Lord Maugham:-

This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in its appellate jurisdiction, dated 19th March 1935. The judgment allowed in part the respondent's appeal from the decree of Davar, J. dated 23rd August 1934, and swarded him the sum of Rs.17,000 as damages for wrongful dismissal from the service of the appellant company. Various questions were argued in the Courts below; but the only question with which their Lordships find it necessary to deal is whether, assuming that upon the true construction of the contract of service between the parties, the respondent's employment was not terminable on one month's notice, the appellants were entitled summarily to dismiss the respondent from their service. In the view their Lordships take of the appeal it is unnecessary to express an opinion upon the true construction of the contract of service, or on the question as to the proper measure of damages, if any were recoverable.

The appellants carry on a large insurance business in Bombay. A firm called Lalji Narainji and Co., are the managing agents and Mr. Lalji Narainji is or was the chairman of the board of directors of the appellants. A Mr. Mody was the managing governor and was authorized to do all the business of the company subject to the control of the managing agents. The respondent was at first in the service of the appellants from 1st June 1925 until 1st June 1926, as a canvasser. In May 1928, the appellants opened a Life Insurance Department, and in that month the respondent re-entered their service as manager of that department. His salary began at Rs. 200 a month. On 24th January 1930, after some other increases, it was raised to Rs. 400 a month as from 1st January, and by a letter of 24th January it was agreed that in the event of the Life Department showing certain annual increases in the business, his salary would be gradually increased up to a maximum of Rs.700 a month. The letter concluded by saying :

In the event of your not being able to fulfill the guarantee mentioned above we have the right to terminate your engagement at any time thereafter by one month's prior notice of our intention to do so.

The letter contained no other statement as to the notice to which the respondent was to be entitled if he was dismissed. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that, upon the true construction of the letter, he was entitled to continue in his employment for at least 3 1/2 years (afterwards extended to 4 1/2 years) subject only to the right to terminate under the concluding paragraph of the letter, in the event of the so-called guarantee as to increase of business not being fulfilled. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this part of the case. The respondent was in fact dismissed from his employment on 21st December 1931, by a letter stating that his services were no longer required, and that the casheir had been instructed to pay him his salary for the current month, and also one month's salary in lieu of notice. The letter was signed by Mr. Mody as managing governor of the company; and both he and the secretary of the company deposed to the fact that the letter was written in that form out of consideration for the respondent, and in order that he should not find it difficult to obtain service elsewhere. Their Lordships were not persuaded that one month's notice was sufficient unless the clause at the end of the letter of 24th January 1930 could be relied on, a question which depends on facts on which there have been findings in favour of the respondent. Their Lordships, therefore, must approach the matter as if the case was one of summary dismissal without notice, though clearly the position of the appellants is not worse than it would have been if no salary in lieu of notice had been paid.

The respondent at the trial and before their Lordships has placed much reliance on a circular bearing date 31st October 1929, and circulated among the sup