The main legal point established in the judgment is that the termination of an employee's services must be carried out by an authority of the same rank or by someone senior to the appointing authority, especially when the appointment letter is not available.

ORDER :

1. The grievance of the appellant is with regard to the decision dated 3.2.2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No.519/1986.

2. The only issue before us is with regard to the authority to terminate the services of the appellant, who was terminated from service after a regular departmental enquiry and finding him guilty.

3. Interestingly, the appellant's letter of appointment, which was issued in the year 1957, was not on record and according to the appellant in his cross-examination before the trial court, it is stated that he was not issued any appointment letter.

4. The appellant was appointed in Class IV post as a Senior Rakshak with the Railways. Ordinarily, at that time the appointing authority was the General Manager. Since the appellant's letter is not on record, it is not clear whether the appellant was appointed by the General Manager or by an authority delegated by him. Be that as it may, in view of the departmental enquiry held against the appellant, he was removed from service by an order dated 12.9.1977 passed by the Assistant Security Officer, who is admittedly holding a lower post than a General Manager.

5. The appellant challenged his removal from service but was not successful in the trial court. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the decree passed by the trial court and that was in-turn set aside by the High Court in second appeal. It is under these circumstances that the appellant is before us.

6. The High Court referred to Union of India Vs. Rajendra Singh, (1993) 2 Supp. SCC 176, to come to the conclusion that the Rakshak in that case had not been removed from service by an authority lower than the appointing authority. We find that in that case the appointment letter was on record, while in the present appeal the appointment letter is not on record. Moreover, in the cited decision the appointment was made by the Assistant Security Officer, while in the present case, the appointment of the appellant appears to have been made by the General Manager.

7. Our attention has been drawn to a letter dated 21.8.1964, written by the Railway Board. The operative portion of the same reads as under :

“G.M. as appointing authority – General Manager shall be considered to be the appointing authority for staff in class III and IV categories as also semi-skilled, skilsled and artisan staff where records or appointment letters to show the actual appointing authority of such staff are not available. Accordingly the punishment of dismissal/removal/compulsory retirement from service cannot be inflicted on such staff by an authority lower than the General Manager. (N.Rly, letter No.52-E/0/31)

E(D&A) of 21.8.1964.”

8. In view of the above letter, it is quite clear that where the appointment letter is not available, it would be assumed that the appointing authority is the General Manager. Accordingly, the punishment of dismissal/ removal/compulsory retirement from service cannot be effected by an authority lower than the General Manager.

9. In the present appeal, as has already been noticed, the appellant's services were dispensed with by an order passed by the Assistant Security Officer, who is admittedly lower in rank than the General Manager. In view of the aforesaid letter, we are of the view that the decision relied upon by the High Court in Union of India Vs. Rajendra Singh (supra), is inapplicable to the facts of this case and it must be held that the appointment of the appellant was made by the General Manager and therefore, his removal could have only been carried out by an officer of the same rank or by someone senior to the General Manager. The order of removal could not have been passed by the Assistant Security Officer, who is lower in rank than the General Manager.

10. Since the dismissal/removal of the appellant from his services dates back to 1977 and we are told that the appellant had passed away in the year in 2014, therefore no useful purpose would be served by remandin