ORDER :

1. Heard Learned Solicitor General appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and Dr. A.M. Singhvi learned Senior Counsel for Respondent Nos.3 to 5.

2. This Court, speaking through several different Benches, has explained the provisions of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter Act of 2013). This includes the oft and ubiquitously cited three-Judge Bench decision in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183. An adumbration of the law can also be found in the decision of this very Bench in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Jagjit Singh in Civil Appeal No. 2592 of 2015, delivered on 27.2.2015.

3. At the commencement of the hearing of this SLP, we were of the view that this SLP also deserved similar dismissal. However, the learned Solicitor General has vehemently contended that the facts obtaining in the present SLP are singularly and significantly different to the others, and that the present matter requires detailed consideration. He has emphasized that there is no controversy regarding the fact that the possession of the subject land has been taken over by the Delhi Development Authority (for short “the DDA”) several years ago; the latter asserts that this transpired in January 2000. The learned Solicitor General has painstakingly taken us through the litigation filed by late Khyali Ram and continued by his legal representatives, as also the other Respondents who claim to have purchased these lands from Khyali Ram. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 in which, in essence, it was concluded that it was legally impermissible for Khyali Ram to have sold the lands to the Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 after the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 on 24.10.1961, followed by the Declaration under Section 6 on 4.1.1969, sequentially followed by the issuance of Section 9 Notification on 26.4.1983 and the publication of the Award. The conveyance of the land by Khyali Ram to Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 before us is beyond cavil.

4. The dismissal of writ petition filed by Khyali Ram by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court as well as in Appeal by its Division Bench, followed by the dismissal in this Court is beyond challenge. This is also the position so far as the contentions and prayers in the writ petitions filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are concerned. It also appears that Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 had issued notices to the DDA setting up their respectively claims of ownership, in denial of any subsisting ownership of Khyali Ram and/or his legal representatives. Therefore, the dispute inter se the Respondents was well within the knowledge of not only the Land Acquisition Collector (for short “the LAC”) but also the DDA, who avowedly is the beneficiary of this acquisition. The fruitless challenge to the subject acquisition and the Award that has been passed, at the instance of Khyali Ram as also Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to whom the former endeavoured to convey the land is, as already mentioned, also beyond disputation.

5. Predicated on these facts, it is contended by the learned Solicitor General that the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act are facially attracted; and that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation as well as several other precedents are inapplicable. Repeated reliance has been made to paragraphs 31 and 38 of Meera Sahni. It is contended that since there was genuinely a controversy as to which party was entitled to compensation, the action of DDA in depositing the compensation pursuant to orders passed by the High Court of Delhi in December 2011 would legitimize this action and complete the acquisition under the old Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, would be of no avail to the Respo