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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, AMITAVA ROY, JJ.
VASANTHI – APPELLANT
VERSUS
VENUGOPAL (D) THR. L.RS. – RESPONDENT(S)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4311-4312 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NOS.29405-29406 OF 2008)
Decided On : 21-03-2017
(2006) 13 SCC 295; (2010) 13 SCC 517 – Relied upon
(b) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 53A r/w Section 16, Specific Relief Act, 1964 – Agreement for sale executed between respondent and original owner – Part consideration money paid – Possession handed over – Knowledge of appellant/petitioner about the agreement not established – Appellant/petitioner purchasing the property by sale deed for consideration – Respondent not taking any steps for specific performance of the agreement – Their readiness/willingness to perform their part of agreement not established – Benefit of section 16 not available to respondents. (Para 17, 20, 28, 30)
(2002) 3 SCC 676; (2007) 14 SCC 87 – Relied upon
Facts of the case:
The appellant/plaintiff instituted O.S. against the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents i.e. Venugopal (deceased) praying for a declaration of her title in the suit property and also for recovery of possession thereof. She claimed to have purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 26.6.1982 for the consideration price of Rs. 35,000/- from the sons of Ramnathan Chettiar, the original owner, whereupon she was registered in the municipal records as the title-holder thereof.
She averred that at the time of sale, the original defendant Venugopal was in possession of the property as a tenant of her vendors on payment rent of Rs. 100 per month. As the defendant-Venugopal did neither accept her as his landlord nor agreed to pay the enhanced rent of Rs. 150/-, as demanded, after causing a notice to be served on him, the appellant/plaintiff filed an application before the Rent Controller, Cuddalore for his eviction from the suit property.
The original defendant-Venugopal denied the title of appellant/plaintiff in the suit property and claimed to be in occupation thereof on the strength of an agreement of sale executed between him and the original owner Ramnathan Chettair.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding inter alia that the possession of the original defendant of the suit property was protected under Section 53A of the TP Act, as the ingredients thereof stood complied with by him and that the appellant/plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of declaration or possession, as sought for.
The appellant/plaintiff preferred appeal before the High Court which also met the same fate. Her Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed as not maintainable being in the teeth of Section 100-A of C.P.C..
Finding of the Court:
Courts below wrongly appreciated import of section 53A, CPC.
Result: Civil appeal filed against the judgment and order dated 31.7.2006, rendered in A.S. No. 124 of 1990 affirming the judgment and order dated 28.4.1989 passed in O.S. No. 172 of 1987 allowed.
Civil Appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 8.10.2007 passed in LPA SR No. 16958 of 2007 dismissed.
As a consequence, the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is decreed.
Key Points: - The appellant was a bona fide purchaser without notice of an agreement for sale and sought relief; the Court discusses Section 53A protections and its proviso regarding transferees with no notice (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The decision analyzes prerequisites for Section 53A protection: a written contract, part performance with possession, and readiness/willingness to perform; it also notes that protection is denied if the transferee had notice or if those conditions aren’t proven (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The judgment explains that Section 16 bars specific performance where the party hasn’t proven readiness/willingness to perform essential terms; it emphasizes the need to aver performance or readiness to perform (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The Court discusses that though LPA is not maintainable here, the respondents cannot avail Section 53A protection due to lack of proven readiness/willingness and lack of clear knowledge by the plaintiff (!) (!) . - Section 100-A CPC (as amended in 2002) bars further appeal from a single judge’s decision in High Courts; only pre-amendment Letters Patent Appeals were maintainable; the amendment clarified scope for such appeals (!) (!) (!) (!) . - Facts: owner’s heirs had executed an earlier agreement; despite sale to plaintiff, part performance existed via possession; the Court evaluates whether defense under 53A applies to respondents (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The Supreme Court ultimately decreed the suit in favor of the appellant/plaintiff, holding that the LPA was not maintainable but the respondents were not entitled to 53A protection; suit is decreed (!) . - The judgment cites and applies prior cases such as Kamla Devi, Mohd Saud, Shrimant Suryavanshi, and A. Lewis regarding readiness/willingness and notice requirements (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The decision provides a nuanced view: protection under 53A requires specific conditions; lack of clear proof of readiness/willingness defeats 53A; bona fide purchaser without notice may still be shielded in certain scenarios (!) (!) (!) (!) . - Overall outcome: Civil appeal allowed in part; suit decreed in appellant’s favor; LPA dismissed; costs none (!) .
JUDGMENT
AMITAVA ROY, J.
Leave granted.
2. The impugnment herein is both of the judgment and order dated 31.7.2006, rendered by the Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in A.S. No. 124 of 1990, preferred by the appellant/plaintiff questioning the decision of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore dated 28.4.1989 in O.S. No. 172 of 1987 as well as the order dated 8.10.2007, passed by the Division Bench of the said High Court rejecting the Letters Patent Appeal SR. No.16958 of 2007 preferred by her against the dismissal of Appeal A.S. No.124 of 1990, as not maintainable in the face of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as "CPC/Code").
3. We have heard Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Ms. Malini Poduval, learned counsel for the respondents.
4. As the rival assertions are integrated in the pleadings, a brief reference thereto, is indispensable. The appellant/plaintiff instituted O.S. No.172 of 1987 against the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents i.e. Venugopal (deceased) praying for a declaration of her title in the suit property and also for recovery of possession thereof. She claimed to have purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 26.6.1982 for the consideration price of Rs. 35,000/- from the sons of Ramnathan Chettiar, the original owner, whereupon she was registered in the municipal records as the title-holder thereof. She averred that at the time of sale, the original defendant Venugopal was in possession of the property as a tenant of her vendors on payment rent of Rs. 100 per month. As the defendant-Venugopal did neither accept her as his landlord nor agreed to pay the enhanced rent of Rs. 150/-, as demanded, after causing a notice to be served on him, the appellant/plaintiff filed an application before the Rent Controller, Cuddalore being R.C. O.P. No. 29 of 1986 for his eviction from the suit property.
5. In the said proceeding, the original defendant-Venugopal denied the title of appellant/plaintiff in the suit property and claimed to be in occupation thereof on the strength of an agreement of sale executed between him and the original owner Ramnathan Chettair. At this, the appellant/plaintiff instituted a suit claiming the reliefs, as aforementioned, by pleading that neither she was aware of any such agreement at the time of her purchase nor of any part performance thereof as claimed and that even if any such agreement did exist, the respondent/defendant was not entitled to remain in possession of the suit property without enforcing the same, as contemplated in law. She contended that she was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of such agreement and maintained that the defendant was not entitled to avail the protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, hereinafter to be referred to as "T.P. Act").
6. The original defendant-Venugopal in his written statement, while reiterating that Ramnathan Chettiar was the owner of the suit property, stoutly denied the transaction of sale by his sons in favour of the plaintiff vide registered sale deed dated 26.6.1982. He also asserted that the vendors of the appellant/plaintiff had no subsisting title in the suit property to convey to her. He denied that his possession of the suit property at the time of purported sale in favour of appellant/plaintiff was that of a tenant under her vendors and reiterated that pursuant to an agreement of sale dated 20.5.1975 with the original owner Ramnathan Chettiar, he had by installments, in all paid Rs. 26,000/- by 12.4.1976 which formed a major part of the consideration price. He stated further that at the time of execution of the agreement of sale dated 20.5.1975, one Purushothaman was in occupation of the suit property as a tenant under the original owner, who following the compromise between him (tenant) and the landlord vacated the suit premises, whereafter possession thereof was
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