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2018 Supreme(SC) 1523
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. Sikri, Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Chander Kant - Appellant
Versus
State Of Himachal Pradesh - Respondent
Criminal Appeal Nos. 74 of 2018 (Arising Out of Special Leave Petition(Crl.) Nos. 5036 of 2017)
Decided On : 12-01-2018
Mr. Govind Goel, Mr. Prijeshwar S. Kanwar and Mr. Ankit Goel, AOR, Advocates., for the Petitioner; Mr. D.K. Thakur, AAG, Mr. S. Ahmed, Mr. V.K. Sharma, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, AOR and Mr. Sanjeev Tyagi, Advocates., for the Respondents
The rejection of anticipatory bail does not preclude the consideration of an application for regular bail, as the grounds for both are different.
Headnote:
Bail - Anticipatory Bail - Regular Bail - Judicial Discipline
Fact of the Case:
The appellant was charged with offenses under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. After the rejection of anticipatory bail, the appellant sought and was granted regular bail by the Magistrate. The High Court subsequently cancelled the bail, leading to the present appeal.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court erred in law by assuming that the rejection of anticipatory bail precluded the Magistrate from considering the application for regular bail. The grounds for grant of anticipatory bail are different from those for regular bail. The High Court's cancellation of bail solely on the ground of rejected anticipatory bail was incorrect.
Issues: The main issue was the correctness of the High Court's decision to cancel the bail granted by the Magistrate based on the rejection of anticipatory bail.
Ratio Decidendi: The rejection of anticipatory bail does not preclude the consideration of an application for regular bail, as the grounds for both are different. The High Court's decision to cancel bail solely on the ground of rejected anticipatory bail was erroneous.
Final Decision: The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the present appeal was allowed. The complainant was advised to seek cancellation of bail through an appropriate application before the Trial Court, based on fresh grounds that arose after the grant of bail.
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The appellant herein is charged for the offences under Sections 420, 4 67, 4 68 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) in the First Information Report No. 235 of 2015 (FIR) registered with Police Station, Dharamshala, Distict Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. After registration of the said FIR and when the investigation was pending the appellant had sought anticipatory bail by filing a petition under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C), which was dismissed by the High Court on 26.08.2016. However, thereafter the appellant was arrested and taken into police custody and he sought regular bail by filing an application under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate and on 30.08.2016 bail was granted. This order of grant of bail was challenged by the complainant by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the High Court. The High Court has vide impugned order allowed the said petition and cancelled the bail granted to the appellant by the Magistrate on 30.08.2016. Challenging this order the present appeal is filed.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has made a neat submission to the effect that the entire order of the High Court proceeds on the basis that once the anticipatory bail was rejected by the High Court, it was not open to the Magistrate to grant bail thereafter and for grant of bail the appellant could only approach the High Court. In the process, the High Court has referred to various judgments laying down principles on "judicial discipline".
5. We find that the aforesaid approach of the High Court is erroneous in law. Merely, because an application for anticipatory bail preferred by the appellant was rejected, it could not be said that thereafter the Magistrate was precluded from even considering the application for grant of regular bail. It hardly needs to be emphasized that the grounds for grant of anticipatory bail are altogether different from that of regular bail. No doubt, anticipatory bail was rejected on 26.08.2016 and within four days thereafter-regular bail was granted. However, the High Court could not have cancelled the bail, as mentioned above, only on the ground that the anticipatory bail was rejected. The High Court is also wrong in observing that in the aforesaid circumstances the only remedy for the appellant was to approach the High Court alone and as if he was precluded from fling an application for regular bail before the Magistrate.
In view thereof we set aside the impugned order.
6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the complainant aswell as by the learned counsel for the State that immediately after the grant of bail by the Magistrate, the appellant had threatened the complainant with dire consequences, which forced the complainant to even lodge the FIR. That is an event that has occurred after the grant of bail, which may be a fresh ground to the complainant to seek cancellation of bail. For this purpose, it could be open to the complainant to move an appropriate application before the Trial Court and on moving such an application, the Trial Court shall consider the same in accordance with law.
7. With these observations, the present appeal is allowed.
