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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DEEPAK GUPTA, ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.
Shilpa Mittal – Appellant
Versus
State of NCT of Delhi and Another – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2020, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7678 of 2019
Decided On : 09-01-2020
(A) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 2(33) – Indian Penal Code,1860 – Section 304 – Heinous offence – Purpose of Act of 2015 is to ensure that children who come in conflict with law are dealt with separately and not like adults – Scheme of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that children should be protected – Treating children as adults is an exception to the rule – Even if a child commits a heinous crime, he is not automatically to be tried as an adult – Meaning of words ‘heinous offence’ cannot be expanded by removing the word ‘minimum’ from definition – Act does not deal with 4th category of offences viz., offence where maximum sentence is more than 7 years imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as ‘serious offences’ within meaning of the Act and dealt with accordingly till Parliament takes call on the matter – High Court directed to correct judgment and remove name of child in conflict with Law. (Paras 30, 31, 34, 36 and 37)
(B) Interpretation of Statute – Principles of Statutory Interpretation – Heinous offence – It is not necessary that intention of Legislature is one what Judge feels it should be – If intention of Legislature is clear then Court can get over inartistic or clumsy wording of statute – However, when wording of statute is clear but intention of Legislature is unclear, Court cannot add or subtract words from statute to give it a meaning which Court feels would fit into scheme of things – If intention of Legislature is absolutely clear from objects and reasons of the Act then Court can correct errors made by person who drafted legislation and may write down or omit/delete/add words to serve purpose of legislation and ensure that legislation is given a meaning which was intended to by Legislature – Normally an exception has to be given a restricted meaning. (Paras 28, 29 and 31)
Facts of the case:
Whether an offence prescribing a maximum sentence of more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years, can be considered to be a ‘heinous offence’ within the meaning of Section 2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015?” is the extremely important and interesting issue which arises in this case.
Findings of Court:
Copy of this judgment be sent to Secretary Law, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India and the Secretary, Home, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Registrar General, Delhi High Court, who shall ensure that the issue raised in this judgment is addressed by Parliament as early as possible or by Executive by issuing an Ordinance. Our directions shall continue to remain in force only till such action is taken.
Result : Appeal disposed of.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:
A juvenile who commits a heinous crime is not automatically to be tried as an adult. The decision depends on specific assessments and procedures laid down in the Juvenile Justice Act (!) (!) .
The interpretation of statutes must align with the clear intention of the Legislature. When the language of a law is unambiguous, courts should not add or remove words to alter its meaning. However, if the legislative intent is evident from the objectives and context, courts may correct drafting errors to reflect that intent (!) (!) (!) .
The purpose of the Juvenile Justice Act is to ensure children in conflict with law are dealt with separately from adults, emphasizing protection and reformative measures rather than punishment. Treating children as adults is an exception and should be applied restrictively (!) (!) .
The Act categorizes offences into petty, serious, and heinous, based on the maximum punishment prescribed. The definition of heinous offences includes those with minimum punishment of seven years or more, but does not extend to offences where only the maximum punishment exceeds seven years without a minimum sentence (!) (!) (!) .
There is a recognition of a legislative gap concerning offences where the maximum sentence exceeds seven years but no minimum sentence or a minimum less than seven years is prescribed. The Court cannot extend the definition of heinous offences to include such cases but suggests they should be treated as serious offences until the Legislature clarifies the position (!) .
The Court emphasizes that legislative intent should guide interpretation, and where ambiguity exists, courts should not rewrite laws but may interpret or fill gaps in a manner consistent with the law’s purpose, always respecting the limits of judicial power (!) (!) (!) .
The procedure for handling children accused of heinous offences involves a preliminary assessment of the child's mental and physical capacity to understand and commit the offence. This assessment is not a trial but a basis for deciding whether the child should be tried as an adult. If the child is above 16 and the offence is heinous, the assessment guides the subsequent legal process (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
Even if a child is to be tried as an adult, the law mandates that the child be kept in a place of safety until they reach the age of 21, with provisions for reformative and rehabilitative services during this period. The final order must include an individual care plan for rehabilitation (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
No child in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, emphasizing the protective intent of the Act (!) .
The Court recognizes that the law has a legislative gap regarding offences with maximum sentences over seven years but without a minimum sentence, and it cannot fill this gap through judicial interpretation. The Court directs that such cases be treated as serious offences until Parliament legislates further (!) .
The Court mandates that the identity of children in conflict with law should be kept confidential and that the judgment should be corrected to remove any disclosure of the child's name, in accordance with the law (!) .
The Court directs that a copy of this judgment be sent to relevant authorities to ensure that the legislative gap is addressed promptly, either through legislative amendments or executive action (!) .
Please let me know if you need further clarification or assistance.
JUDGMENT :
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. “Whether an offence prescribing a maximum sentence of more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years, can be considered to be a ‘heinous offence’ within the meaning of Section 2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015?” is the extremely important and interesting issue which arises in this case.
3. The factual background is that a juvenile ‘X’ is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC for short) which offence is punishable with a maximum punishment of imprisonment for life or up to 10 years and fine in the first part and imprisonment up to 10 years or fine, or both in the second part. No minimum sentence is prescribed.
4. The deceased in the motor vehicle accident was the brother of the appellant herein. The juvenile at the time of occurrence was above 16 years but below 18 years. The Juvenile Justice Board vide order dated 04.06.2016 held that juvenile ‘X’ has committed a heinous offence, and, therefore should be tried as an adult. The appeal filed to the Children’s Court was also dismissed on 11.02.2019. Thereafter, the juvenile ‘X’ through his mother approached the High Court of Delhi, which vide order 01.05.2019 held that since no minimum sentence is prescribed for the offence in question, the said offence did not fall within the ambit of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. This order is under challenge in this appeal.
5. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel and Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned counsel appearing for juvenile ‘X’.
6. To appreciate the contentions of the parties, it would be relevant to make a brief reference to the history and development of Juvenile Justice Act in India. In India there was no pan India Act to govern children, and some states had their own enactments, like the Madras Children Act, 1920. The Union had also enacted the Children Act of 1960 but this was only applicable to Union Territories and not the States. Therefore, this Court in Sheela Barse and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1986) 3 SCC 632 observed as follows:
“4. We have by our order dated August 5, 1986 called upon the State Governments to bring into force and to implement vigorously the provisions of the Childrens’ Acts enacted in the various States. But we would suggest that instead of each State having its own Childrens’ Act different in procedure and content from the Childrens’ Act in other States, it would be desirable if the Central Government initiates Parliamentary Legislation on the subject, so that there is complete uniformity in regard to the various provisions relating to children in the entire territory of the country.......”
It would be pertinent to mention that these observations were made in the context of developments happening internationally in the field of Child Rights. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice on 29th November, 1985. These Rules are commonly referred to as the Beijing Rules. Clause 4.1 of the Rules reads as follows:
“4.1 In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.”
7. As is apparent, the Rules did not fix any specified age and left it to each country to frame their domestic laws, keeping in view the various relevant doctrines.
8. After the adoption of the Beijing Rules, India enacted the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. In this Act, the juvenile was defined under Section 2(h) to mean a boy who has not attained the age of 16 years or a girl who has not attained the age of 18 year
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