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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R. BANUMATHI, A.S. BOPANNA, HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.
University of Delhi – Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-9489 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.5581-5582 of 2019)
Decided on : 17-12-2019
(a) Administration of justice - Delay and laches - Condonation of delay - A liberal approach should be taken - However, condonation of long delay should not be automatic - Therefore routine explanation not enough - “Sufficient cause” has to be shown to justify the delay. (Para 20)
(b) High Court rules - LPA - Delay of 916 days in filing appeal against limitation of 30 days - Retirement of Vice Chancellor and deliberation in Executive Council cited as cause of delay - When writ petition was filed after detailed deliberations there was no need for such deliberations again for filing appeal as appeal is an continuation of original writ petition - Secondly, Vice Chancellor retired six months after dismissal of writ petition - No sufficient cause shown for delay. (Para 23, 24)
(c) Administration of justice - Delay and laches - Condonation of delay - Writ petition filed after a decade - LPA filed after 916 days - Cumulatively shows casual approach of appellant - Such delay cannot be condoned. (Para 26, 27)
Administration of justice - Delay and laches - While considering condonation of inordinate delay, accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. (Para 28)
Facts of the case:
Writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed on merits as also delay and laches.
The writ appeal filed after delay of 916 days was dismissed on that ground alone as the court refused to condone the same.
Finding of the Court:
Cause shown for inordinate delay of about a decade in filing writ petition and 916 days in filing LPA being not sufficient the delay cannot be condoned.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Key Points: - The judgment centers on condonation of inordinate delay and laches in filing a writ petition and subsequent LPA, and whether such delay can be condoned (!) (!) (!) . - It emphasizes that a liberal approach to condonation is allowed but not automatic; "sufficient cause" must be shown, considering accrued rights of opponents (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The Division Bench’s dismissal of the LPA due to 916 days delay was upheld, finding the delay not sufficiently explained and constituting laches, thereby denying merits consideration (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The Court reiterates that public interest does not automatically override delay or laches; the State’s delay does not grant an automatic concession to condone (!) (!) (!) . - The decision references Katiji and M/s Katiji principles on sufficient cause and the need for a rational, common-sense approach to condonation (!) (!) (!) . - It concludes that the appeals are devoid of merits and dismisses them; no costs awarded, pending applications disposed (!) .
JUDGMENT :
A.S. Bopanna, J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred by the appellant-University of Delhi through its Registrar to challenge the common judgment and order dated 29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to condone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to challenge the judgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the learned Single Judge had dismissed the W.P (C) No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.
3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to the decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short) who had allowed respondent no.13-M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd. to construct a high-rise multistory group housing society in the control zone of Zone-C in the University campus, without any height restriction. The construction permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the, “DMRC” for short) by permitting segregation of 2 hectares as a separate entity from the total 3 hectares of land, acquired for the metro station.
4. The principal contentions of the appellant University on the merits of the challenge were as follows:
(a) the permission sought by Respondent No. 13 (namely, M/s Young Builders Private Limited) for the proposed construction of a group housing society on the land originally owned by the Ministry of Defence in the University enclave is violative of the MPD-2021 and is against the larger public interest, given the fact that the project site in question and its vicinity are within the North Campus of the University and that it contains various historical and archaeological buildings, apart from it being the centre of higher education and advanced learning; and
(b) the change in the character of the subject land is impermissible in law, since the land having been acquired for public purpose for construction of the metro rail project, has suddenly been diverted to private commercial use and auctioned to private builder for building a group housing society in a manner contrary to the purpose and charter of incorporation of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC)
(c) The restriction on certain developments for Metro Station prescribed under Master Plan of Delhi – 2021 (‘MPD’ for short) was also a contention raised by the writ petitioner which imposed ban on construction of high-rise buildings in the control zone of the Delhi University. The location of various ladies’ hostels of the University in close vicinity of the proposed construction site was highlighted as an important privacy concern. The impediment to access of thousands of students, teachers at the entrance of the University was the other main contention raised in the writ petition.
5. On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that after construction of the University Metro Station, 2 hectares of land remained surplus and the housing project was intended to generate revenue for the DMRC as per the policy of the Government. The formal application made to the authorities for change of land use and approval secured for conversion of the land for residential use, was also highlighted by the DMRC.
6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire sequence refused to entertain the writ petition of the University including on the ground of delay and laches. In the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Court however observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and implementation of the Master Plan and, necessary approvals have been taken from various statutory authorities for the housing project. It was also observed that the change in the land use from “public” to “residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench Judgment in Adil Singh vs. Union of India (2010) 171 DLT 748. According to the Writ court, since it was a policy decision taken by the Government body and since the appellant University has failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide in the d
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