Acquittal in a criminal case is not determinative of misconduct and does not entitle the employee to claim immunity from disciplinary proceedings. The fact of acquittal may be a relevant factor in awarding punishment, but it depends on the factual matrix of each case.

ORDER :

1. The contention of the petitioner is that having regard to the fact that subsequently he has been acquitted of the criminal charges pending against him was a relevant factor which should have been taken into consideration in the matter of imposition of punishment, in support whereof reliance has been placed on United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar wherein it was held: (SCC p. 377, para 15)

“Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon the facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application.”

This decision is not an authority for the proposition that in each and every case the punishment of a lesser degree should be imposed in the event the delinquent is acquitted in a criminal case. It only hints about a possibility that the same may be a relevant factor. But it is also said whether the circumstance that the delinquent officer has been acquitted in the criminal proceeding shall be taken into consideration or not would depend upon the factual matrix of each case.

2. However, in this case, the petitioner was dismissed from services by an order dated 7-8-1989 whereas the judgment of acquittal was passed on 30-10-1995. The respondent, therefore, by no stretch of imagination could have considered the subsequent event for the purpose of passing an order of punishment. Even the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court in his award dated 31-12-1994 directed the management to treat dismissal of the petitioner as discharged from service.

3. Although the award was passed in the year 1994, the petitioner filed a writ petition on 3-9-2003 i.e. after a period of eight years. The writ petition filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed by the High Court inter alia noticing the finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court. In this case, therefore, even the question as regards quantum of punishment has been considered by the Labour Court as also by the High Court. In RBI v. S. Mani it was held: (SCC p. 109, para 12)

“12. It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer.”

4. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interfering with the impugned judgment.

5. The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.