The grant of specific performance is within the discretion of the court, and the findings of fact by the lower courts are binding.

JUDGMENT :

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

This appeal is filed against the judgment and final order dated 30.07.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 2039 of 2007 whereby the High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 21.03.2007 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Amritsar in C.A. No. FTC/10 of 2003/2006 by which the appeal filed by the appellant herein was dismissed with costs affirming the judgment and decree dated 12.08.2003 passed by the Additional Civil Judge(Senior Division), Ajnala in Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006.

2. We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issues involved in this appeal.

3. The appellant is the defendant and the respondent is the plaintiff in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises. The appellant and the respondent are real brothers. The respondent is elder to the appellant.

4. The appellant (defendant) is the co-sharer of the land to the extent of 55/118, which comes to 84 Kanals, in the joint Khata of total land measuring 177 kanals 10 Marlas situated in Village Vachhoa, Tehsil Ajnala, District Amritsar. The appellant entered into an agreement on 02.07.1995 with the respondent (plaintiff) whereby he agreed to sell his share of 55/118 of the entire land to the respondent for a total sale consideration of Rs.5 lakhs. The agreement, inter alia, recited that out of Rs.5 lakhs, the respondent has paid Rs.4 lakhs in cash at the time of execution of agreement (02.07.1995) to the respondent and has agreed to pay the balanced amount to the appellant at the time of registration of the sale deed. It was agreed that the sale deed would be executed on or before 13.12.1995.

5. Since the appellant did not execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent in terms of the agreement, the respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant seeking specific performance of the agreement dated 02.07.1995 in relation to the suit land. The plaint, inter alia, contained necessary averments as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for claiming specific performance of the agreement in question.

6. The appellant while denying the averments mainly averred that, (i) the agreement in question is a forged document; (ii) he had only signed on blank paper on request from the respondent; (iii) he never intended to sell the land to the respondent; (iv) his signature was taken by the respondent on blank paper for being used in one pending litigation in which both were parties; and (v) since the appellant at that time was staying away from the respondent for pursuing his studies, he sent the blank paper, which was converted by the respondent in the form of an agreement in question without his knowledge. In substance, this was the defense taken by the appellant while opposing the suit.

7. Parties adduced evidence. The Trial Court, vide judgment/decree dated 12.08.2003 decreed the respondent's suit. It was held that, (i) the agreement in question is real and genuine; (ii) it bears the signature of appellant; (iii) the appellant did not execute the sale deed in terms of agreement; (iv) the respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement; (v) he also performed his part; and (vi) the appellant breached the agreement and did not execute the sale deed in terms of agreement.

8. The appellant (defendant) filed first appeal before the Additional District Judge, Amritsar being C.A. No.FTC/10 of 2003/2006. The first appellate Judge, vide his judgment dated 21.03.2007, affirmed all the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appellant's appeal.

9. The appellant pursued the matter to the High Court in Second Appeal. The High Court, by impugned judgment dated 30.07.2007, dismissed the second appeal and affirmed the judgment/decree of the first Appellate Court.

10. The appellant, felt aggrieved of the judgment of the High Court, preferred this appeal by way of special leave to th