The central legal point established in the judgment is the significance of complying with the requirements of Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 before the entry, search, and seizure by the officer, as emphasized by the Constitution Bench in Karnail Singh vs. State of Haryana.

JUDGMENT

1. Aggrieved by the conviction recorded under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, 'the Act') and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 10 years imposed, this appeal has been filed.

2. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

3. The matter lies within a short compass in view of the precise argument that has been made. This is with regard to the violation of Section 42 of the Act, the purport and effect of which has been laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh vs. State of Haryana , (2009) 8 SCC 539. Paragraph 35 of the Judgment is extracted below:

"35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul Rashid did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham hold that the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows:

(a) The officer on receiving the information [of the nature referred to in sub-section(1) of Section 42] from any person had to record it in writing in the register concerned and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1).

(b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior.

(c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42 (1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency.

(d) While total non-compliance of requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of Section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001."

4. From a reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench it would appear that the law laid down in this regard is that the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) of the Act should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the