IMPORTANT POINT
A candidate cannot be discriminated and denied appointed when similarly situated candidates are appointed.

JUDGMENT :

Navin Sinha, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant, a successful aspirant for judicial service, is aggrieved by the order dated 04.06.2010 cancelling his selection for appointment due to the character verification report of the police, and the refusal of the High Court to interfere with the same.

3. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that the denial of appointment on grounds of moral turpitude is wrong and unsustainable. The appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34, I.P.C. on 28.10.2004 much before he cleared the examination for appointment in the year 2009. He had truthfully and honestly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal by the Sessions Court, Sangli. According to the allegations, the appellant was in an autorickshaw along with another, following the autorickshaw in which the main accused was traveling with the girl. The main accused has also been acquitted of the charge under Section 376. In similar circumstances, another aspirant Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who was prosecuted in Case No. 3022 of 2007 under Sections 294, 504, 34, I.P.C. but acquitted on 24.11.2009, has been appointed. The appellant has therefore been subjected to arbitrary and hostile discrimination. Reliance in support of the submissions was placed on Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, 2015 (2) SCC 377.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant being an aspirant for judicial service, the standards of behaviour and conduct, to consider suitability for appointment will have to be different from any other service. He was involved in an act of moral turpitude in kidnapping of the girl in question. The acquittal, because the prosecutrix turned hostile, cannot come to the aid of the appellant. The candidate referred to, for contending hostile discrimination, was not involved in an act of moral turpitude. Mere empanelment for appointment creates no rights to seek mandamus for appointment. The fact that he may have disclosed the alleged involvement in the attestation form, cannot be considered sufficient to ignore his conduct involving moral turpitude.

5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The only allegation against the appellant in Sessions Case No.173 of 2000 is that he along with another was travelling in an autorickshaw that was following the autorickshaw in which the prime accused Bilal, who was charged under Section 376, IPC, was travelling with the girl in question. All the accused were acquitted because the prosecutrix did not support the allegations. The appellant was 21 years of age on the date of occurrence i.e. 25.05.2000.

6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our country. Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly, judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead in life by self-improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact situation of a case.

7. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of precise definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:

“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently