JUDGMENT :

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against order dated 3.8.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. Lucknow Bench, whereby he dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant questioning the legality of order dated 26.2.1993 passed by Deputy Director, Consolidation, Bahraich in Revision No.53/120 filed by the appellant under Section 48 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the ground that while dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge neither adverted to factual matrix of the case nor considered the grounds on which the appellant had challenged the order of the Deputy Director, Consolidation. To put it differently, the impugned order does not satisfy the test of the speaking order which every judicial court and quasi-judicial authority is required to pass while deciding lis between the parties.

5. In Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, this Court, after considering various judicial precedents emphasised that judicial courts and quasi-judicial authorities must pass reasoned order. The principles culled out in that judgment are extracted below:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudiciality.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) if a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.)

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. Univ