A female Hindu who has gifted away property and parted with possession is not considered to be in possession of the property and cannot become the full owner under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

JUDGMENT :

Bhargava, J.

(May 1, 1967)

1. This Appeal relates to property which belonged to one Akwak Singh, who died in the year 1894, leaving his widow Smt. Mehtab Kaur. In the year 1926, Smt. Mehtab Kaur gifted the disputed land to Harnam Singh, the predecessor -in interest of the appellants. The collaterals of Akwak Singh at that time challenged the gift by filing a Suit for declaration that Smt. Mehtab Kaur, the widow, being a limited owner, could not make a gift of the property, and that the gift would not be binding on them as reversioners after her death. The defence taken, inter alia, in that Suit was that the property had come to Smt. Mehtab Kaur under a Will executed by Akwak Singh, so that she was absolute owner of the property and was entitled to make the gift. The Suit was dismissed, but, on Appeal, the Appellate Court held that the Will was not genuine and, consequently, decreed the Suit holding that the deed of gift will not be binding on the reversioners after the death of Smt. Mehtab Kaur. That decree became final, so that the claim of succession of Smt. Mehtab Kaur under the Will was finally negatived.

2. On 17th June, 1956, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (No. 30 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") came into force. Smt. Mehtab Kaur died on 16th October, 1957, and then on 21st January, 1958, the present respondents, as reversioners of Akwak Singh, brought a Suit for possession of the property, which had been gifted to Harnam Singh, against the appellants who had succeeded on the ground that, on the enforcement of the Act, Smt. Mehtab Kaur had become full owner of the property and consequently, the appellants were entitled to retain the property as donees under the deed of gift executed by her. The Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, but on Appeal, the first appellate Court decreed the Suit in respect of ¾th share in the disputed property, holding that Smt. Mehtab, Kaur did not become full owner of the property on the enforcement of the Act. The Suit in respect of ¼th share was not decreed on the ground that the reversioners, who were entitled to that share, had not joined in the Suit as plaintiffs. In second Appeal, the High Court of Punjab upheld this decision of the first Appellate Court. The appellants have, therefore, come up to this Court in this Appeal by special leave.

3. On the facts stated above, the only question that falls for decision is whether Smt. Mehtab Kaur had become full owner of the property when the Act came into force on 17th June, 1956. The view accepted by the High Court is that, since Smt. Mehtab Kaur had already gifted the property to Harnam Singh and had parted with the possession of the property, it could not be held that this property was possessed by her when the Act came into force and, consequently, the provisions of Section 14(l) of the Act did not become applicable. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is correct and must be upheld.

4. The provisions of Section 14(1) came up for consideration before this Court in four cases. The earliest case was that of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Sotra Veerayya, 1959 Suppl 1 SCR 968 in which, on the date on which the Act came into force, the property in dispute was in possession of a person purported to have been adopted as a son by the widow, but his adoption was held to be invalid. The question to be considered was whether the property could be held to be possessed by the widow, even though the actual physical possession was with another person, whose claim of adoption by tho widow had been negatived. The next case was that of Brahamdeo Singh v. Deomani Missir, C.A. No. 120 of 1960 decided on 15.10.1962. In that case, the widow of the last male owner had transferred the property by two sale-deeds in favour of the purchasers before the Act came into force, and the reversioners claimed possession of the property pleading that the widow was not possessed of the property at the commencement of the Act, as