1. Assault and criminal intimidation charges under IPC — Landlord-tenant dispute — Quashing of FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C. based on a compromise deed. (Para 2 , 6 , 7 )
2019 Supreme(SC) 140
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.
Satish Sharma and anr. – Appellant
Versus
State (NCT of Delhi) and Others – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 2019 (Arising Out of SLP (Crl) No. 10791 of 2015)
Decided On : 08-02-2019
For the Appellant : Mr. Anil Hooda, Adv. Mr. Ajay Sharma, Adv. Mr. Ram Awadh Yadav, Adv. Ms. Ankita Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Nandlal K. Mishra, Adv. Mr. Jitendra Hooda, Adv. Mr. Ram Kishor Singh Yadav, AOR Ms. Sunita Yadav, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Chirag M. Shroff, AOR Ms. Divya Roy, AOR.
IMPORTANT POINT
Case can be disposed in terms of compromise reached between parties.
Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 323, 324, 506 and 34 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 320 and 482 – Hurt and criminal intimidation – Common intention – FIR in question itself was lodged after 19 days from date of alleged incident – Accused party had also attempted to maintain a cross-case by filing a complaint before Magistrate – Deed of Compromise had apparently been signed by informant as also present appellants – Sum of Rs. 25 Lakhs was paid by the accused persons to the complainants. Though appellants seek to state grievance about want of notice to them while quashing proceeding in FIR, for they being also injured persons but then, interestingly, appellant No. 2 is shown to have remained present before High Court as counsel for informant, who was respondent No. 2 before High Court – Moreover, even in petition filed before this Court, appellants have not disputed factum of execution of Deed of Compromise – Order of High Court upheld. (Paras 9 to 11)
Facts of Case:
Appellants, said to be the injured persons in incident in question that had taken place for offences under Sections 323, 324, 506 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, have questioned order whereby High Court of Delhi, while allowing petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, has quashed proceedings under FIR on being satisfied that dispute had essentially been one between landlord and tenant which stood cleared/settled in terms of Deed of Compromise executed by parties.
Findings of Court:
We are unable to find any error or illegality in approach of High Court in this case. In cumulative effect of what has been noticed and observed, we are satisfied that High Court has rightly found no reason that matter be allowed to be dragged further and has rightly quashed proceedings in proper exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Result : Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed based on a compromise when some injured persons claim they were not heard by the High Court. (Para 3 , 4 )
3. The compromise deed was signed by all injured persons, the FIR was delayed, and the High Court correctly applied guidelines for quashing settled disputes. (Para 8 , 9 )
4. Criminal proceedings may be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. where parties have consciously settled a dispute, particularly in cases arising from private or civil conflicts. (Para 8 , 10 )
5. Appeal dismissed; High Court order quashing the FIR upheld. (Para 11 )
6. Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. based on a compromise between parties?
Yes, the High Court can quash proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. if it is satisfied that the dispute has been amicably settled, especially in cases arising from private disputes like landlord-tenant conflicts, following established guiding principles. (Para 8 , 10 )
7. Does the failure to hear every injured person individually preclude the quashing of an FIR if a compromise deed is signed by them?
No, if the injured persons have signed a voluntary deed of compromise and the court is satisfied that the settlement was conscious and the proceedings would be an exercise in futility, the proceedings can be quashed. (Para 4 , 9 )
8. What factors influence the court's decision to uphold the quashing of an FIR based on a settlement?
Factors include the delay in lodging the FIR, the existence of cross-complaints, the voluntary execution of a compromise deed by all affected parties, and the payment of settlement amounts. (Para 8 , 9 )
JUDGMENT :
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellants herein, said to be the injured persons in the incident in question, that had taken place on 05.12.2010 at C-17, New West Avenue, Club Road, Punjabi Bagh (West), New Delhi and formed the subject matter of FIR No. 382 of 2010 registered with Punjabi Bagh Police Station, New Delhi for offences under Sections 323, 324, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC'), have questioned the order dated 06.08.2015 in Crl. M.C. No. 3673 of 2013 and Crl. M.A. No. 13346 of 2013 whereby, the High Court of Delhi, while allowing the petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code ('Cr.P.C.'), has quashed the proceedings under the said FIR on being satisfied that the dispute had essentially been the one between landlord and tenant, which stood cleared/settled in terms of the Deed of Compromise executed by the parties.
3. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the High Court has been in error in quashing the proceedings under the FIR aforesaid merely on the basis of the statement of one of the injured persons whereas, there were three injured persons in the incident, two of them being the appellants, who were not made parties before the High Court and were not heard in the matter.
4. The submissions made on behalf of the appellants are countered by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, who were the accused persons and were the petitioners before the High Court. It is submitted that during the course of investigation in the FIR aforesaid, the Deed of Compromise dated 30.05.2011 was executed between the parties, which was duly signed, by the informant-Ms. Jyoti Sharma (respondent No. 4 herein) as also by the appellants-Shri Satish Sharma and Shri Deepak Bhardwaj on one hand; and by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as also by one Shri Manish Talreja and another Shri Ashok Kumar on the other. It is further asserted that in fact, the deed was drafted by the appellant No. 2-Shri Deepak Bhardwaj, one of the alleged injured person; and the complainants received a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs from the contesting respondents, the accused in the said FIR. It is also submitted that the appellant No. 2-Shri Deepak Bhardwarj was indeed present before the High Court at the time of passing of the impugned order dated 06.08.2015 and his appearance is distinctly marked as counsel for the respondent No. 2 before the High Court (who is respondent No. 4 herein). It is contended that the parties had consciously compromised the matter and the present appeal is merely an attempt to get the matter reopened on the baseless premise and a flimsy ground that all the alleged injured persons were not heard in the High Court.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material placed on record, we are unable to find even a wee bit of reason to consider interference in this matter.
6. Perusal of the record makes it clear that in relation to the incident that had taken place on 05.12.2010, written information leading to the said FIR was filed by the respondent No. 4 Ms. Jyoti Sharma only on 24.12.2010. The respondent No. 4 alleged in the written information, inter alia, that the respondent No. 3 Shri Sushil Malhotra, the respondent No. 2 Ms. Sunita Malhotra, the son of respondent No. 3, another person Shri Ashok Kumar, and 5-6 goonda-type persons, who were armed with weapons, came to her house at C-17, New West Avenue, Club Road, Punjabi Bagh (West), New Delhi; that the respondent No. 3 slapped the informant and his son pressed her neck whereupon her brother (appellant No. 1) came for the rescue but the son of respondent No. 2 and the said Shri Ashok Kumar threw him (appellant No. 1) on the ground and assaulted him with leg blows; that at the same time, Shri Deepak Bhardwaj (appellant No. 2), nephew of the informant, also came to their rescue but the son of respondent No. 3 assaulted him with a borer, which pierced into his left leg; and that the other persons also surrounded the appellant No. 2 an