1. Suit for partition of immoveable property and recovery of legacy — dispute over validity of sale deed and interpretation of a will regarding revestment of property. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 )
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1937 Supreme(SC) 34
Privy Council At Bombay
Sir George Rankin, Sir Shadi Lal, Justice Lord Maugham, JJ.
Hari Sadashiv Khare -Appellant
Versus
Sitabai Ramchandra Sadashiv Khare and another -Resopndent
Appeal No. 57 of 1934
Decided On : 19-03-1937
Advocates Appeared:
T.L. Wilson and Co., Harold Shephard, J.M. Parikh, P.V. Subba Row, L. DeGruyther
T.L. Wilson and Co., Harold Shephard, J.M. Parikh, P.V. Subba Row, L. DeGruyther
A will's clause directing a beneficiary to maintain themselves from their "entire estate" can be interpreted as a gift revesting property. Additionally, beneficiaries of an estate are equitably liable for the deceased's debts to the extent of the benefits received.
Headnote:(A) Hindu Law - Mitakshara Law - Testamentary Disposition - Interpretation of Will - Revestment of property - Where a will contains a clause stating that a beneficiary should maintain herself by making expenses from the "entire estate got by her" and is competent to give her "whole estate" to an adopted son, such language, despite inaccuracies, is sufficient to negative the theory of a mere recital and indicates an intention to revest property previously transferred by a sale deed.
(B) Equity - Liability of Beneficiaries - Principle that he who takes the benefit must also take the burden - A person taking the estate of a deceased is under an obligation to pay the debts of the deceased to the extent of the estate received.
Facts of the case:
A testator devised immoveable property to two widows in equal shares. One widow subsequently acquired the other's share through a sale deed for inadequate consideration. The purchasing widow later executed a will which, in one clause, stated that the other widow should maintain herself from the "entire estate got by her" and could give her "whole estate" to a son she might adopt. Upon the death of the testatrix, a dispute arose between the adopted son of the testatrix and the other widow regarding the ownership of the immoveable property and the payment of a monetary legacy due under the original testator's will.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the language used in the will was intended to operate as a gift, thereby revesting the property in the daughter-in-law. Regarding the monetary legacy, the court found that the beneficiary of the estate is liable for the debts of the deceased to the extent of the assets received.
Issues: Whether a specific clause in a will, describing a beneficiary's right to maintain herself from her "entire estate," constitutes a gift of property previously sold to the testatrix, and whether a beneficiary of an estate is liable for the deceased's debts.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that the phrase "entire estate" and the reference to the beneficiary's ability to give her "whole estate" to an adopted son imply that the testatrix intended to return the property; otherwise, the beneficiary could not maintain herself or bequeath property she did not own. Furthermore, based on equitable principles, a beneficiary who accepts the benefits of an estate must also assume its burdens, including the payment of debts.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
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2. Whether a sale deed was nominal — whether a specific clause in a will operated as a gift revesting property in the beneficiary — liability for unpaid legacies. (Para 7 )
3. The sale deed was valid based on facts; Clause 7 of the will, despite imprecise language, intended to revest the property in the daughter-in-law as a gift. (Para 7 )
4. A testamentary clause directing a beneficiary to maintain themselves from an estate and empower them to bequeath it implies a gift revesting the property. (Para 7 )
5. How is a testamentary clause interpreted when it grants a beneficiary the power to maintain themselves and bequeath the estate?
Such a clause is interpreted as a gift that revests the property in the beneficiary, rather than being a mere recital, especially when it empowers the beneficiary to maintain themselves and bequeath the estate to another. (Para 7 )
6. Does an adopted son automatically acquire rights to the self-acquired property of the adoptive father?
No, an adopted son does not automatically acquire rights over the self-acquired immoveable property of the adoptive father, as the testator may preserve ownership rights over such property. (Para 3 )
Lord Maugham:-
This is an appeal from a decree dated 29th February 1932, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, affirming with the exception of certain costs of defendant 2, who is not a party to this appeal, the decree dated 23rd October 1929, of the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Ratnagiri. The suit in which the said decrees were passed was brought by the respondent, Sitabai, against the appellant, Hari Sadashiv Khare (defendant 1), for partition of immoveable properties consisting of agricultural land and two houses of which the plaintiff and defendant 1 were in joint possession and for separate possession of her (plaintiff's) own share therein. Both Courts in India have given judgment in favour of Sitabai, who however has since died. The parties are Hindus of the Brahmin caste subject to the Mitakshara law as interpreted in Bombay. One Sadashivrao Khare, a retired Subordinate Judge, died on 4th May 1915, leaving him surviving his widow Yamunabai and the respondent (Sitabai) the widow of his only son Ramchandra who had predeceased him. Sadashivrao left a will dated 2nd February 1914 and a codicil thereto dated 5th January 1915. The testator by his will after stating that all his properties were acquired by himself proceeded to devise his entire immoveable property consisting of two houses and certain agricultural lands to the two widows in equal shares. He gave the bulk of his moveables, consisting of promissory notes, debts due to him and gold and silver ornaments, to his own widow (Yamunabai) but gave a part thereof of the value of Rs. 14,200 in addition to a large proportion of gold and silver ornaments to his son's widow (Sitabai). In the codicil the testator stated that the promissory notes of the amounts mentioned in his will to be given to the widows had already been transferred to them respectively. He also stated that the ornaments bequeathed to them were in fact ornaments which belonged to them as their stridhan.
On 6th April 1916, the testator's widow Yamunabai, obtained probate of both the testamentary documents. The two widows lived together in the dwelling-house left to them jointly on very amicable terms until the death of the elder widow on 9th July 1927. On 13th June 1916, Yamunabai adopted or purported to adopt the appellant as the son of her late husband. The appellant was a son of Yamunabai's sister and was at the time a married man of 30 years of age and a practising pleader. The appellant's name in his natural family was Maheshwar Dhondo Sathe and on adoption he was re-named Hari Sadashiv Khare though he continued to use the name of Maheshwar. Three documents were executed on the date abovementioned. The first was a deed of adoption executed by Yamunabai in favour of the appellant. It was afterwords registered. The second was a document executed by the appellant in favour of the adoptive mother to the effect that by his adoption he did not get any right to the moveable and immoveable property given to her as stridhan under the will of her late husband "excepting to the estate that you may of your own accord give me out of the same". The third document was executed by the adoptive mother. It is called "vyawasthapatra" which is a will. By it Yamunabai devised the whole of the immoveable property which she had got under her husband's will to the appellant and bequeathed to him a large portion of the moveable property.
On 20th July 1916, the younger widow, Sitabai, executed a deed of sale in favour of the elder widow Yumunabai in respect of the immoveable property which she had received under the will of her father-in-law for the consideration, as stated, of Rs. 2,000. It seems to be agreed that the sale deed was executed for a specific purpose though there is no agreement as to the nature of the purpose. In spite of this document, both widows remained in joint possession and enjoyment of the immoveable property which they had respectively received under the will of Sadashivrao. The parties
