agricultural lands near to the River Ganges and to the border line between the district of Shahabad in Bihar and Orissa and the district of Ballia in the United Provinces. By S. 149, Bengal Tenancy Act, a tenant, if sued for rent by a person whose title to the rent he does not admit, may pay the money into Court with a plea that the rent is due to a third person. The Court thereupon gives notice to the third person with a view to his bringing a suit against the plaintiff and obtaining an "order restraining payment out of the money". In the case of the five tenancies, with which the present case is now concerned, the suits so brought raised the question of title to the lands of the tenancies, and were not confined to the question of the right to a particular amount of rent deposited.
The controversy between the Maharaja on the one hand and Bhagjogna and Ramsarup on the other hand, arises out of the fact that in the district in question the River Ganges has altered its course from time to time. Originally, on the northern bank, and in what is now the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, there was a revenue paying estate called Mahal Sheopur Diar. As land accreted to this estate by the recession of the river towards the south another estate was settled called Sheopur Diar Numberi. In 1825 a further accretion of a large quantity of land had taken place and this in turn was made into a separate estate, Sheopur Diar Gangbarar (hereinafter called Gangbarar). The river continued to alter its course to the south and by 1851 still further accretion had taken place. At some date between 1851 and 1862 it returned to the north, flowing through the middle of Gangbarar, as indeed it still does. More land having thus emerged to the south of Gangbarar, a separate estate, Sheopur Diar Naubarar ("Naubarar") was formed in 1862 and settled with the owner of estate Gangbarar to which it had accreted. The main question at issue is : What land was thus settled in 1862? And it arises from the fact that in 1903 the proprietors of Naubarar having defaulted in payment of land revenue, the estate Naubarar was sold for arrears of revenue under the provisions of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act (11 of 1859) to a purchaser acting on behalf of the then Maharani of Dumraon. The rubakari, dated 11th September 1903, confirming the sale under S. 27 of the Act has been put in evidence, and from this it appears that the subject matter of the sale was "No. 1504 Shibpur Diar Naubarar, parganah Bhojpur". By virtue of this purchase by his predecessor, the Maharaja of Dumraon claims to be entitled to the superior interest in the whole of Naubarar, whatever its boundaries may be, and he claims that those boundaries include the lands of the tenancies which form the subject matter of the five suits now before the Board.
Ramsarup, on the other hand, on 23rd March 1920, and his wife Bhagjogna, on 8th December 1915, purchased an interest in the estate Gangbarar. In this way each derives title as a co-sharer to a subdivision of Gangbarar, Bhagjogna being co-sharer in patti Sheo Bux Singh and Ramsarup in patti Naunhid Singh. The lands of Gangbarar from long before 1903 have been distributed among some 17 pattis, and the lands of each patti are also allocated to particular co-sharers in respect of their interest in the patti. Thus, for example, in Mt. Bhagjogna's suit she claims to
