2018 Supreme(SC) 1917
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah, JJ.
Apsrtc & Anr. - Appellants
Versus
B. Venkataiah - Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 12246 of 2018 (Arising Out of SLP (Civil) No.36235 of 2014)
Decided On : 07-12-2018
The main legal point established in the judgment is that continuity of service can only be granted when an order of termination is set aside, and that granting continuity to a person found to have committed misconduct would place him on the same footing as other contractual employees with a clean record.
Headnote:
Termination - Continuity of Service - Article 226 of the Constitution of India - [DRIVER APPOINTMENT] - [Article 226 of the Constitution of India] - [Clause 6 of the operative order provided that in cases where no enquiry was conducted, the Corporation would be at liberty to conduct an enquiry in accordance with law, on the allegations of misconduct.]
Fact of the Case:
The respondent was appointed as a driver on contract, and a departmental enquiry was initiated against him, leading to his termination. After a departmental review, he was granted fresh appointment. The respondent approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking continuity of service and other benefits.
Finding of the Court:
The learned Single Judge and Division Bench directed the Corporation to extend the benefit of continuity of service to the workman from the date of termination until the date of his re-engagement, without any monetary benefit and only for the purpose of regularization. The appellant's appeal was allowed, setting aside the impugned judgments and ordering the seniority of the respondent workman to be counted from the date of his fresh appointment.
Issues: The main issue was whether the respondent was entitled to continuity of service and other benefits after being granted fresh appointment following a departmental enquiry and termination.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that continuity of service could only be granted when an order of termination is set aside, and that granting continuity to a person found to have committed misconduct would place him on the same footing as other contractual employees with a clean record. The court also emphasized that the learned Single Judge and Division Bench had lost sight of the facts of each individual case in their common order.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgments were set aside. The seniority of the respondent workman was ordered to be counted from the date of his fresh appointment.
JUDGMENT
M.R. Shah, J. - Leave granted.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 30.12.2013 passed by the Division Bench of High Court of judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No.1959 of 2013 by which the Division Bench has affirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 01.08.2012 passed in Writ Petition No.23552 of 2012, the original respondent-appellants herein corporation have preferred the present appeal.
3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under :
a. That the respondent herein was appointed as driver on contract, after undergoing a process of selection. He was working in Mushirabad I Depot, Hyderabad.
b. That a departmental enquiry was initiated against the workman.
c. That following the report of the Enquiry Officer his service came to be terminated.
d. After the dismissal of the departmental appeal and in the course of the departmental review, the Divisional Manager issued an order for the reengagement of the respondent on contract on 27.04.2011.
e. After his re-engagement the respondent initiated the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prayed to consider the order/proceedings dated 27.04.2011 and prayed for the continuity of service appointment benefits and all consequential benefits including regularization.
4. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition, holding that the matter was not res integra and was covered by an earlier judgment of a learned Single Judge dated 29.02.2012 in Writ Petition No.2786 of 2012. Though on behalf of the Corporation an effort was made to distinguish the earlier decision on the ground that in the present case a fullfledged enquiry has been held, this distinction did not find acceptance by the learned Single Judge. On the contrary, it was held that in the previous case, the learned Judge had found that the enquiry was not in keeping with the principles of natural justice. Moreover, in the view of the Single Judge, once the Corporation had granted a largesse in the form of a fresh employment, the workman should not be deprived of the benefit of continuity of service for the limited purpose of regularisation. Hence, in terms of the direction in the earlier decision, the petition was disposed of by directing the Corporation to extend the benefit of continuity of service to the workman from the date of termination until the date of his re-engagement except for the period when he was absent. This was, however, without any monetary benefit and was directed to count only for regularisation.
5. The above order of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench in a Writ Appeal.
6. Mr. Gourab Banerji, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that there was a manifest error on the part of both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. In the present case, a disciplinary enquiry was held against the workman after which an initial decision was taken to terminate him from service. In a departmental review, he was granted fresh appointment. Neither the termination nor the order granting him fresh appointment as a contract driver were challenged. As a matter of fact, it has also been submitted that in certain other cases, the workmen had taken recourse to proceedings before the Industrial Court but in the present case that was not done. Be that as it may, the learned Single Judge relied on the earlier decision and issued directions, to govern the entire batch of cases. This direction was confirmed by the Division Bench without having regard to the facts of individual cases.
7. Since the order of the learned Single Judge in the present case, was exclusively based on the earlier decision dated 29.02.2012, a copy of that judgment has been placed on the record. The judgment of the Single Judge indicates that the earlier case also dealt with persons who were working as contract employees who were appointed after a