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2019 Supreme(SC) 2072

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
D.Y. Chandrachud, Hemant Gupta, JJ.
Birendra Prasad Sah - Appellant
Versus
The State Of Bihar & Ors. - Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 868 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10811 of 2018)
Decided On : 08-05-2019

Advocates Appeared:
Nagendra Rai, Sr. Adv., Prerna Singh, Adv., Shantanu Sagar, AOR, Aakash and Priya Ranjan, Advs., for the Appellant; Keshav Mohan, Rishi K. Awasthi, Advs., Santosh Kumar-I, AOR, Jay Savla, Sr. Adv., Arvind Gupta, AOR and Sanjeev Kumar Verma, Adv., for the Respondents

The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of issuing notices within thirty days and the provisions for condonation of delay under Section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Headnote:

Delay condoned - Negotiable Instruments Act - 138 - Summary: The court considered the issuance of legal notices and the delay in filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It interpreted the provisions of Section 138 and 142, emphasizing the requirement of issuing notices within thirty days and the condonation of delay. The court held that the delay in filing the complaint was condoned for sufficient cause and allowed the appeal, restoring the complaint to the trial court.

Fact of the Case:

The dispute involved dishonored cheques, legal notices, and the delay in filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the delay in filing the complaint was condoned for sufficient cause and allowed the appeal, restoring the complaint to the trial court.

Issues: The issues revolved around the validity of legal notices, the delay in filing the complaint, and the condonation of delay under Section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the delay in filing the complaint was condoned for sufficient cause, emphasizing the requirement of issuing notices within thirty days and the provisions for condonation of delay under Section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the order quashing the proceedings was set aside, restoring the complaint to the trial court.

Judgement Key Points

The reason for the delay in this case was due to the appellant's inability to serve the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 despite repeated efforts and queries with the postal department, as no proof of service was provided. Consequently, the appellant issued a second legal notice on 26 February 2016. The appellant explained that the delay in filing the complaint was caused by the difficulty in serving the initial notice and the subsequent need to issue a second notice, which was beyond the initial thirty-day period stipulated for issuing notices under the relevant provisions. The court found that the appellant had provided sufficient cause for the delay, which was considered during the condonation of delay proceedings (!) (!) (!) .


JUDGMENT

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. - Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 10 May 2018 by which an order taking cognizance of an offence Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1888 (sic 1881) [1] has been quashed.

4. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:

5. The dispute arises over two cheques drawn on the State Bank of India in the amount of Rs. 36,00,000 and Rs. 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The Appellant received the memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015 intimating the dishonour of the cheque. According to the Appellant, between 14 February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but no proof of service was provided. Accordingly, on 26 February 2016, a second legal notice was issued. This was replied to by the second Respondent on 2 March 2016. Eventually, a complaint Under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016.

6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai by an order dated 14 July 2016, condoned the delay in filing the complaint. While taking cognizance, the CJM issued summons to the second Respondent. The second Respondent instituted revisional proceedings before the Sessions Judge which were rejected on 8 March 2017. In a further recourse to the High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Single Judge held that the complaint Under Section 138 was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days prescribed Under Section 138 as a result of which the proceedings were quashed.

7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in MSR Leathers v. S Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177 a three judge Bench of this Court has taken the view that the issuance of successive notices is permissible under the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the delay in the institution of the complaint was condoned by the CJM Under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second Respondent submitted that:

    (i) The second legal notice dated 26 February 2016 was sent beyond a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015 and hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint;

    (ii) If at all, the complaint could have only been instituted on the basis of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour;

    (iii) The complaint which was lodged on 11 May 2016 was beyond the stipulated period from the date of issuance of the first notice;

    (iv) The CJM had condoned the delay which had occurred in the institution of the complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second notice; and

    (v) In the decision of the three judge Bench in MSR Leathers (supra), there was a re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be within the ambit of the law.

9. Section 138 provides thus:

    138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. -

    Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any

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