Lord Maugham:-

This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Allahabad, dated 5th December 1933, which reversed the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly, dated 30th July 1929. The plaintiff-appellant is a pardanashin lady, who at the date of the suit was, as their Lordships are given to understand, nearly 60 years old. She claimed in the suit instituted by her a declaration that a certain deed of gift dated 13th April 1928, executed by her in favour of defendant 2, was obtained through fraud; that she did not understand the contents of it; that she could not get independent advice in respect of it; that the conditions for consideration were not fulfilled; that she had no intention to execute the same, and that therefore it was null and void as against the plaintiff. The person in whose favour the deed of gift was executed, (defendant 2), was her grandson, a minor, who is now respondent 1 (commonly called Majjan), a child whom she had brought up from the age of only 10 months old on the death of his mother and on whom, according to the evidence, she had bestowed much love and affection. Defendant 1 (now deceased) was her younger son, Iftikhar Wali Khan, the guardian of the donee. The gift had been completed by delivery of possession shortly after the deed had been registered. The High Court at Allahabad in a very able judgment carefully considered the nature of the transaction embodied in the deed of gift. They examined the evidence as to the income of the appellant, and the liabilities of her estate and as to the benefits which were to come to her under the deed of gift. It will not be necessary to mention all the figures; but it is material to state that the gift was a gift for consideration, that it is plain that the lady, who was at the date of the deed about 58 years of age, derived substantial advantages from its execution and that it was beyond doubt a reasonable document for her to enter into. It is of first importance to observe that the deed was not an improvident document which the appellant, if adequately advised, could not properly have entered into, but is one which might well be to her real advantage. There was a great deal of dispute as to the extent of her knowledge of the precise terms of the deed before it was executed and a little dispute as to what took place when three days after the execution of the deed it came in for registration in due course. Their Lordships are relieved from the necessity of going carefully through the evidence on these two points, because the whole evidence has been most admirably and carefully summarised and commented upon in the judgment of the High Court, and they think it quite unnecessary to repeat the statements and the considerations which are contained in that judgment. This curious fact however should be mentioned that when the contents of the document were read out and explained to the appellant by the Sub-Registrar, upon the occasion of the registration of the deed on 16th April 1928, the appellant stated that she admitted the execution and completion of the document, but added that the sum of Rs.300, and not Rs.250 as stated in the deed, had been agreed upon to be paid for her monthly maintenance; and she also stated that it had been agreed that, apart from that monthly amount, grain and fuel would be supplied to her 'in accordance with her expenses', and she added that she accepted the gift subject to the conditions there stated. The Sub-Registrar stated upon the documents the facts which have been mentioned and the contentions made by the appellant. The thumb impression and seal of the plaintiff was affixed below this statement as required by the Sub-Registrar, and the witnesses included, it may be mentioned, Iftikhar Wali Khan, the guardian of the donee, Majjan. It seems to their Lordships that if there had been any dispute before them as to whether in these peculiar circumstances the appellant was entitled to Rs.300 and to the grain and fuel