1. Dispute over possession of joint family properties — claim based on valid adoption established by Privy Council — defense of adverse possession and limitation bar. (Para 1 , 2 )
Back
Next 
1944 Supreme(SC) 23
Privy Council At Bombay
Sir Madhavan Nair, Lord Wright , Justice Lord Thankerton, JJ.
Narayan Jivangouda Patil and another -Appellant
Versus
Puttabai and others -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 16 of 1942
Decided On : 24-07-1944
Advocates Appeared:
Harold Shephard, T.L. Wilson and Co., V.K. Krishna Menon, J.M. Parikh, S.P. Khambatta, Sir Thomas Strangman
Harold Shephard, T.L. Wilson and Co., V.K. Krishna Menon, J.M. Parikh, S.P. Khambatta, Sir Thomas Strangman
An injunction restraining a party from interfering with the possession of property does not prohibit the institution of a suit for possession; therefore, such an injunction does not justify the exclusion of time under Section 15 of the Limitation Act.
Headnote:(A) Limitation Act - Sections 14 and 15 - Adverse Possession - Exclusion of time - Suit for possession of joint family properties - Claim that time spent defending a suit challenging adoption and the existence of an injunction against interfering with possession should be excluded - Section 14 not applicable as the previous proceeding was not in a court lacking jurisdiction or for a cause of a like nature - Section 15 not applicable as the injunction restrained specific acts of interference with possession and management but did not prohibit the institution of a suit for possession - The fact that a suit might seem futile while title is being contested does not prevent the running of limitation.
(B) Injunction - Scope and Effect - An injunction restraining a party from interfering with the possession or management of property, or from recovering rents, does not, by implication, restrain that party from instituting a legal proceeding to recover possession of said property.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose over the possession of joint family properties. The appellant's title was eventually established after a long legal battle regarding the validity of his adoption. However, the respondent had been in exclusive possession of the properties since 1920. The appellant filed a suit for possession in 1932. The respondent contended that the suit was barred by limitation due to adverse possession for over 12 years. The appellant sought to exclude the period of the previous litigation and the duration of an injunction under Sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the suit was barred by limitation. The appellant could not claim the benefit of Section 14 or Section 15 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the title was extinguished by adverse possession, and the appellant was not entitled to restitution.
Issues: Whether the suit for possession was barred by limitation and whether the period of previous litigation and the existence of an injunction could be excluded under Sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: For Section 15 of the Limitation Act to apply, there must be an express or implied prohibition restraining the party from instituting the suit. An injunction restraining a party from disturbing possession or collecting rents does not constitute a stay on the institution of a suit for possession. The perceived futility of filing a suit while title is being litigated does not stop the limitation period from running, as the institution of a suit prevents the running of limitation.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
Sir Madhavan Nair:-
These are consolidated appeals from a judgment and two decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 14th January 1938, affirming a decree of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar dated 31st October 1936, and an order of that Judge dated 21st November 1936, The questions which arise in the appeals are; (1) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation. (2) Whether Narayan (plaintiff 1, hereinafter referred to as the appellant) was entitled to restitution or other relief consequent upon a decision of the Privy Council in ('33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 1 : 57 Bom. 157 : 60 IA 25 : 141 IC 9 (PC), Bhimabai Jivangounda v. Gurunath Gouda Khandappa Gouda hereinafter mentioned. The parties to the suit are Hindus governed by the Bombay School of the Mitakshara law. The table given below shows their relationship.
One Dyamangouda I and his three sons Nilkantgouda, Khadappagouda and Jivangouda formed a joint and undivided Hindu family. Dyamangouda died sometime before 1895 leaving him surviving, his three sons who took the family properties including the properties now in suit by survivorship. In 1895, Khadappagouda separated from his two brothers who continued joint, and the properties now in suit are those which were allotted to the two brothers jointly. The bulk of the properties consisted of watan lands. Khadappagouda died in 1912, leaving a widow but without a male issue. On 6th July 1915, she adopted Gurunath the defendant in the present suit who died on 20th February 1933, subsequent to the High Court judgment. His legal representatives have been since brought on the record and they are now respondents 1 to 3. oh 15th January 1913, Jivangouda died leaving his widow Bhimabai (plaintiff 2, now respondent 4) but without male issue. On 17th November 1919, she adopted the appellant who attained his majority on 5th March 1920. In December 1915, Nilkantgouda died leaving him surviving Dyamangouda II whom he had adopted as his son on 20th May 1915. Dyamangouda died in August 1919, leaving a son Dattatraya who was born in August 1918, and a widow Tungawa. On 6th February 1920, Dattatraya died unmarried and the appellant became entitled by survivorship to all the joint family properties subject to the rights of Tungawa and Bhimabai for maintenance. Tungava took possession of the properties to the exclusion of the appellant.
Disputes, however, arose between Tungawa and Gurunath, the latter claiming that he was entitled to watan properties in preference to Tungawa. These disputes were referred to two arbitrators who made an award on 23rd February 1920, in terms of which a consent decree was afterwards passed by the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar on 24th February 1920. On the same date, purporting to act under its terms Tungawa handed over the properties now in suit to Gurunath who has since been in sole and exclusive possession of them. Subsequently, Gurunath applied for mutation in his favour in the Revenue Records; a similar application had been made by the appellant also, who had by this time come of age on 5th March 1920. The Mamlatdar of Gadag ordered mutation in favour of Gurunath, but this order was set aside by the District Deputy Collector. Thereupon, on 25th November 1920, Gurunath filed a suit (Suit No. 588 of 1920) in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar against Bhimabai, the appellant, and some others challenging the adoption of the appellant, and praying for cancellation of the order of the District Deputy Collector, a declaration that he was in possession, and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from dispossessing him and receiving rents from the tenants. On the same date, Gurunath filed an application for and obtained a temporary injunction to the same effect as the permanent injunction applied for by him. On 1st April 1921, Bhimabai and the appellant filed a written statement in which Gurunath's claim was denied and the title of the appellant
