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1962 Supreme(SC) 468

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar and K.N. Wanchoo, JJ.
Girjashankar Kashiram And Others - Appellants
Versus
Gujarat Spinning And Weaving Co. Ltd., And Another. - Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 189 of 1961
Decided On : 30-01-1962

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant :C.T. Daru and V.L. Narasimhamoorthy, Advocates, and E. Udayarathnam and S.S. Shukla, Advocates of Shukla and Co.
For the Respondent 1:C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (I.M. Nanavati, Advocate and J.B. Dadachanji and O.C. Mathur, Advocates of J.B. Dadachanji and Co..
For the Respondent 2: N.M. Barot, Secretary of the Textile Labour Association.

Where a Representative Union appears in any proceeding under the Act, no one else can be allowed to appear not even the employee at whose instance the proceedings might have begun under Section 42(4).

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - REPRESENTATIVE UNION - APPEARANCE IN PROCEEDINGS - EXCLUSION OF EMPLOYEE - INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 27-A, 32 AND 33 OF THE BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1947.

Fact of the Case:

A dispute arose between the old company and its workmen regarding bonus. The dispute was settled before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the workmen agreed not to press for compensation for their discharge. Later, some workmen gave a notice under Section 42(1) of the Act claiming compensation for the closure. The Textile Labour Association (Association), a Representative Union, appeared before the Labour Court and contended that the application should be dismissed in view of the compromise. The Labour Court accepted this contention and dismissed the application. The Industrial Court also dismissed the appeal filed by the workmen. The workmen then filed a petition before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, which was summarily rejected.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the provisions of the Act are plain and provide that where a Representative Union appears in any proceeding, it alone, to the exclusion even of the employee who might have made an application under Section 42(4), is entitled to carry on with the proceedings and the employee concerned has no locus standi in the matter after the application has been filed by him, if the Representative Union chooses to appear.

Issues: Whether an employee making an application under Section 42(4) of the Act is debarred from appearing in the Labour or Industrial Court and carrying on with his application even though the Representative Union makes an appearance.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted Sections 27-A, 32 and 33 of the Act and held that Section 27-A places a complete ban on the appearance of an employee in any proceedings under the Act once it has commenced except through the representative of employees. However, there are two exceptions to this ban contained in Sections 32 and 33. Section 32 gives power to the authorities under the Act to permit an employee himself to appear even though a representative of employees may have appeared but this permission cannot be granted where the Representative Union has appeared as a representative of employees. Section 33 allows an employee to appear through any person in certain proceedings only even though a representative of employees might have appeared; but here again it is subject to this that no one else, not even the employee who might have made the application, will have the right to appear if a Representative Union has put in appearance as the representative of employees.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

Wanchoo, J.

1. This appeal by special leave against the order of the Bombay High Court summarily dismissing the petition of the appellants under Article 227 of the Constitution raises an important question with regard to the right of a Representative Union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 11 of 1947, (hereinafter called "the Act") to appear in a proceeding under the Act to the exclusion of an employee desiring a change under Section 42(4) of the Act. The question arises in this way. The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Company Limited (hereinafter called "the old Company") closed its business on May 14, 1953 and sold its assets to the Tarun Commercial Mills Company Limited (hereinafter called "the new Company"). The old Company had discharged all its workmen when it closed its business which happened before Section 25-F relating to retrenchment was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947). The new Company restarted the business after a week and took in its service the workmen of the old Company. It appears that at the time the closure took place a dispute was pending between the old Company and its workmen with respect to bonus. As the closure had taken place while that dispute was pending, the Textile Labour Association (hereinafter called "the Association"), which is a Representative Union of the textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad, filed an application under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 before the Labour Appellate Tribunal where the dispute was pending. In that matter there was a compromise, and though, according to the old Company, there was no available surplus to give bonus, the old Company agreed to pay bonus by way of settlement to the extent of ?th of the earnings of the workmen for the year in dispute; and in consideration of this the Association on behalf of all the workmen discharged as a result of closure agreed not to press for any compensation for their discharge and the workmen who accepted the bonus by this agreement gave an undertaking not to claim compensation in any other way in any future proceeding. This happened in March 1955. Thereafter in July 1956, 376 persons who had been in the employ of the old Company and were a minority of its workmen gave a notice under Section 42(1) of the Act and claimed compensation for the closure which had taken place in 1953. As no settlement could be arrived at between the parties this was followed by an application under Section 42(4) of the Act before the Labour Court in October 1956 and these workmen claimed that they should be paid adequate compensation for the closure of the mill in view of their past services. To this application both the old Company and the new Company were made parties. The application was opposed by both the companies on various grounds with which we are however not concerned in the present appeal. In January 1957, the Association made an appearance before the Labour Court and contended that the application should be dismissed in view of the compromise which had been arrived at before the Labour Appellate Tribunal in 1953. The Labour Court accepted this contention and dismissed the application.

2. Thereupon some of the workmen went in appeal to the Industrial Court and their contention seems to have been that, though no individual can be permitted to appear in any proceeding where the Representative Union appears as representative of employees, in this case the action of the Association after its appearance in not supporting the case of the workmen before the Labour Court was mala fide; therefore the Association should not have been allowed to appear on behalf of the employees who had applied to the Labour Court and they should be permitted to carry on their application. This contention was rejected by the Industrial Court, which was of opinion that it was not for an industrial court to go into the question of bonafides or mala fides of the appearance of a Representative

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