Proceedings before an Income Tax Officer under section 26A of the Income Tax Act, 1922, are judicial proceedings for the purposes of sections 193, 196, and 228 of the Penal Code, but the Income Tax Officer is not a revenue court.

JUDGMENT :

J.M. SHELAT, J.

1. Between June 16, 1962, and May 4, 1964, respondent No. 1 was the income tax Officer for Additional B-X VIII District, New Delhi. The appellants have, at all material times, been carrying on business in partnership in the name of M/s. Balwant Singh Santok Singh within the said Additional B-VIII (income tax) District. For the assessment year 1960-61 (accounting year 1959-60), the firm was registered u/s 26A of the income tax Act, 1922. During the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62 (accounting year 1960-61), respondent No. 1 noticed that the firm had not applied for renewal of registration. The firm was, therefore, liable to be assessed as an unregistered firm. At that stage, appellant No. 1, Balwant Singh, represented to respondent No. 1 that the firm had filed an application for renewal for the assessment year 1961-62 within the prescribed period, and therefore, its registration should be renewed. Respondent No. 1 adjourned the case to May 27, 1963, and called upon appellant No. 1 to produce evidence to show that such an application was made. On May 27, 1963, appellant No. 1 appeared before respondent No. 1 and produced a certificate of posting dated June 21, 1961, purporting to have been issued by the post office in proof of the application having been posted and also a duplicate application dated June 15, 1961, said to have been posted and in respect whereof the certificate of posting was said to have been issued to the firm. Respondent No. 1, however, noticed that the form of the certificate said to have been issued on June 21, 1961, was actually printed in 1962. This aroused his suspicion about the genuineness of the certificate. He, therefore, recorded the statement of appellant No. 1 on oath. In that statement, Appellant No. 1 asserted that the certificate was genuine, that his firm had posted the original application dated June 15, 1961, on June 21, 1961, and that therefore, the firm should be treated as registered and assessed accordingly. Respondent No. 1 rejected the appellants claim for renewal and assessed the firm on the footing of an unregistered firm. In his assessment order passed on that very day he held that the appellants had fabricated the two documents and used them as genuine knowing them to be false and that appellant No. 1 had given false evidence on oath before him. But he did not pass an order in the said assessment order that they should be prosecuted. At the foot of the order, however, there was a separate note to the effect that the appellants should be prosecuted. On October 26, 1964 i.e., after respondent No. 1 was said to have ceased to be the income tax Officer of the Additional B-XVIII District, he lodged a complaint before the Magistrate alleging that the said certificate of posting and the said duplicate application in the proceedings before him u/s 26A of the income tax Act as genuine knowing them to be forged, that the statement on oath of appellant No. 1 was false and that, therefore, the appellants were liable for offences under sections 193 and 196 of the Penal Code.

2. The appellants filed an application before the High Court of Punjab (Circuit Bench, New Delhi) u/s 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the said complaint. The High Court reject the application. The appellants obtained special leave from this court and filed this appeal.

3. Two contentions were urged in support of the said application before the High Court and the same were canvassed by Mr. Gupte before us. These were : (1) that the income tax Officer while acting u/s 26A of the income tax Act, 1922, was a court and that that being so, it was incumbent on him follow the procedure laid down in sections 476 and 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before he could validly file a complaint for offences under sections 193 and 196 of the Penal Code, and (2) that in any event, respondent No. 1 had ceased to hold the charge of the post of income tax Officer for Addit