Lord Macmillan.-

The sole question presented for decision in this appeal is whether (1) certain shares of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd., and (2) an interest in a timber business carried on by the firm of Sultan Singh and Co., were the separate self- acquired property of the late Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh or were the property of the Hindu joint family of which Sultan Singh was a member. The question arose in consequence of a decree for Rupees 24,798-4-6 and costs obtained by the respondents on 22nd August 1934 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Lahore against the appellant, recoverable from the estate of the late Sultan Singh, the appellant's father. The respondents on 29th November 1934 applied in the Court of the District Judge at Delhi for execution of this decree by the attachment of a kohti or bungalow in Delhi alleged to have been owned by Sultan Singh. The application was resisted by the appellant on various grounds and appropriate issues were framed.

After taking evidence the Senior Subordinate Judge at Delhi, to whom the case had been transferred, held that the appellant and his two sons were, along with Sultan Singh until the death of the latter on 3rd June 1930, members of a joint Hindu family; that the property sought to be attached had been acquired during the minority of Sultan Singh and his brother Multan Singh by the District Judge at Delhi, who then had the management of the family estate, with funds provided from the estate; and consequently that the property was part of the joint family estate. He further held that the appellant, during his father's lifetime, had been adopted by the widow of his uncle Multan Singh and had thereby ceased in law to be the son of Sultan Singh, with the result that there was no liability incumbent on him under S. 53, Civil PC, for his natural father's debts. On these findings the Subordinate Judge held that the kothi was not liable to attachment and sale and struck the execution off the file.

The respondents appealed to the High Court at Lahore and the appeal came before Dalip Singh J. who agreed in effect with the findings in fact of the Subordinate Judge. But he nevertheless did not dismiss the appeal, which would seem to have been the appropriate course. He held that, in view of the pleadings and evidence, the question should be investigated whether Sultan Singh owned at his death any separate property, apart from the specific property which the respondents had sought and failed to attach. He accordingly framed a general issue raising this question and remanded to the Subordinate Judge to take evidence and report his opinion thereon. At the same time he held it clear that "there was a nucleus of joint Hindu family property" and stated that all acquisitions of property must in the absence of evidence to the contrary be held to be joint Hindu family property, unless shown to be a separate acquisition.

The Subordinate Judge, in pursuance of the remand to him, heard further evidence and on 14th March 1938 reported that in his opinion the respondents had failed to prove that Sultan Singh had left any separate self-acquired property on his decease in the hands of the appellant. In particular, he held that the respondents had failed to prove that either the shares in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company or the interest in the timber business, which have formed the subject-matter of debate before their Lordships, were separate property of the late Sultan Singh. The case having returned to Dalip Singh J. that learned Judge expressed his general agreement with the findings of the Subordinate Judge but differed from him in two instances in which it appeared to him that the respondents had succeeded in discharging the onus which lay upon them, namely, with regard to the Delhi shares and to the interest in the timber business. He decided that 140 of the shares in the Delhi company which stood in the name of Sultan Singh at his death and his interest in the timber bus