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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, Amitava Roy, JJ.
Mohd. Hashim – Appellant
Versus
State of UP & Ors. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 1218 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) No. 6104 of 2014)
Decided On : 28-11-2016
(1974) 4 SCC 222; (2004) 4 SCC 590 – Relied upon
(b) Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 4 – Before exercising the power under Section 4 the court has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4. (Para 25)
(1979) 2 SCC 279; AIR 1965 SC 444; AIR 1973 SC 780; AIR 2000 SC 1677 – Relied upon
(2014) 15 SCC 340; (2006) 11 SCC 473 – Referred
Facts of the case:
The respondent Nos.2 and 3 were convicted under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each with the default clause. The other accused, i.e., respondent nos.4 to 10 were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of six months and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each with the default clause. All the accused persons were convicted under Section 323 of the IPC and Section 4 of the 1961 Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on the first count and for a period of one year on the second score. They were also sentenced to pay fine with the stipulation of the default clause.The Sessions Judge extended the benefit under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, as prayed for.
The High Court concurred with the opinion expressed by the learned Sessions Judge.
Finding of the Court:
Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not provide minimum sentence
Result: Appeal allowed.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
When the statutory provisions do not prescribe a minimum sentence, the court has the discretion to impose a sentence of zero, meaning the statute does not mandate a minimum punishment (!) (!) (!) .
The concept of "minimum sentence" refers to a fixed quantum of punishment that the court must impose without discretion. If the sentence can be reduced to nil, the provision does not constitute a minimum sentence (!) (!) .
A provision that grants the court discretion not to impose the minimum sentence cannot be equated with a statutory minimum sentence requirement (!) .
Certain statutes explicitly prescribe a minimum sentence, and in such cases, the courts are bound to impose at least that minimum, leaving no discretion for reduction (!) (!) .
When a statute specifies a minimum sentence but also provides for discretion to impose a lesser or no sentence, the court must carefully consider the nature of the offence and other relevant conditions before exercising its discretion (!) (!) .
The applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act depends on whether the statute prescribes a minimum sentence. If a minimum sentence is mandated, the benefits under the Probation Act are generally not available (!) (!) .
The court's discretion under the Probation of Offenders Act involves considering the nature of the offence, the character of the offender, and other relevant circumstances, with the aim of reform rather than punishment alone (!) (!) .
The Act provides specific procedures and conditions for releasing offenders on probation, including the necessity of a report from a probation officer and considerations of the offender's character and mental condition (!) (!) (!) .
For offenders under twenty-one years, the court is restricted from imposing imprisonment unless it is deemed undesirable to deal with them under the provisions for probation or admonition, and must record reasons if imprisonment is imposed (!) (!) .
When the legislation explicitly prescribes a minimum sentence, courts are generally required to impose at least that minimum, and discretion to reduce below that is not permitted unless specific provisions allow for it (!) (!) (!) .
The interpretation of "minimum sentence" hinges on whether the statute prescribes a mandatory, fixed period that cannot be reduced, or if it merely allows discretion, in which case the Probation of Offenders Act may apply (!) (!) .
The overall legal approach emphasizes that the court must interpret statutory provisions in their widest context, considering the purpose and object of the law, especially when determining the applicability of probation or minimum sentencing requirements (!) (!) .
The appellate court's exercise of discretion must be guided by these principles, taking into account the nature of the offence and the conditions specified in the relevant statutes and procedures (!) (!) .
When a statute includes a non-obstante clause or specific overriding provisions, these take precedence over the general provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, limiting the court's discretion (!) (!) (!) .
The court's primary aim should be to ensure that the statutory intent and the principles of justice and reform are upheld, especially when considering the application of probation or reduction of sentences (!) .
Please let me know if you need further clarification or assistance.
JUDGMENT :
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. Respondent Nos. 2 to 10 were prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, 'the 1961 Act'). The respondent Nos.2 and 3 were convicted under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-(Rupees one thousand only) each with the default clause. The other accused, i.e., respondent nos.4 to 10 were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of six months and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) each with the default clause. All the accused persons were convicted under Section 323 of the IPC and Section 4 of the 1961 Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on the first count and for a period of one year on the second score. They were also sentenced to pay fine with the stipulation of the default clause.
3. The respondents challenged the judgment of conviction and order of sentence before the learned Sessions Judge, Unnao, U.P. in Criminal Appeal No.55 of 2013 who, in course of hearing, taking note of the fact that the counsel appearing for the appellants had abandoned the challenge pertaining to the conviction but only confined the argument seeking benefit under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short, 'the PO Act'), extended the benefit as prayed for.
4. Being grieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned appellate Judge, the informant preferred Criminal Revision No.252 of 2013 before the High Court. In its assail, the counsel for the informant placed reliance on Shyam Lal Verma vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 15 SCC 340 State Through SP, New Delhi vs. Ratan Lal Arora, (2004) 4 SCC 590 and State represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai, T.N. vs. A. Parthiban, (2006) 11 SCC 473 to buttress the submission that the benefit under Section 4 of the PO Act could not have been extended to the convicts regard being had to the nature of the offences and the punishment provided for the same. The High Court repelling the argument concurred with the opinion expressed by the learned Sessions Judge.
5. We have heard Mr. Ashutosh Jha, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, learned counsel for the State and Ms. Rashmi Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. As the controversy related to the Probation of Offenders Act, we have also heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General of India and Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India.
6. There is no dispute over the fact that the respondents were convicted as has been stated earlier. The question is whether the approach of the learned appellate Judge which have been concurred by the High Court is legally sustainable.
7. In this context, it is pertinent to appreciate the scheme of the PO Act. Section 3 of the PO Act confers power on the Court to release certain offenders after admonition. The said provision reads as follows:-
“3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition. - When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct unde
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