ORDER

1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

2. Despite granting sufficient and adequate opportunity to the Respondents, they did not choose to file objections with regard to the averments made by the applicants/Appellants in their applications that they have been in physical and actual possession of the acquired land and compensation also not paid to them.

3. Since the above averments of the applicants are not controverted despite granting opportunity, the assertions made by the applicants shall have to be accepted as true and correct. Further, the right of the applicants is accrued Under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for short 'the Act', on the date of filing of the applications as they have asserted that they have been in physical and actual possession of the acquired land and also not paid the compensation by the Respondents in respect of their acquired land. Therefore, the contention urged on behalf of the Respondents that in view of promulgation of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 on 31.12.2014, by inserting the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, the period of stay obtained in the judicial proceedings shall be excluded for computation of five years' period to hold that the acquisition proceedings are lapsed and, therefore, the said provision does not enure to the benefit of the applicants, cannot be legally accepted by us in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhry AIR 1957 SC 540. Para 23, which is relevant is reproduced hereunder:

From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:

(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.

(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.

(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.

(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.

(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.

4. The aforesaid case is further approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar (2001) 8 SCC 24. Paras 24, 26, 27 and 28 of the judgment, which are relevant are reproduced hereunder:

24. In Garikapati Veeraya s. N. Subbiah Choudhry, 1957 SCR 488 this Court observed as thus: (AIR p.533, para 25)

The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed.

xxx xxx xxx

26. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 602, this Court laid down the ambit and scope of an amending act and its retrospective operation as follows: (SCC p.633, para 26)

(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be ret