1945 Supreme(SC) 14
Privy Council At Bombay
Sir John Beaumont, Sir Madhavan Nair, Justice Lord Thankerton, JJ.
Tammanna Shivappa Kori and others -Appellant
Versus
Parappa Girimallappa Kori, minor, by his guardian, Satawa kom Girimallappa Kori -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 10 of 1944
Decided On : 19-03-1945
Hy. S.L. Polak and Co., Dold, Duglas Grant , J.M. Parikh, P.V. Subba Row, C.S. Rewcastle
Important Points
Subject
Family Law - Adoption
Headnote
(B) Evidence - Adoption Ceremony - Registered Deed - Where a registered adoption deed exists and there is no evidence that adoption was impossible at the time, the execution of the deed supports the fact that the necessary ceremony took place. Minor discrepancies in witness testimony regarding the ceremony, attributable to the lapse of time, are not sufficient to reject the fact of adoption when the vital facts are agreed upon.
Facts of the case:
A suit for partition of immovable joint family property was filed by a plaintiff claiming adoption by his great grandmother. The trial court rejected the claim, characterizing it as a "paper adoption" because it believed the necessary ceremony had not occurred. The High Court reversed this decision. On appeal, it was contended that the adoption was invalid because the adopting widow lacked the authority of her husband and the consent of the coparceners, and that the parties were governed by a school of law that required such consent.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the delay in the adoption was explained by a change in legal precedent regarding the necessity of coparceners' consent. The court further held that the age of the child and the absence of certain witnesses or photographs were not conclusive evidence against the adoption. The registered adoption deed indicated that the parties understood the requirements of an adoption ceremony, making it improbable that they would omit the ceremony while competent to perform it.
Issues: Whether the adoption was proved by the evidence and whether the adoption by a widow without the consent of coparceners was valid in the absence of evidence of a special custom.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that in the absence of evidence of a special custom, the principle that a widow may adopt without the consent of coparceners applies. Furthermore, a registered adoption deed serves as significant evidence of the adoption ceremony, and minor discrepancies in oral evidence do not outweigh the existence of such a document when the adoption was legally possible.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree dated 24th June 1940, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which reversed a judgment and decree of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum dated 15th August 1938. The parties are Lingayats, and the plaintiff sued for partition of the immovable joint family property, relying upon his adoption by his great grandmother, Satawa. The learned Subordinate Judge disbelieved the evidence as to the alleged adoption ceremony and held that the adoption was what he called "a paper adoption," by which he presumably meant an adoption evidenced by an adoption deed, but in which the necessary ceremony had not taken place. The High Court (N. J. Wadia and Sen JJ.) in appeal reversed this decision. In the defendant's written statement it was contended that if the adoption was proved it was, on various grounds, invalid, and certain issues upon these points were raised, including issue 2, which was whether defendant proved that there is a local custom amongst the Lingayats not to adopt in a joint Hindu family without the consent of the coparceners. As the learned trial Judge held that bo adoption was proved, it was unnecessary for him to deal with these issues, but he answered them in case it should be held in appeal that his decision as to the fact of adoption was wrong, and, in answer to issue 2, he found that there was no evidence of the local custom set up. In the High Court no question was raised as to the validity of the adoption if proved, the only question discussed and dealt with in the judgment being as to the fact of adoption. Before their Lordships' Board, counsel for the appellants desired to argue that, if the adoption was proved, it was invalid in law since the adopting widow had neither the authority of her husband nor the consent of the coparceners to the adoption. The contention sought to be raised was that the parties, being Lingayats resident in a Kanarese district of the Province of Bombay, part of the Karnatik, are governed by the Dravida School of law, and not by the Mayuka School, and that the decision of this Board in ('33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 1 : 57 Bom. 157 : 60 IA 25 : 141 IC 9 (PC), Bhimabai Jivangouda v. Gurunath Gouda that a widow can adopt without the authority of her husband or the consent of the coparceners has no application. In view of the fact that there is no evidence as to any special custom affecting the Lingayats, and that the question as to the school of law by which the parties are bound was not discussed in the High Court, and no authorities on the matter were referred to, their Lordships were not prepared to allow the matter to be raised before the Board. Moreover, their Lordships observe that the litigation in ('33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 1 : 57 Bom. 157 : 60 IA 25 : 141 IC 9 (PC), Bhimabai Jivangouda v. Gurunath Gouda originated in the District of Dharwar, which is as much a part of the Karnatik as is the adjoining District of Belgaum from which the parties in the present suit come, and there is nothing on record to show that the parties in 60 IA 251were not Lingayats, as their names suggest that they were. This consideration may explain why the suggestion that ('33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 1 : 57 Bom. 157 : 60 IA 25 : 141 IC 9 (PC), Bhimabai Jivangouda v. Gurunath Gouda does not apply to the Lingayat community in the Province of Bombay was not advanced in the High Court. It is unnecessary to decide any such question and their Lordships will confine their decision to the fact of adoption.
Satawa who is alleged to have adopted the plaintiff, Parappa, was the junior widow of Girimallappa, who died in the year 1895. They had one daughter, who also had one daughter, and the plaintiff is the son of that daughter. Girimallappa, at the time of his death, was joint with his brother Shivappa and with Shivappa's sons, defendants 1 and 5. Shivappa died in 1904, but his sons remained joint with their sons, defendants 2 to 6. The adoption is alleged to have