The court held that proving collateral relationships in India does not require "special strictness." A reasonable standard of proof, combining oral testimony of deceased persons with special knowledge and corroborating documentary or circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to establish pedigree.

Sir George Rankin:-

On this appeal the question for decision is whether the plaintiffs have shown that they are the nearest reversioners of one Rokkam Nagi Reddi, a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara. The year of his death is not precisely ascertained but that he died "about 1898" or "about 1900" is not in dispute. The succession to his estate opened on the death of his widow Chinnamma in 1935. The word "Rokkam" is a "house name" or "family name" but witnesses on both sides agree that there are in the same village several families using this "house name" who are not related to one another. The addition of the word "Reddi"-used in certain families, including the family now in question, as a name-does not make it distinctive of any single family. The caste of Rokkam Nagi Reddi was kapu (agriculturist).

The appellants (defendants 2 and 3) not only deny the alleged relationship between Nagi Reddi and the plaintiffs: they claim to be themselves his nearest reversioners. The trial Judge accepted the defendants' case and dismissed the suit (22nd June 1928). The High Court of Madras reversed this decision and gave the plaintiffs a decree for possession of the suit lands together with mesne profits and other relief (13th October 1933).

The schedule to the plaint set forth as the properties which belonged to the estate of Nagi Reddi 14 items in three different villages-five (items 1-5) being in Londipalli, eight (items 6-13) in Nannur and one (item 14) in Bodduvanipalli. Item 5 (in Londipalli) is a share of a hay yard (vamidoddi) : this defendants 2 and 3 claimed as their own, denying that it had ever belonged to Nagi Reddi, but the High Court found against the defendants on the point and the matter is not now in contest. The other 13 items are fields, of which the area and other particulars are given. It is established by documentary evidence that Nagi Reddi's father obtained items 10, 11, and 12 in 1875 and 1877 by purchase. Item 13 is said by plaintiff 2, who gave evidence at the trial, to have been bought by Nagi Reddi himself: for this and for item 14 no document of purchase is in evidence, but it is not in dispute that they belonged to Nagi Reddi.

By deed dated 15th October 1921 Chinnamma gave a lease for 10 years of the suit lands (or the bulk of them) together with certain other land of hers to the first defendant, Bachu Seshaya, at a rent of Rs. 600 per year in addition to payment of the land revenue. On 14th April 1922, Bachu Seshaya sublet to plaintiff 1 for Rs. 150 a year, two fields, of which one at least had belonged to Nagi Reddi. Chinnamma having died on 15th November 1925, the appellants (defendants 2 and 3) at the end of the agricultural year (April 1926) obtained possession from Bachu Seshaya of all the lands which had been let to him by her (including the fields sub-let by him to plaintiff 1). Bachu Seshaya claimed to be discharged of his obligation to pay Rs. 600 as rent for 1925-26 by reason that Chinnamma a few days before her death had orally directed him to pay that sum to the managers of certain temples. This claim the appellants allowed, calling evidence in support of it at the trial; but the High Court rejected it and gave a decree against the first defendant for the balance of rent due up to April 1926. The first defendant has not appealed from the High Court's decree and the question is now of importance only as part of the circumstances in which the appellants (defendants 2 and 3) obtained possession of the suit lands, with the consequence that on 28th December 1926 they were recorded by the tahsildar in the revenue records as the persons in possession. The plaintiffs being out of possession had to assume the burden of proving their title and brought their suit on 2nd December 1926.

Neither of the rival parties has put forward evidence of the kind described in the 6th or 7th clause of S. 32, Evidence Act-i.e., statements in wills, horoscopes, family pedigrees, andc., as to the existence of relationship between pe